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     Abstract 
Conventional thinking in participatory democracy theory contends that public participation 
improves the quality and effectiveness of government. Effective public participation promotes 
accountability, transparency, inclusivity and responsiveness in governance. The assumption is that 
the benefits of public participation are to be found in the efficiency of service delivery by 
municipalities. This dissertation investigates the idea that the benefits of public participation are 
outweighed by the cost to efficiency in service delivery. Public participation has negative effects 
on service delivery in local government due to the time and resources required for effective public 
participation. It is argued that the correlation between public participation and service delivery 
efficiency is also mainly theoretical, and not based on convincing empirical evidence. Service 
delivery efficiency in local government is influenced by other factors such as the ability of the 
municipal management and governance structures to resist party political interference through 
structural design, the capacity of the municipality to plan and deliver basic services within its 
jurisdiction, and the economic and financial resources available to the municipality.  
The dissertation concludes that there is a need to thoroughly investigate the impact of 
intergovernmental relations on local government service delivery, given the legislative positioning 
of municipalities in relation to other spheres of government. The functionality and efficiency of 
local municipalities is dependent on the relations between the local government and the district 
municipality, or the local government and the provincial government. The role of district 
municipalities is therefore questioned, and it is suggested that further research on the subject is 
imperative.  
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Chapter 1: Introduction  
In 1994, South Africa emerged from one of the most brutal and unjust regimes in modern times: 
Apartheid. This regime thrived in the oppression of the majority by a minority through repressive 
laws and the highly skewed allocation of resources. Through comprehensive legislation, 
communities were separated into four broad categories (White, Colored, Indian and African) and 
these were also hierarchies according to which the distribution of resources would be allocated1.  
The structure of government and powers given to each of the institutions of government were such 
that they ensured that quality basic services were not provided to non-white communities at the 
                                                          
1 Apartheid laws included the Prohibition of Mixed Marriages [Act 55 of 1949], which banned marriages between 
white people and people of other races; The Immorality Amendment [Act 21 of 1950], which illegalised extra-
marital sexual activities between white people and people of other races; The Population Registration [Act 30 of 
1950], which provided for the establishment of a central register to divide the population groups to White, Native, 
Indian and Coloured;  The Group Areas [Act 41 of 1950], which essentially made it illegal for non-whites to leave in 
areas designated as white, by assigning different races to different areas of the country; The Suppression of 
Communism [Act 44 of 1950] outlawed the Communist Party and other formations that subscribed or were 
considered to subscribe  to communism, as defined by the Act; The Native Building Workers [Act 27 of 1951] 
limited places in which skilled non-white labourers in the construction industry could work; The Separate 
Representation of Voters [46 of 1951] sought to remove all non-whites from the common voters roll through 
revoking the coloured qualified vote system of the Cape;  the Bantu Authorities [Act 68 of 1951] which established 
Bantu authorities with some jurisdiction in traditional homelands, based on hierarchy of chiefs and councillors; The 
Native (Bantu) Laws Amendment [Act 54 of 1952] put further restrictions and limited the number of black people 
who could be granted permanent residency status in urban areas; The Natives (Abolition of Passes and Co-
ordination of Documents) [Act 67 of 1952] was aimed at putting further restrictions on the movement of black 
people in urban areas by requiring black people to carry pass documents with their personal information, including 
employment details. The pass had to be obtained within 72 hours for purposes of employment and women also 
required to carry pass documents; The Natives Labour Settlement of Disputes [Act 48 of 1953] made it illegal for 
black people to strike; The Reservation of Separate Amenities [Act 49 of 195] legalised the segregation of public 
facilities according to race and to exclude people from certain public facilities according to race; The Bantu 
Education [Act 47 of 1953] legalised the segregation of educational facilities according to race and ensured that the 
State controlled the education, particularly of black people; The Natives Resettlement [Act 19 of 1954] legalised 
the forced removal of black people by government from areas close to or surrounding the magisterial district of 
Johannesburg, particularly from Sophiatown; The Bantu Prohibition of Interdicts [Act 64 of 1956] made it illegal for 
a black person to interdict the government from banishing such a black person from an area; The Natives Taxation 
and Development [Act 38 of 1958] provided a sliding scale taxation black men from the age of 18 when men of 
other races were only required to pay tax from the age of 21; The Promotion of Bantu Self-Government [Act 46 of 
1959] provided for the establishment of 8 Bantustans with self-determination for the different tribes and the 
abolishment of parliamentary representation of black people, with the ultimate aim of depriving black people of 
any South African citizenship; The Prisons [Act 8 of 159] made it illegal to report on prisons conditions without 
prior authorisation by government; The Extension of University Education [Act 45 of 1959] extended the racial 
segregation of education through by establishing and compelling students of particular races to attend certain 
racially designated universities; The Unlawful Organizations [Act 24 of 1960] banned the African National Congress 
and the Pan African Congress; The Urban Bantu Councils [Act 79 of 1961] provided for the election of black people 
as chairpersons of municipal councils with limited administrative duties; The General Laws Amendment [Act 37 of 
1963] empowered government to detain indefinitely without charge and without access to legal counsel anyone 
deemed have been participating in political crimes;  
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same standard as in white communities. This meant that, by-and-large, black communities had 
limited or no access to quality basic services from their local governments. They had limited or no 
access to fresh running water, sanitation, housing and electricity, amongst others. Even in instances 
where such were provided, they were often not of the same standard. Quality was the reserve of 
the white people. Black2 people had to get by with whatever was provided to them.  
With the advent of democracy in 1994 certain expectations were developed by citizens, especially 
the previously disenfranchised, on the benefits of democracy. For the largely poor black majority, 
democracy meant government providing jobs, housing, basic services for free or at very low prices 
to the people. Democracy meant not just the right and ability to choose leaders, but also the right 
to tangible developmental benefits, as envisaged in the Freedom Charter of 1955.3 The debate was 
also captured in the resultant socio economic policy of the ANC government—the Reconstruction 
and Development Programme.4 For some, democracy meant the same or similar quality of life for 
whites and non-white people. This ideal was profoundly articulated by Nelson Mandela in 1964 
when he stated, “I have cherished the ideal of a democratic and free society in which all persons 
live together in harmony and with equal opportunities. It is an ideal for which I hope to live and 
achieve. But if needs be, it is an ideal for which I am prepared to die.”5 
In the quest to address such expectations and to improve the efficiency and quality of local 
government services, the South African government introduced a number of legislative and policy 
instruments since 1994. Amongst these was the restructuring of the municipal structures through 
the Municipal Structures Act of 1998 and the Municipal Systems [Act 32 of 2000] as amended in 
2003. There have also been a number of policy instruments that have been put in place to support 
the legislation, such as the Policy on Batho Pele. All such pieces of legislation emanate from the 
Constitution of the country which places the responsibility of providing basic services largely on 
the local government, in the form of municipalities6. Section 152 of the Constitution specifically 
                                                          
2 For purposes of clarity, black people refers to the previously oppressed groups involving coloureds, Indians and 
Africans. 
3 Congress of the People. 1955. The Freedom Charter. Online: 
http://www.historicalpapers.wits.ac.za/inventories/inv_pdfo/AD1137/AD1137-Ea6-1-001-jpeg.pdf  
4 African National Congress. 1994. The Reconstruction and Development Programme. Online: 
https://omalley.nelsonmandela.org/omalley/index.php/site/q/03lv02039/04lv02103/05lv02120/06lv02126.htm  
5 Mandela, Nelson. 1964. I Am Prepared to Die: Statement from the Dock at the Opening of the Defence Case in the 
Rivonia Trial.  
6 Constitution of South Africa Act, 1996 [Act No. 108 of 1996] 
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states that local government has a responsibility to (a) provide democratic and accountable 
government for local communities; (b) ensure the provision of services to communities in a 
sustainable manner; (c) to promote social and economic development; (d) to promote a safe and 
healthy environment; and (e) to encourage the involvement of communities and community 
organization in the matters of local government.  
In addition, government reports indicate widespread improvements on the delivery of essential 
services. According to the Department of Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs, 91% 
of the population has access to clean potable water; 77% has access to basic sanitation; 73% have 
access to electricity. These figures are based on the population of about 50 million South Africans, 
many of them black.7   
However, despite this there has been a large and growing number of public protests over 
dissatisfaction with the pace and quality of service delivery at the municipal level in South Africa, 
over the past few years. Piper and Chanza8 state that according to government there had been about 
5085 public protests related to poor service delivery at local government level country-wide before 
March 2006. This figure has grown substantially since then. Often these protests take place in 
largely poor, black9 areas of the country where the many, especially the youth, are unemployed. 
More often than not, these protests are violent, involving road blockages, stone-throwing, tyre 
burnings, destruction of public and private property and clashes with police. In some cases, the 
protests have become so violent that they have resulted in the deaths of people. To understand this, 
the local government SETA commissioned a study into the causes and possible solutions to the 
public service delivery protests.10  
                                                          
7 Stats SA. 2011 
8Piper, Laurence and Nonhlanhla Chanza. “Too ‘Raw’ to Represent: the Marginalization of Youth in Msunduzi Ward 
Committees.” In Buccus, Imraan. Et al (eds.) Critical Dialogue: PublicParticipation in Review. Vol. 2. No. 2. 2006. 
Pp. 18-23 
9 For the purposes of the study, black refers to those people who, prior to 1994, were disenfranchised by the 
Apartheid regime because of the colour of the skins. These are the people sometimes referred to as non-white and 
they included Africans, Indians/Asians and Coloured people.  
10 See Peliwe, Lolwana, et al. Undated. Mitigating Service Delivery Protest Through Skills Development And 
Deployment: Research Project Commissioned By The Local Government SETA. University of Johannesburg. Online: 
http://cdn.lgseta.co.za/resources/performance_monitoring_and_reporting_documents/Mitigating%20Service%20
Delivery%20Protest.pdf 
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At the heart of many of these protests seems to be issues of the delivery or lack thereof (perceived 
or real) of basic services such as housing, water, electricity, sanitation and health infrastructure 
development. A major characteristic of many of these public demonstrations is the complaint that 
the delivery is very slow, non-existent, shady or downright inhumane.11 For instance, communities 
in Cape Town and the Free State took to the streets complaining about dehumanizing open air 
toilets. These public protests take place at the time where there is a growing debate and focus on 
enhancing democracy and service delivery through deepening the level of participation of the 
public at all levels of government: most importantly in local government. However, the structures 
put in place to achieve this - where they have been established - such as Ward Committees and 
Local Development Committees, do not seem to be functioning effectively for a number of 
reasons: which include resources, funding and the actual powers to make decisions. In some 
instances, these structures are either politicized to the extent that their functionality squarely rests 
on the political dynamics of the context; or, as with some instances, structures are deliberately 
impeded from performing their functions.  This may include the inability by people serving on the 
committees to either access or to understand the relevant documents, processes and policies. As 
such there continues to be a gap between service delivery and public participation, especially in 
local government12.  
Problems associated with many of the more than 200 municipalities in the country are well 
documented. The 2009 State of Local Government in South Africa (prepared by the Department of 
Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs) paints a dim picture of the ability of 
municipalities to meet their responsibilities. The reported stated inter alia that many municipalities 
were struggling financially due to non-payment of services by residents and lack of, or inadequate, 
financial accounting skills and systems. “By the end of 2007, the national municipal debt was 
around R32 billion, a figure that is estimated to be growing at R3.2 billion a year”.13 Due to this, 
                                                          
11 It is worth noting that there allegations on the part of government that some of these protests are fueled by 
elements in society that use people’s genuine concerns for their own personal agendas against government or 
certain officials of government. While not ignoring this serious allegation, this research focuses on the nature of 
the protests and how many participating in it see the action as.  
12 In 2009 the Department of Cooperative Government and Traditional Affairs published a report on “The State of 
Local Government in South Africa”. This report provides a comprehensive diagnosis of the problems facing local 
government in the country. And it argued that a number of municipalities are showing signs of serious distress in 
many of their functions and responsibilities.  
13 Stanton, Anne. 2009. Decentralization and Municipalities in South Africa: An Analysis of the Mandate to Deliver 
Basic Services. University of KwaZulu-Natal. Pg. 15.  
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some municipalities have had to be put under administration by provincial governments to sort 
their finances and to revive service delivery. For instance, in 2010 the Msunduzi Municipality was 
put under administration for maladministration and serious financial constraints for having failed 
to collect over R400 million in debts.14  
However, even where these structures are effective, there is still the question of efficiency (speed 
and quality) of service delivery as the local governments are required by law to create space for 
meaningful public participation, while also required to deliver services efficiently and effectively. 
Public participation requires substantial resources and time if it is to be effective. Such resources 
and time could be spent delivering services. This is a difficult balance to strike. And this may be a 
contributory factor in the public protests. 
Therefore, this study departs from the premise that these problems are a reflection of a fundamental 
compatibility problem between efficiency and democracy. In other words, public participation 
delays or slows service delivery through slow decision-making processes, even where there are 
effective public participation mechanisms or instruments. In this regard, the type of public 
participation that is referred to here is that which promotes citizen involvement in decision-making 
beyond just elections and public opinion surveys, in accordance with the Constitution of the 
Republic of South Africa of 1996. This ultimately contributes to the public protests over service 
delivery. There are several studies that have attempted to explain the problems of service delivery 
through an analysis of the competencies and skills shortage at municipal levels; some have focused 
more on the impact of corruption and resource scarcity as the main culprits. The focus of this 
research, however, is to scrutinize the relationship between public participation as it is practiced 
in local government in South Africa and service delivery in the same context.  
 
1.1 Rationale for the study  
The topic is relevant in the current South African context as there are many concerns being raised, 
and protests, by citizens in different parts of the country about service delivery. In some of these 
protests citizens object to the way in which the authorities govern and the speed at which basic 
                                                          
14 See The Witness Newspaper. 2011. Msunduzi Struggling to Collect Debt. Online: 
https://www.news24.com/Archives/Witness/Msunduzi-struggling-to-collect-debt-20150430  
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services are delivered. This environment provides the ideal conditions in which systems and 
policies in place can be reviewed so as to understand their effectiveness and compatibility with 
each other. It also provides for an opportunity to question what is otherwise regarded as common 
knowledge and to propose new systems and approaches.    
The objective of the study is to understand the problems of service delivery in South African local 
government from a democratic systems’ point of view. The aim is to provide a proposal that seeks 
to advance a more relevant and practical approach to public participation in the South African local 
government, which would meet constitutional and democratic principles and improve efficiency 
in service delivery. The gap in the literature and perhaps political focus, as well, is that the policy 
framework, which is the interpretation and application of the constitutional and democratic 
principle of public participation, has not been considered as a possible hurdle in efficient service 
delivery. The many structures and forums which are meant to enhance public participation could 
adversely affect the level of efficiency in the delivery of services. Current literature in the South 
African context, is incomplete as it does not thoroughly look at the possible dichotomy between 
democracy and efficiency. There is an assumption that effective democracy is also efficient. 
Several reports of service delivery in South Africa point towards problems in the speed and quality 
of service delivery in local government. Yet few questions are raised about the impact of public 
participation. Barichievy15, having conducted research on the impact of public participation on 
decision-making in municipalities, concludes that greater democracy in decision-making comes at 
cost to efficiency. But Barichievy limits his focus only to decision-making and does not explore 
the component of service delivery.  
Furthermore, despite the widely accepted critical role that local government plays in the post-
Apartheid South Africa, the field remains rather disappointingly understudied. Only recently has 
there been a growing focus on local government as a field of research. As such, from an academic 
standpoint, there is relatively a small body of literature on South African local government, which 
leaves open a number of gaps in the literature. For instance, there are limited studies on how the 
structural arrangement of local government in the country compare to other countries: studies such 
                                                          
15Barichievy, Kevin. 2006. Efficiency versus Democracy: Unpacking the Decision-Making Process in South 
African Cities. University of KwaZulu-Natal, Pietermaritzburg.  
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as the one conducted by McKinlay Douglas Limited16 in which local government structures in 
New Zealand are compared to other countries. Predominantly, the reports on the performance of 
Local Government in South Africa are produced by the office of the Auditor-General or 
government departments.  Often these reports look at financial management and linear quantifiable 
service delivery indicators17.   
The research question the study seeks to explore is whether public participation, as it is practiced 
in South African local government, has an unintended negative effect on efficient service delivery 
in terms of slowing down the decision-making processes and ultimately the efficiency of service 
provision. The problem therefore is the balance between the constitutional and democratic 
requirement of effective public participation, on the one hand, and efficiency on the other. While 
there might be other factors influencing the efficiency of service delivery, such as capacity and 
corruption, this research only seeks to examine the effects of public participation on efficient 
service delivery.    
In attempting to address the main research question, the dissertation asked a number of questions18. 
1. What do the case studies (Msunduzi Local Municipality and eThekwini Metro) tell us about 
the relationship between public participation and service delivery? 
2. What, if any, is the relationship between effective/ineffective public participation and 
service delivery efficiency? 
3. Do different types of municipalities have the same or similar challenges around these 
issues, or does this differ according to the type and size of the municipalities? 
4. Is there a way of ensuring the efficiency of service delivery in local government while at 
the same time broadening and deepening the involvement of the public in the municipal 
process without the two conflicting with each other?  
5. To what extent do the complex and sometimes contrasting agendas of civil society, political 
parties and traditional authorities affect public participation and the efficiency of service 
delivery in local government?  
                                                          
16McKinlay Douglas Limited. 2006. Local Government Structure and Efficiency: A Report Prepared for Local 
Government New Zealand  
17Seethe Department of Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs. 2009. State of Local Government in South 
Africa: Overview Report. 
18 These are not arranged in any particular order.  
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6. What new approach to public participation could be more effective in the South African 
local government service delivery context?  
 
1.2 Research approach 
In philosophy, the concept of knowledge19 has received considerable attention and debate through 
the field of epistemology.  The debate concerning knowledge stems from an ancient Plato’s 
definition of knowledge being “a justified true belief”20. For a person to ‘know’ A, A must be true 
and real, the person must believe A to be true and the person must be justified in believing A to be 
true. It is only under these conditions that knowledge can exist. ‘Justified’ in this case has to be 
predicated on some form of evidence or experience. Having been initially generally accepted by 
philosophers, this definition and the subsequent understanding of knowledge was problematized 
in 1963 by Edmund Gettier21 in what became known as the Gettier problem. His argument was 
that the Justified True Belief definition could not account for all knowledge. By means of 
examples, Gettier demonstrated that it is possible for beliefs to be true and justified, but by 
accident. For instance, Paul makes a substantial bet on a horse that he says he knows will win. He 
basis this on the horse’s amazing speed and track record. At the end of the race, Paul’s chosen 
horse actually does win. However, unbeknownst to Paul is that the horse only won because the 
fastest horse in the race suffered an injury during warmup. So in this instance Paul’s justified belief 
just happens to be true but can hardly be considered knowledge. 
From this problem emerge a few issues regarding knowledge. The first is on the definition of 
knowledge. The Cambridge Dictionary defines knowledge as “understanding of or information 
about a subject that you get by experience or study, either by one person or by people generally.”22 
The Oxford Living Dictionaries defines knowledge as “facts, information, and skills acquired 
through experience or education; the theoretical or practical understanding of a subject.”23  
                                                          
19 This is an oversimplification of the debate regarding knowledge. There are broader and much more complex 
issues that Epistemology considers, which are beyond the scope of this thesis.   
20 Cooper, John M. 2015. Plato’s Theaetetus. Routledge Publishers. London. Pg. 142 
21Gettier, Edmund. 1963. “Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?” Analysis. Vol. 23 
22 The Cambridge Dictionary. 2018. Cambridge University Press. Online: 
https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/knowledge  
23 The Oxford Living Dictionaries. 2018. Oxford University Press. Online: 
https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/knowledge 
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Davenport and Prusak state, “knowledge is a fluid mix of framed experiences, values, contextual 
information, and expert insight that provides a framework for evaluating and incorporating new 
experiences and information. It originates and is applied in the minds of knowers.”24 It is clear 
from just these few definitions that there is no consensus in defining the concept of knowledge.  
However, despite this, there is a pattern that, for purposes of this section, can be identified in the 
definitions. There is an emphasis on the acquisition of knowledge: the process by which 
information becomes knowledge. From this it can be deduced that how one comes to possess 
knowledge validates or invalidates the knowledge. This evokes the second issue emerging from 
the knowledge debate.  Epistemology holds two main schools of thought on the acquisition of 
knowledge: empiricism and rationalism. Empiricism argues that knowledge is acquired primarily 
through experience. It is only after experience that one can truly claim to know. “Traditional 
empiricists emphasized that, sense experience is the only guide in our understanding of the world; 
that it is the only method and criterion of knowledge and truth.”25 Sensory experience is not only 
direct but can also be indirect. Direct experience is when one personally engages or is familiarized 
with an object, feeling or sensation such as pain or smell or hunger. Indirect experience, on the 
other hand, is one that comes from direct experiences of others. Stories and literature are the main 
sources of indirect experience. There are no instinctive ideas.  Such a notion of knowledge has 
been challenged by people such as David Hume26 who argues that sensory experience can be 
unreliable and difficult to prove. Without proof, knowledge is not possible and it is simply belief.  
Rationalism, on the other hand, holds that knowledge is acquired through intuition, reason and 
deduction. There is also knowledge that is innate: that is to say, some knowledge is independent 
of experience, reason or deduction. It is simply part of our nature. This knowledge is ‘programmed’ 
in our DNA or genes, which is why some people are naturally better at certain tasks or subjects 
than others. Reason, deduction and experience may trigger the consciousness of this knowledge 
without causing or providing the knowledge itself. Such knowledge is certain, without doubt, as it 
is different from what is known as a result of experience. Experience is based on perception and 
                                                          
24Davernport, T. and Prusak, L. 2000. “Working Knowledge: How Organizations Manage What They Know.” 
Ubiquity. Online: http://www.acm.org/ubiquity/book/t_davenport_1.html 
25 Hossain, F. M. A. 2014. “A Critical Analysis of Empiricism.” Open Journal of Philosophy, 4. Pp. 225-230 
26 Hume, D. 1966.  Enquiries Concerning the Human Understanding and Concerning the Principles of Morals. Oxford 
University Press, London.  
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belief, which can be doubtful and therefore uncertain. This line of thinking often lends itself to the 
natural sciences, where evidence and logical reasoning are essential in claiming knowledge. 
“This is not so in the social sciences, with some social scientists calling for objective evidence akin 
to that of the natural sciences, while others insist that other forms of knowledge are possible.”27 
This disagreement gives rise to a number of approaches and conceptions of different forms of 
knowledge in the social sciences. These approaches include positivism, post-positivism and 
interpretivism. Positivism argues that the world exists objectively. The purpose of knowledge and 
of the researcher or observer is to measure and or describe what already exists. Using deduction, 
cause and effect can be understood and prediction becomes possible. Consequently, the researcher 
needs to adopt a structured approach with an appropriate methodology whilst remaining 
emotionally detached or neutral to the subject or observed phenomenon.28 The quantitative 
research method is the preferred method for this approach. Post-positivism takes a more flexible 
position by arguing that some phenomenon do not conform to the notion of cause and effect. As 
such, whilst reality remains objective, knowledge of that reality can be uncertain.  
Interpretivism, conversely, postulates that reality (knowledge) is both objective and subjective. 
Knowledge is a social construct based on the meanings in human interactions and their perceptions 
of reality. “Interpretation works at two levels. The world can be understood not as an objective 
reality, but as a series of interpretations that people within society give of their position; the social 
scientist, in turn, interprets these interpretations.”29 In this approach, the researcher considers 
meanings and reasons within a specific time and context. This is better achieved using qualitative 
methods of conducting research.  
 
Therefore, the approach of this research is informed by the view that reality or knowledge 
intertwines with human interactions and their perceptions within a specific context and time. As 
such, the research methodology employed for this study is a mixed methodology (qualitative and 
                                                          
27della Porta, Donatella and Michael Keating. 2008. “How many approaches in the social sciences? An 
epistemological introduction.”  della Porta, Donatella and Michael Keating (eds.) Approaches and Methodologies in 
the Social Sciences. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. Pg. 22  
28See Aliyu, Ahmad Aliyuet al. 2014. “Positivist and Non-Positivist Paradigm in Social Science Research: Conflicting 
Paradigms or Perfect Partners?” Journal of Management and Sustainability. Vol. 4, No. 3. Pp. 79-95  
29See della Porta and Keating, 2008. Pg. 25 
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quantitative) based on the Msunduzi Local Municipality and eThekwini Metropolitan Municipality 
in KwaZulu-Natal (KZN), and it is geared towards drawing up an analysis of the impact of public 
participation in local government in South Africa—whilst understanding the limitations of 
generalization. The two municipalities have been chosen because they belong to two different 
categories, as provided for by the Constitution. The eThekwini Municipality is a Category A 
municipality and Msunduzi Municipality is a Category B municipality.30 Each of these categories 
specifies the size, scope of the responsibilities and functions of each of the municipalities.31These 
municipalities also provide a good sample of the different types of communities (rural, semi-rural 
and urban). The purpose of utilizing these municipalities as case studies is to explore the research 
question in different and yet related contexts.  The research moves from the premise that 
democracy is a time-consuming system, which is made worse by the requirement of public 
participation at local government. This means the study is deductive in that it is concerned with 
exploring a research question.  The method of data collection is through semi-structured 
interviews, observations of decision-making processes in local government, analysis of primary 
documents such as survey reports and the Integrated Development Planning documents and review 
reports by both government and non-governmental organizations. 
With regard to the observation of decision-making processes, the research looks at the time and 
resources it takes to make a decision based on the number of stakeholders that must be involved 
in the process. This means attending and reviewing minutes of meetings (portfolio committees 
meetings, council meetings, community forums) in which decisions are taken. On the basis of this 
result, a link between decision-making and service delivery is made - testing of internal validity. 
To this end, the Functionalist Systems Approach is used as local government is made up of 
numerous systems as governed by the legislative framework, which includes the Municipal 
Structures and Municipal Systems Acts. The intricacies of the interconnectedness of the 
                                                          
30 Section 155 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa [Act 109 of 1996] states: (1) There are the 
following categories of municipality: (a) Category A: A municipality that has exclusive municipal executive and 
legislative authority in its area. (b) Category B: A municipality that shares municipal executive and legislative 
authority in its area with a category C municipality within whose area it falls. (c) Category C: A municipality that has 
municipal executive and legislative authority in an area that includes more than one municipality. 
31 See Chapter Three for an in-depth discussion of the constitutional and legislative arrangements of local 
government in South Africa since 1994.   
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governance and administrative systems are important to consider in establishing the relationship 
between public participation and service delivery at local government level. 
The question, with respect to the relationship between public participation and service delivery, is 
explored through the study of municipal audit reports vis-à-vis the level and effectiveness of public 
participation, interviews (academics, policy analysts, non-governmental organizations and local 
government officials) and interviews of the public. This means that the study is mainly qualitative 
in that it relies on the analysis of existing data in the form of documentation and public perception 
of the efficiency of service delivery and effectiveness of public participation. However, 
quantitative methods are used in analyzing the primary data.   
 
1.3 Sample and Sample Techniques 
The semi-structured interviews focused on civil society (community members, and non-
governmental organizations or community based organizations) because of their research, 
experience and observations of local government and the different municipalities in particular for 
consistency and reliability. The sample of interviewees was selected randomly, through the Simple 
Random Sampling method, with regard to civil society and the community at large within each of 
the chosen municipalities.32 However, a snowball, non-probability sampling technique was used 
for municipal officials. Municipal officials were selected as a result of their knowledge and 
involvement in municipal service delivery, especially as it relates to public participation in local 
government. A total of 128 respondents were interviewed across the two municipalities for this 
study. The respondents represented different racial, gender, age and socioeconomic groups across 
both municipalities. However, most respondents were African from the poor and working classes. 
Of the 128 respondents, none could be classified as bourgeoisie.  
 
 
                                                          
32Trochim, William. 2001. The Research Methods Knowledge Base. (2nd Edition). Cincinnati, 
OH: Atomic Dog Publishing. 
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1.4 Data collection 
This research employed two main methods of data collection tools. Primary data was collected 
through semi-structured interviews with a 128 respondents. Some interviews were conducted face-
to-face with respondents, whilst others were conducted telephonically. The interview questions 
were translated onto English and isiZulu for ease of accessibility where necessary.  
Secondary data was also utilized in this study. Kothari states that secondary data refers to data that 
has been collected and analyzed in previous studies. This data is often documented in either 
published or unpublished sources.33  
 
For this study, a case study methodology was adopted. A case study is mainly about a number of 
perspectives, beliefs and practices that are rooted in a specific context or contexts, which can be 
understood through engaging with multiple sources of data through different, predominantly 
qualitative and some quantitative methods.34The focus therefore is trying to understand the 
phenomenon being study in a specific context and the relationship between the two. “Case study 
methods involve systematically gathering enough information about a particular person, social 
setting, event, or group to permit the researcher to effectively understand how it operates or 
functions.”35 
 
To understand the Msunduzi Local Municipality as a case study in which to examine the 
relationship between public participation and service delivery efficiency, data was collected 
through interviews with municipal officials and civil society organizations, as well as through the 
examination of relevant documents. Interviews were conducted with 39 municipal officials (i.e. 
municipal management, members of the executive mayoral committee, municipal and ward 
councilors) and 15 members of civil society groups (i.e. community-based organizations, non-
governmental organizations, political parties) from 2012 to 2015. The snowball sampling method 
was chosen to identify the best possible respondents, given their positions or responsibilities with 
and within the municipalities. In the beginning, a few strategically located municipal officials were 
                                                          
33Kothari, C.R. 2004. Research Methodology: Methods and Techniques. New Age International Limited, Publishers. 
New Delhi. Pg. 111 
34Lewis, Jane. 2003. “Design Issues”. In Ritchie, Jane and Jane Lewis (eds.) Qualitative Research Practice: A Guide 
for Social Science Students and Researchers. Sage Publications Ltd. London. Pp. 49-76 
35Berg, Bruce L. 2001. Qualitative Research Methods for the Social Sciences. California State University, Long Beach.  
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identified and approached. These officials then identified other respondents that would be useful 
for the study, given their knowledge and positions. A similar approach was adopted with civil 
society.  
With respect to review of the documentations, the study focused on official documents by the 
municipality, such as the IDP reports, the annual reports, the Living Conditions Survey reports, as 
well as other government reports such as the Municipality Ward Committee Functionality 
Verification Report by COGTA and Statistics SA reports. In addition to the official municipal and 
government documents, the study also focused on several academic research papers as well as 
news reports on functionality and performance of the municipality in relation to service delivery 
and public participation. No specific timeframe was placed as a scope of consideration for the 
documents, although the unspecified focus of the overall study was between 2012 and 2015. This 
was informed by the fact some important research had been conducted in time outside this period, 
which informed the context of the municipality and from which this research sought to continue. 
In studying eThekwini Metro data was collected through interviews with 39 municipal officials 
(i.e. municipal management, members of the executive mayoral committee, municipal and ward 
councilors) and 35 members of civil society organizations, as well as through the examination of 
relevant documents. Interviews were conducted from 2012 to 2015. Purposive sampling method 
was chosen to identify the best possible respondents, given their positions or responsibilities with 
and within the municipalities. In the beginning, a few strategically located municipal officials were 
identified and approached. These officials then identified other respondents that would be useful 
for the study, given their knowledge and positions. A similar approach was adopted with civil 
society.  
With respect to review of the documentations, the study focused on official documents by the 
municipality, such as the IDP reports, the annual reports, the Living Conditions Survey reports, as 
well as other government reports such as Statistics SA reports. In addition to the official municipal 
and government documents, the study also focused on several academic research papers as well as 
news reports on functionality and performance of the municipality in relation to service delivery 
and public participation. No specific timeframe was placed as a scope of consideration for the 
documents, although the unspecified focus of the overall study was between 2012 and 2014, with 
later additions of 2015 and 2016 documents. This was informed by the fact some important 
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research had been conducted in time outside this period, which informed the context of the 
municipality and from which this research sought to continue. 
 
1.5 Data Analysis 
In the light of the fact that the study adopts a mixed methodology (mainly qualitative and 
qualitative), content analysis was conducted in analyzing secondary data. Overarching and 
pertinent themes that emerged were identified and sorted in order to be tested for correlation with 
the emerging themes and patterns of the primary data. The secondary data was separated according 
to two main source groupings: official government documents and non-governmental sources. A 
comparison was done in order to test the reliability and suitability of the data.  
The primary data collected through interviews was analysed through first transcribing the 
interview records. The interview schedules that were conducted in isiZulu were translated back 
into English for consistency. Interview responses were coded and then classified according to 
common descriptive attributes, through a process of reduction. The coded and classified data was 
processed using the Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS). Frequency and correlation 
analysis was performed in order to understand the findings of the data. The results of the primary 
data analysis were then compared to the content analysis to test the hypothesis and understand the 
relationship between public participation and service delivery efficiency in local government.  
 
1.6 Ethical Considerations 
The study was conducted in line with the University of KwaZulu-Natal’s research ethics guidelines 
and the universally accepted norms of social research. This means that during the interviews, 
respondents were provided with a Research Participation Form, which contained the name of the 
researcher, the nature and purpose of the research and the name of supervisor. The researcher 
explained the form and the rights of the participants in relation to issues of confidentiality and 
anonymity. Information shared on condition of anonymity or in confidence was not used in the 
study or the sources are not identified in any way.  The respondents also had a right to withdraw 
from participation at any time during the study.  
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Given the limitations stated below, all quotations from the interviews - including those who did 
not request anonymity or confidentiality – reference with a code id for each interview. 
Consequently, the list of interviewees is not included in the thesis. It is, however, provided to the 
supervisor of this research for verification and safekeeping.  
 
1.7 Limitations of the Study 
There were a few limitations encountered during the course of the study. Firstly, due to funding 
limitations, a number of interviews were conducted telephonically as opposed to the preferred 
face-to-face method. The telephonic interviews limit the researcher’s appreciation of context and 
non-verbal data provided by the face-to-face discussions.  
In addition, as a result of ethical considerations, there is a significant amount of data that could not 
be used in the study, which would have illuminated some issues in both eThekwini and Msunduzi 
municipalities. In this regard, there are a number of respondents who requested not to be recorded 
or sign the consent forms, despite agreeing to continue with the interview. Although they provided 
information and answers to questions, they requested that the thesis not associate the information 
to them. Linked to this was also a common request for off-the-record discussions around some 
questions considered politically sensitive by some respondents, particularly municipal officials. 
This information is not reflected in any way in the thesis.  
It might also be worth noting that, in relation to Msunduzi Municipality, the research was 
conducted during a volatile period when the municipality was recovering from major political and 
administrative challenges that led to it being placed under administration. This is reflected in the 
thesis. It is important to consider the outcomes of the study in relation to the Municipality in the 
context of the issues and feelings about the placement of the Municipality under administration.  
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1.8 Structure of the Dissertation  
The themes of this dissertation are divided into 8 chapters. Chapter One is the introductory 
chapter. It provided a background, relevance, outlines and scope of the research including the 
research question that underpins this study. It further provided insight into the research design and 
approach.  
Chapter Two reviews the literature concerning the research problem particularly as it relates to 
the democracy debate and local government as well as discussing participatory democracy as the 
theoretical framework underpinning the study. The central point of the chapter is that the 
participation of citizens is fundamental to the democratic agenda, especially at local government 
level.  
Chapter Three comprises an historical analysis of the transformation of local government to its 
current design. The legislation and policies governing local government are discussed followed by 
the nature and scope of operation of local government. The types of services that municipalities 
provide to the public are established. The overarching purpose of the chapter is to understand the 
structural arrangements and sole purpose of local government. Moreover, the chapter discusses the 
transformation of local government in KwaZulu-Natal, especially since 1994.  The chapter 
concludes that the history of local government in South Africa has indicates that local government 
has been and continues to reflect the dominant ideology of the time or governing party. During 
colonialism and Apartheid, local government was an instrument for the perpetuation of the idea of 
separate development and the superiority of the white race.  
Chapter Four discusses the conceptualization of public participation broadly and local 
government specifically. There is a further look at the legislation and policies governing public 
participation in South Africa, in relation to service delivery. The chapter concludes that the 
influence of international groups in the design of legislation and policies cannot be ignored.  
Chapter Five interrogates the role and extent of public participation processes in local 
government. Of importance here is the understanding of the impact of public participation on the 
efficiency in service delivery. Amongst the issues that are examined, is the extent to which the 
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public can and does participate in the delivery of services starting from the planning stage. The 
chapter further studies the impact of public participation in service delivery. The aim is to 
understand whether public participation impedes the efficiency of service provision or not. In so 
doing the chapter looks at the mechanisms put in place for public participation and their relation 
to the actual service provision.   
Having discussed public participation vis-à-vis decision-making at local government in the 
previous chapter, Chapter Six explores the research question within the context of Msunduzi 
Municipality. Amongst other issues, the chapter discusses the profile and challenges of the 
Municipality in terms of service. The chapter concludes that the Municipality is characterized by 
low levels of participation and low levels of service delivery efficiency—although there are 
significant improvements with respect to the latter.  A key finding of the chapter is that, at least in 
terms of perception, there is a symbiotic relationship between public participation and service 
delivery efficiency.  
Similarly, Chapter Seven discuss public participation and service delivery efficiency within the 
context of eThekwini Metropolitan Municipality. The Chapter concludes that whilst eThekwini 
Metro is considered efficient in service delivery, the level of participation of the community in 
local government affairs, through the established formal processes, is low. There are significant 
challenges with regard to the design and administration of the public participation spaces. The 
administrative structure further complicates public participation and could reinforce apartheid 
spatial designs. A key conclusion of the chapter is that, at least in the Metro, public participation 
is not necessary for service delivery efficiency. 
Chapter 8 discusses the overall findings of the research and their implications for the research 
question. The chapter further identifies areas for further research, which arose in the course of the 
research. Essentially, the chapter makes the point that there is no evidence to clearly prove the 
correlation between public participation and enhanced service delivery efficiency, based on the 
data from the two case studies. Consequently, the chapter raises a question about the structural 
arrangement of local government, especially in relation to the tiers of local government.  
Chapter 9 is the conclusion of the dissertation. It provides a summary of the discussions and 
findings of the research in relation to the question being explored.  
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Chapter 2: Literature review and Theoretical Framework 
2.1 Introduction 
The aim of this chapter is to locate the research within the context of the existing body of 
knowledge in order to understand the phenomenon of public participation in local government. 
The chapter begins by discussing the different theories of democracy and identifies that which is 
most relevant for the study. Thereafter, the chapter explores the literature in relation to local 
government in South Africa: specifically literature related democracy and service delivery. The 
theoretical foundation of the research, which this chapter discusses, is participatory democracy.  
 
2.2 Democracy  
To set the tone of the research, it is prudent to first deal with the meaning of democracy. Of the 
many concepts that are controversial amongst political scientists, democracy is perhaps the most 
controversial. As Diamond states, “just as political scientists and observers do not agree on how 
many democracies there are in the world, so they differ on how to classify specific regimes, the 
conditions for making and consolidating democracy, and the consequences of democracy for peace 
and development.”36 
Western conceptions of democracy are often traced back to ancient Greece where people 
participated in the directing of the activities of their society.  This type of democracy could be 
described as direct democracy since people (while in real terms this meant adult male citizens, as 
women and slaves were excluded) could participate actively and directly in the assembly. 
Blackwell’s37 account of Athenian democracy crystallizes the notion of direct democracy, in which 
citizens govern themselves. Democracy in Athens was underpinned by the conceptualization of 
citizenship, which involved a duty to participate in governance. Those classified as citizens (mostly 
                                                          
36Diamond, L.  1999. Developing Democracy: Toward Consolidation. The Johns Hopkins University Press. London. 
Pg. 7. 
37Blackwell, C.W. 2003. “Athenian Democracy: an overview,” in C. Blackwell, ed., Dēmos: Classical Athenian 
Democracy. The Stoa Publication. Mahoney and R. Scaife, eds 
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men who were not slaves) congregated in a structured manner to debate all matters related to the 
state.  
However, this has changed in the modern world.  The population size no longer makes it practically 
feasible to have a sustainable direct democracy, in many instances.  Consequently, democracy has 
shifted from direct to representative democracy, where people elect representatives to represent 
their interests in structures of governance.  Thus the meaning of democracy - while still embracing 
some of the ancient Greece features - has changed over the centuries. While on the meaning of 
democracy, Cricks38 is of the view that democracy is the most promiscuous concept in the public 
affairs discourse. The concept means a lot of different things to different people in different 
contexts. It can be defined subjectively to suit specific narrow political agendas; it can also be 
defined too broadly that the meaning accommodates any political practice and agenda. In fact, 
Hippler states, “The fact that all the relevant actors today are in favor of democracy doesn’t mean 
that they all have the same thing in mind”.39 
There are varying and, at times, imaginative definitions of the concept. Schumpeter’s minimalist 
conceptualization of democracy defines it as a mechanism “for arriving at political decisions in 
which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for the people’s 
votes.”40 Peter41defines democracy as “a process by which people are free to choose the man who 
will get the blame.” Abraham Lincoln said, “Democracy is the government of the people, by the 
people, for the people”.42 This is perhaps one of, if not, the most quoted definition of democracy. 
Democracy can be broadly understood to entail a system of governance in which powers to decide 
on the organization, values and activities of society are given to the people. On democracy, Nyerere 
states, “Democracy in Africa or anywhere else is government by the people.  Ideally, it is a form 
of government whereby the people - all the people - settle their affairs through free discussion.”43 
                                                          
38Crick, Bernard. (2005). In Defence of Politics. Continuum International, London. Pg. 38 
39Hippler, Jochen.  (1995) “Democratization of the Third World after the End of the Cold War.”  In Hippler, Jochen 
(Ed.) The Democratization of Disempowerment: The Problem of Democracy in the Third World.  Pluto Press, 
London.  pp. 1-31 
40Schumpeter, Joseph. 1947. Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy. Harper, New York. Pg. 269.  
41 Peter, Laurence. 
http://www.democraticunderground.com/discuss/duboard.php?az=view_all&address=389x5355659 
42 See (2006: www.democracy.ru) 
43Nyerere, J. 1963. The African and Democracy. Oxford University Press. Oxford. Pg. 104.  
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An important factor in many of the definitions of democracy is the notion that “democracy requires 
substantive social equality.44 
However, there is strong disagreement on the applicability and practicality of democracy.  While 
different actors agree that it is the political arrangement that gives power to the people, the same 
actors disagree on how this power should be practiced.  This is the point of contention that has 
engendered the debate and has further given rise to the different typologies of the same concept.  
These different classifications have added and expanded the meaning of the concept to support 
and enhance their type of democracy.  “Democracy itself is a developing conception and an 
increasingly complex form of political organization”.45 
 
2.2.1 Liberal democracy  
Hippler46 argues that liberal democracy, as advocated by the countries and institutions of the West, 
in practical terms, not only consists of the traditional liberal democratic features such as multiparty 
elections, constitutionalism, civil and political liberties.  The concept also consists of an economic 
notion that democracy is only good if it eventually leads to the embracement of capitalism and the 
free market.  He states: 
Since, after the end of the Cold War, there is no relevant alternative to capitalism; 
the notion of democracy has been narrowed politically to conform to the Western 
conception, in which it is seen merely as the liberal political organizational form of 
a market economy, with a minimum of rules pertaining to electoral mechanisms 
and political rights.  According to this conception, there can be no democracy 
without a market economy because, in the absence of the latter, the citizens would 
lack economic freedom.47 
In line with this conception, the promotion of democracy by the countries of the West, according 
to Hippler, is not to make the world a better place, but to pursue the self-interests of the largely 
                                                          
44Frazer, N. 1990. “Rethinking the Public Sphere: A Contribution to the Critique of Actually Existing Democracy.” 
Social Text, No. 25/26. Duke University Press. Pg. 65. 
45Sklar, Richard L.  (1996)  “Developmental Democracy.”  In Julius E. Nyang’oro (Ed.) Discourses on Democracy: 
Africa in Comparative Perspective.  Dar es Salaam University Press, Tanzania.  pp. 1-30 
46see Hippler 1995: 18 
47 Ibid  
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capitalist northern hemisphere.  In this regard, Dahl48 argues that democracy is historically and 
currently about the private ownership of the means of production. At the heart of liberal democracy 
is the liberty of every individual in society.  Such liberty means that the individual has the right to 
choose his own destiny and realize his potential, without the excessive control of government.  In 
line with this Henry David Thoreau stated, “That government is best which governs least”.49 
Diamond50 emphasizes this point by stating that his conception of liberal includes the notion of 
protection of individual or group liberties from state control.    
Huber and Powel, Jr.51 state that liberal democracy posits to establish and promote solid relations 
between citizens and those in government through the regular process of elections, which ensures 
accountability and responsiveness to citizens’ demands. Liberal democracy, according to Phillips, 
“makes its neat equations between democracy and representation, democracy and universal 
suffrage…”52 
However, the notion of liberal democracy is not without its critics, especially in relation to the 
values that it purports to promote. MacPherson makes the point that historically liberal democracy 
has not always translated to political freedom for the masses. Where liberal democracy extended 
political freedom, this was at the expense of economic freedom.53 Brown concurs and states that 
liberal democracy is intrinsically hypocritical and is embedded in elite, white and masculine value 
imperatives.54 “The resulting pattern has been firmly skewed in the direction of white middle-class 
men, with the under-representation of women only the starkest… among a range of excluded 
groups.”55 
Furthermore, scholars such Barber argue that liberal democracy is deficient in that its values of 
privacy, individualism and representation have adverse effects on citizen participation in 
                                                          
48Dahl, R.A. 1982. Dilemmas of Pluralist Democracy. Yale University Press, New Haven. 
49  Thoreau, Henry. (1849). Civil Disobedience. http://www.quotecounterquote.com 
50Diamond, L. 2003. “Defining and Developing Democracy.” In Dahl, R.  Et al. (eds.) The Democracy Sourcebook. 
The MIT Press, Massachusetts. Pp. 29-39 
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Democracy.” In Dahl, R.  Et al. (eds.) The Democracy Sourcebook. The MIT Press, Massachusetts. Pp. 330-342 
52Phillips, A. 2003. “The Representation of Women.” In Dahl, R.  Et al. (eds.) The Democracy Sourcebook. The MIT 
Press, Massachusetts. Pg. 354.  
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government.56 Manley adds one of the problems of liberal democracy is its connection to 
capitalism. This connection leads to the view that liberal democracy only promotes equal 
opportunity, as opposed to substantive equality. Even equal opportunity is “really the opportunity 
to become unequal.”57 
An additional critique of liberal democracy and its proponents is that it is founded on the 
conception of superiority of western values, which assume that only liberal democracy can be 
regarded as democracy. In this regard, Nyerere asserts that the criticism of Africa by the West on 
the infeasibility or absence of democracy in Africa is only founded on the type of democracy that 
has taken place in the western countries. He refers to this type of democracy as the ‘Anglo-Saxon’ 
form of democracy; this is the two-party system in which there is a ruling party and the opposition, 
and the debate between these parties is conducted in a parliament. Nyerere maintained that liberal 
democracy sought to disrupt African traditional conceptions of democracy, in which all the citizens 
were regarded and therefore could participate as equals. In this, the vision and interests of the 
individual are the same as those of the community in which he lives.  This is because the 
community is an extension of the family. A society of equals where discussions between 
individuals are free, it makes no sense to begin to divide the community into two opposing parties.  
Because the views and values of an individual in a society are essentially that of society, it follows 
therefore that disagreements are not on fundamentals.  There are merely disagreements on strategy.  
If there are no disagreements on fundamentals, it makes no sense therefore to form opposing parties 
just so that this could fit with the western form of democracy. Moreover, multiparty democracy is 
not as democratic as it professes to be.  As earlier argued by Nyerere, democracy is government 
by the people through discussion on the basis of equality with people having the right and 
opportunity to freely elect their representatives.  In a multi-party system, democracy is government 
by a section of society.  Membership to such groups is confined to some kind of aristocracy58, 
which - more often than not - has its origins from imperialism and foreign domination.   
                                                          
56Barber, B. 1984. Strong Democracy: Participatory, Politics for a New Age. University of California Press, Berkeley. 
57Manley, J.F. 2003. “Neo-Pluralism: A Class Analysis of Pluralism I and Pluralism II. In Dahl, R.  Et al. (eds.) The 
Democracy Sourcebook. The MIT Press, Massachusetts. Pg. 385. 
58 This aristocracy perpetuates factionalism in society in a sense that some members of the same society regard 
themselves as superior to others.  This then takes away the element of equality amongst the people as the ‘upper 
class’ seeks to rule those that it regards as inferior.  
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Moreover, Nyerere states that disciplines of the two-party system are “bound to prove fatal to 
democracy.”59 The two-party system involves the imposition of party discipline.  This entails the 
limitation of freedom of expression in parliamentary discussions.  Party loyalty limits the 
discussions in a sense that members of the same party rally their support behind one another when 
they face the rival party.  As a result, the essential element of democracy - that of free discussions 
- is compromised in a two party system: making the system undemocratic.    
Furthermore, notwithstanding the conviction that democratic government requires an opposition, 
all parties want to win as many seats in parliament as they possibly can.  Upon failure, claims 
Nyerere, these parties then make a virtue of necessity of the opposition and praise such failure in 
the name of democracy.     
 
2.2.2 Social democracy 
On the other hand, Hyslop60 is of the view that the promise of pure liberal democracy does not 
really address the needs of the ordinary people in society. Aké61 refers to this as the 
disempowerment of the people, which leaves them worse-off than before.  In line with this view, 
Baregu62argues, “The challenge of democratization, therefore, is to create a strong civil society in 
which a strong but legitimate political order can address the enduring economic crisis and, in so 
doing, enhance popular control of public power”.  This statement captures well the essence of 
social democracy.  
Contrary to liberal democracy, what is at the heart of social democracy is economic freedom and 
social equality of all citizens.  Social democracy argues that economic, social and cultural rights 
                                                          
59Nyerere, 1961: 200.  
60Hyslop, Jonathan.  (1999) African Democracy in the Era of Globalization. Witwatersrand University Press, 
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61 Ake, Claude.  (1995)  “Political Elites and the Process of Disempowerment in Africa.”  In Jochen Hippler (Ed.) The 
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must complement civil and political rights.  The advocates for social democracy, such as Li63 and 
Shaw64argue that the problem with liberal democracy is that it has increased the social and income 
inequality gap in society due to the promotion of capitalism and the free market, which inevitably 
promote inequality. Johnson65 adds that an additional value of social democracy is the recognition 
of the role of the state in providing basic services to the citizens, especially the poor and 
disadvantaged. They argue further that democracy is not just about the individual, but it is also 
about the society. In attempting to crystallize the distinctiveness of social democracy, Berman 
states, “instead, social democracy, at least as originally conceived, represented a full-fledged 
alternative to both Marxism and liberalism that had at its core a distinctive belief in the primacy 
of politics and communitarianism.”66 Democracy is about the participation of the public in the 
governance of the society.  In turn, effective public participation requires social equality.  In the 
absence of social equality, democracy benefits only the privileged.  As such, the advocates 
contend, government must play an active role in trying to uplift the standard of living for all in 
society, especially the underprivileged.  Government must intervene to protect people from the 
negative effects of the free market and liberal democracy.  In so doing, governments should create 
jobs and provide subsidies and social welfare as a way of reducing the social and income gap.  This 
is contrary to the liberal democratic idea of a minimalist government; social democracy is about 
extensive government that actively intervenes in order to provide and create acceptable living 
standards and opportunities for the ordinary people.67 
Social democracy is not without critics. In studying the demise of social democracy at the British 
Broadcasting Corporation, Mill argues that one of the main problems with social democracy is the 
dichotomy of pursuing social justice and equality without rigorous transformation of existing 
cultures and hierarchal institutions.68 Central to this debate is the foundation of social democracy 
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on capitalism with the view of equitable redistribution of the wealth generated through it. 69“Social 
democrats have traditionally accepted or tolerated the market because of its ability to provide the 
material basis upon which the good life could be built, but have been unwilling to accept the 
market’s primacy in social life.”70Capitalism is essentially undemocratic and by extension, social 
democracy risks being undemocratic. Moreover, Gray states:  
  Social democracy was a political project whose stability and even identity  
  depended on the geo-strategic environment of the Cold War. It defined its  
  socialist content by its opposition both to Soviet communism and to American 
  individualism. The Soviet collapse has removed this environment and denuded 
  social democracy of the identity a bipolar world conferred on it. The new  
  realities that spell ruin for the social-democratic project are the billions of  
  industrious and skilled workers released onto the global market by the  
  communist collapse and the disappearance of any effective barriers to the global 
  mobility of capital. In this changed historical circumstance, the central economic 
  programme of social democracy is unworkable and social democracy itself a 
  bankrupt project.71 
 
 
2.2.3 Developmental democracy 
In addition to the aforementioned models of democracy, there is developmental democracy.  This 
model of democracy occupies a very peculiar and highly contested space in the ideological 
spectrum.72Developmental democracy builds on the values of liberal democracy and advances a 
link between democracy and socio-economic development. In addition to the liberal values, this 
theory emphasizes the role of active citizenry in government affairs, based on what is deemed 
morally correct. Though widely considered as an advocate of liberal democracy, it was John Stuart 
Mill who argued that people have the intellectual and moral ability to think and behave in ways 
that are mutually beneficial. Given this potential, people must be active participants in public 
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70Berman, 2005. Pg. 36 
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affairs.73The more people participate in governance the more they are able to develop their 
potentials.  
This model of democracy is concerned largely with what Sorensen74calls ‘developmental states’. 
The theory recognizes the shortcomings of liberal and social democracy on the role of the state in 
improving economic conditions of society.  Of importance here is the social and economic 
development in developing states, through the creation of policies and institution that are geared 
towards providing an environment that is conducive for investment and growth.  Towards this, 
international financial institutions, such as the World Bank, International Monetary Fund and 
donor countries, advocated for Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs) in developing countries as 
the strategy for development75 since the mid-1980s.  These institutions argue that SAPs require, 
amongst other things, the liberalization of the economy, privatization of state-owned enterprises, 
good governance that includes transparency and accountability, reduction of expenditure on social 
services and liberalization of the political space to promote pluralism. 
However, as Healey and Robinson76 argue there is a growing debate about the relationship between 
development and democracy.  This debate revolves around issues of types of regimes necessary 
for development and the strategic sequence of the outcomes.  For instance, does democracy lead 
to development, or does development lead to democracy?  Alternatively, are these two mutually 
reinforcing?  Sorensen77is of the view that development in a developmental state contains a ‘non-
democratic bias’.  He argues that Johnson78 “stresses that political stability and order are necessary; 
therefore political pluralism, which might challenge the goals of the development elite, must be 
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avoided.” This view challenges the often assumed causal relationship between democracy and 
development.79  
 
2.2.4 Participatory Democracy 
It was Aristotle who argued that governance must be left to the elite as people cannot govern 
themselves. The masses, some contend, are not capable of deciding informatively what is best for 
them. They do not have the skills and the knowledge to effectively participate in governance. As 
such, governance must be left to the educated and experienced. Given the representative nature of 
democracy in the modern age, public representatives are elected to decide on behalf of the public. 
People delegate governance powers to those seeking public office. Consequently, the 
representatives must be left to do their jobs. Where there is dissatisfaction with the level and 
effectiveness of representation, the recourse simply is for the electorate to elect a different 
representative.80 
However, Warren81 looks at the link between democracy, particularly the different types of 
democracy, and the transformation of individuals. Of importance in this study is how democracy 
is able to allow for the articulation and accommodation of the interest of individuals and groups. 
As such, Moote and McClaren82contend that democracy, particularly participatory democracy 
involves the participation of ordinary citizens in public participatory processes with regard to the 
governance of their society. In line with this view, Mejlgraad83argues that:  
Participatory democracy stresses the need and the importance of full citizenship in 
terms of both political and social rights, which serve to protect the individual on 
                                                          
79 There is also the argument that the term “developing, development etc. as applied to African states is 
historically loaded – meaning must catch up with the West – as if their own modernity cannot be separated from 
the linear view of how the world “must” evolve. However, this discussion is beyond the remit of the thesis. 
80 See Urbinati, Nadia. 2011. “Representative Democracy and its Critics”. In Alonso, Sonia et al. (Eds). The Future of 
Representative Democracy. Cambridge University Press, New York. Pp. 23-49  
81Warren, Mark. (1992). “Democratic Theory and Self-Transformation”. The American Political Science Review, Vol. 
86, No. 1 pp. 8-23 
82Moote, Margaret A. and Mitchel P. McClaran (1997), “Implications of Participatory Democracy for Public Land 
Planning” Journal of Range Management, Vol. 50, No. 5. Allen Press pp. 473-481 
83Mejlgaard, Niels. (2009). “The Trajectory of Scientific Citizenship in Denmark: Changing Balances between Public 
Competence and Public Participation.” Science and Public Policy. Vol. 36, No 6. Pg. 487 
29 | P a g e  
 
the one hand, but also – and equally important – an ideal of citizenship as a sense 
of societal obligation or duty in which participation is a virtue.  
Pateman assets that “participation develops and fosters the very qualities necessary for it; the more 
individuals participate the better able they become to do so.”84 Rousseau speaks of the sovereignty 
of the assembly of the people, which he calls “body politic”.85 The body politic makes laws based 
on the general will, and no act is valid unless ratified by the people in person in a lawful assembly.86 
In support of this, Bryan states: 
Real democracy (for good or ill) occurs only when all eligible citizens of a general-
purpose government are legislators; that is, called to meet in a deliberative, face-
to-face assembly and to bind themselves under laws they fashion themselves.87 
In addition, Rousseau holds the view that representation equals slavery while Bryan is of the view 
that representation is not real democracy. It is a substitute for real democracy. Both believe that it 
is only when the people themselves -in person -are assembled legitimately to make laws - by act 
of general will or purpose -that the people truly govern themselves and abide by the laws that they 
make in person. “The bottom line is this: in a real democracy, the citizens - in person, in face-to-
face meetings of the whole - make the laws that govern the actions of everyone within their 
geographical boundaries.”88 In addition, Rousseau states: 
Sovereignty, for the same reason as makes it inalienable, cannot be represented; it 
lies essentially in the general will, and will does not admit of representation: it is 
either the same, or other; there is no intermediate possibility.89 
An important similarity between the two accounts is the emphasis or importance placed on the act 
of general will or purpose. Both argue that the laws are made by act of general will. This means 
that the central question in such assembles is that which is concerned about the good of the people 
and not of the individuals. 
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However, as earlier mentioned, Schumpeter states, “the democratic method is that institutional 
arrangement for arriving at political decisions which realizes the common good by making the 
people itself decide issues through the election of individuals who are to assemble in order to carry 
out its will.”90 This means that the election of representatives is in itself the will of people; though 
not through the general will, but through the will of the majority. This statement moves from a 
number of premises that challenge the foundation of Rousseau’s claim. The first premise is that 
practically the general will requires the presence and “full participation”91 of the people. This 
means that every member of the associate must not only be assembled, but all must also “talk till 
they agree”.92 Surely, it is easy to understand that the size of the association would determine the 
ability of every member to express themselves. If the association is large, not every member gets 
the opportunity to express themselves; and if this were the case, it would not be correct to say that 
decisions are taken through the act of the general will. On the contrary, such acts would be based 
on the will of the majority.  
Moreover, the assembly of all the people - irrespective of the size of the association - does not 
necessarily translate into the act of the general will. This is because the principle upon which the 
association is based is equality. The notion of equality often refers to economic, social, political 
and legal equality93. However, there is another aspect of equality that is essential for the general 
will: i.e. intellectual equality. For people to truly engage on issues, they must first understand them. 
The reality is, not everyone can understand all issues the same way. Therefore, not everyone can 
engage equally on all issues. Consequently, on the issues that they understand, people may speak. 
However, on the issues that they may not fully understand, they choose others to speak on their 
behalf, without necessarily voting for them. That in itself is representation.  
Therefore, representation does not equal slavery if people voluntarily, upon recognition that some 
people would better express their opinions on their behalf, choose to delegate their rights and 
responsibilities to those who are well positioned to act on their behalf. It is difficult to comprehend 
                                                          
90 See Joseph Schumpeter. Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy. Unwin, London. Pg. 250. See also Macpherson. 
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how and why representation equals slavery if such representatives get their mandate from those 
they represent. Rousseau himself acknowledges this when he states, “The Deputies of the people, 
therefore, are not and cannot be representatives: they are merely its stewards, and carry through 
no definite acts.”94 
The second premise from which the earlier statement moves is individual freedom. Rousseau states 
that the ultimate aim of the body politic is to unite people while protecting and promoting their 
individual freedom. In other words, it is about the preservation of the individual freedom. In line 
with this, Mill identifies freedom of taste as one of the most important individual freedoms.95 This 
freedom allows individuals to make choices in accordance with their preferences, provided that 
such choices do not harm others. In practicing this choice, people choose to delegate their rights 
to their representatives. If, in his own judgment, it is in the interest of the association96 that he 
should delegate his rights and responsibilities to a representative, and if others in the same 
association also are of the same view with regard to their responsibilities and subsequently agree 
that this should be the case, the decision to have representatives is not only practice of the 
individual freedom with the collective, but it is also the will of the association. Following this, 
representation cannot become slavery since it is the demonstration and practice of individual 
freedom and the people’s will.   
Furthermore, having representatives is not the same as desertion of social responsibilities. It is 
simply a delegation of such responsibilities to those who are better able to address them. Social 
responsibilities cannot be structured in such a way as to infringe upon individual freedom. For 
individuals may have other more pressing responsibilities that they need to attend to, which may 
from time to time conflict with the schedule of the assemble. For instance, a medical doctor cannot 
be reasonably expected to attend public assembles while he has responsibilities to his medical 
duties. It makes sense for the doctor to simply delegate a representative to conduct his other social 
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duties on his behalf. That way he ensures that both his medical duties and social responsibilities 
are addressed. In this case, slavery would be for the doctor to be expected to address both the 
medical duties and social responsibilities by himself. Representation ensures that social 
responsibilities are addressed while individuals need to address their individual private duties and 
responsibilities.  
In theory, democracy is the rule of the people based on the principle of equality; at least in so far 
as political rights are concerned. In practice, however, democracy is the rule of the majority and 
or those with power; and equality only really matters in the elections of the representatives. In 
practice, some are more equal than others. Equality in material conditions determines 
sociopolitical equality. 
Michels and Graaf97argue that rather than focusing on direct say in decision-making, aspects of 
democratic citizenship are more important at local government. These challenges are particularly 
important when considered in the context of this study, two KZN municipalities.  
The question of public participation in relation to service delivery has received considerable 
academic attention recently in South Africa and internationally. In this regard, Johnson98 describes 
public participation as “a process wherein the common amateurs of a community exercise power 
over decisions related to the general affairs of a community.” Brynard99 himself argues that public 
participation goes well beyond ‘decision-making’. The World Bank defines public participation as 
a “process in which stakeholders influence and share control over the development initiatives and 
the decisions and the resources that affect them.”100  For people such as Robert Dahl101 public 
participation is a crucial component of any meaningful democracy. Indeed Rousseau argued that 
an ideal state is that in which the citizens are able not only to choose their representatives, but are 
also able to decide, on as regular basis as possible, on the affairs of their state. Public service, he 
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contends, is the chief business of citizens. This understanding provides a useful link between 
public participation and democracy.  
Sherry Arnstein102states that public participation is a ladder that involves eight different levels. At 
the bottom of the ladder is ‘manipulation’ in which people are manipulated into thinking that their 
views are taken into consideration in decision-making processes. At the top of the ladder is ultimate 
expression of citizen participation in which the citizens actually have control of the resources and 
shape governance and policy. This demonstrates that public participation is not simply about 
involving the citizens in decision-making. In fact, some scholars (Habermas103, Bohman104, 
Dryzek105,) argue that Deliberative Democracy, which is a form of public participation, is riddled 
with challenges of inequality, differences , limited access and language to the extent that it is often 
those with resources, time and higher education levels that are able to deliberate meaningfully in 
public participation forums. In a capitalist society, for instance, some own the means of production 
and some own only their labor power, which they also have to sell to the owners of the means of 
production.106 The owners of the means of production have economic power, which, according to 
Macpherson107 can be used to influence or buy political power. In turn, such political power is 
used to reinforce economic power. This deepens inequality amongst people as those with economic 
power have the ability to undermine deliberation; those without economic power often lack the 
resources, such as information and education that would allow them to start and sustain arguments 
in a deliberation process.108 “Some citizens are so poor in the politically necessary resource of 
information that they cannot effectively participate and must defer to those who possess 
information.”109 
                                                          
102Arnstein, S. 1969. A ladder of citizen participation. Journal of the American Institute of Planners. (35). Pp. 216–
224. See Appendix A: Arnstein’s Ladder of Citizen participation 
103Habermas, Jurgen. “Deliberative Politics” in David Estlund (Ed.). Democracy Oxford. Blackwell. 2002 
104Bohman, James. Public Deliberation. Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press. 2000 
105Dryzek, John. Deliberative Democracy and Beyond. Oxford University Press. Oxford. 2000 
106 See Marx, Carl. And Frederick Engels. 1848. Manifesto of the Communist Party. 
Online:http://www.anu.edu.au/polsci/marx/classics/manifesto.html Accessed  on 
the 31st of August 2006.  
107 See Macpherson, C.B. 1973. Democratic Theory: Essays in Revival. Oxford University Press, London. Pg. 154 
108Bohman, James. 2000. Public Deliberation. Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press. 
109 Ibid. Pg. 130 
34 | P a g e  
 
Moving from this, the relationship between local governance and service delivery has been 
explored, with some scholars such as Pratchett and Wilson110 raising questions about the 
diminishing role of local authorities in the context of increasing public participation in service 
delivery. In addition, Clapper111 contends that in fact there are a number of disadvantages and 
problems associated with public participation. These disadvantages range from low levels of 
citizen participation, threat to professional image of public administration, potential for conflict 
between the many different stakeholders, time and high costs of the processes. The element of time 
as it relates to the efficiency of the service delivery is the main concern of this research.  
This project is founded primarily on the theory of participatory democracy. This theory gives 
meaning to the concept of public participation in service delivery. It is about the values of 
democracy and the relationship between the government and the people. Moote and McClaran112 
identify five elements or issues critical in the participatory democracy theory - efficacy, 
representation and access, information exchange and learning, continuity of participation and 
decision-making authority.   
 
2.3 Local Government in South Africa 
In addition and linked to the democratic debate, is the debate around the theoretical and practical 
value and foundations of local government. In this regard, Haque argues that, despite the debate 
on normative value of local government, no political system can be considered fully democratic 
without some form of local government.113 Sikander114 opines that institutions of local 
government are critical in not only promoting democratic values, but also in accelerating 
                                                          
110Pratchett, Lawrence and David Wilson. Local Democracy and Local Government. Macmillan Press LTD. Hampshire. 
1996 
111Clapper, Valiant. 1996. Positioning citizen participation in democratic local government, in Bekker, K. (ed.), 
Citizen Participation in Local Government, Van Schaik Publishers, Pretoria. Pp. 51-78. 
112Moote, Margaret and Mitchel McClaran. 1997. “Implications of participatory democracy for public land 
planning.” Journal of Range Management, Vol. 50, No. 5. Pp. 473-481 
113 Haque, A. 2012. “Theoretical Perspective of Local Government – Literature Review.” MPRA Paper No. 46301. 
Online: http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/46301/  
114 Watt, P. 2006. “Principles and Theories of Local Government.” Institute of Economic Affairs. Blackwell 
Publishing, Oxford.  
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development.115 Watt adds by arguing that the basis for local government cannot be separated 
from the basis for a government in general. The basis of government, he opines, lies in three 
broad areas: allocation of resources, distribution of income and wealth and macroeconomic 
stability - with local government being seen to be more involved with the allocation of resources. 
In this regard, “Local government is seen increasingly as an appropriate institutional context in 
which to pursue short-range objectives, such as creation of market opportunities and redressing 
the disparities within national economies; as well as the long-range goal of social 
transformation.”116 Faguet contends that the function of local government is to “produce local 
services and policies at the intersection of two quasi-market relationships and one organizational 
dynamic.”117 The quasi-markets he refers to are the relations between political parties and 
individual voters through electioneering. The second refers to the relations between decision 
makers and interest groups as influenced by resources and financial exchanges. Local 
government serves as an instrument for addressing local public good. Of public goods and local 
government, Oats states: 
For a public good – the consumption of which is defined over geographical subsets 
of the total population [and for which there are not cost advantages to central 
provision] – it will always be more efficient (or at least as efficient) for local 
government to provide the [locally preferred] levels of output for their respective 
jurisdictions than for central government to provide any specified and uniform level 
of output across all jurisdictions.118 
 
However, in defining local government, Gomme119 highlights the relations between local 
government and central government: The 
                                                          
115 Sikander, T. 2015. “A Theoretical Framework of Local Government.” International Journal of Humanities and 
Social Sciences. Vol. 5 (6) (1). Pp. 171-176 
116 Schoburgh, E.D. 2011. “Local Government and Local Development: Bridging the Gap Through Critical Discourse: 
Evidence from the Commonwealth Caribbean.” Commonwealth Journal of Local Governance. Issue 10. Online: 
http://epress.lib.uts.edu.au./ojs/index.php/cjlg Pg. 6 
117 Faguet, J-P. 2005. Governance from below: a theory of local government with two empirical tests. LSE Research: 
Online: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/archive/00000475 Pg. 5  
118 Oates, W. E. (1972) Fiscal Federalism, New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich. Pg. 35  
119 Gomme, G.L., (1987) “Lectures on the principles of the local government”, delivered at London school of 
Economics, Lent term 1987, Westminster, Whitehall garden. Pg. 1 
36 | P a g e  
 
sub part of the entire government of a nation or states is regarded as local 
government that is managed and administered by the system subordinate to 
authority of state but independently elected of the state’s authority control, by 
competent persons local, or containing properties in specific localities, which 
regions have been structured through common interests and common histories by 
the communities.  
 
This definition and understanding of the value of local government echoes somewhat the 
sentiment shared by other commentators.  Robson, for instance, defines local government thus: 
  In general, local government may be said to involve the conception of a  
  territorial, non-sovereign community possessing the legal right and the  
  necessary organization to regulate its own affairs. This, in turn,   
  presupposes the existence of a local authority with power to act   
  independent of external control as well as the participation of the local  
  community in the administration of its own affairs...120 
 
A common thread in these definitions is the underlying authority, to varying degrees, of the 
central government in a state. Local government, although subject to the authority of the central 
government based on the legislative and cultural design, is critical in that many authors consider 
it to have an information advantage over the central government.121 Erlingsson and Ödalen122 
caution that there is a different between local administration and local self-government. The 
information advantage is critical if the local government does not merely implement directives of 
the central authority, but actually has powers to make and implement decisions without fear of a 
reprimand from the central authority.    
 
The transformation of government in South Africa established three different spheres of 
government, each with its own set of responsibilities and some responsibilities being shared 
                                                          
120 Robson W (1937) “The development of Local Government”. London, G. Allen & Unwin. Pg. 574.  
121 Bardhan, P. 2002. “Decentralization of Governance and Development.” Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 
16 (4). Pp. 185-205 
122 Erlingsson, G. and J. Ödalen. 2013. Normative Theory of Local Government: Connecting Individual Autonomy and 
Local Self-Determination with Democracy. Prepared for the American Political Science Association Annual Meeting 
and Exhibition. Online:  https://www.researchgate.net/publication/307420115  
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between the spheres. This meant the decentralization123 of some of the service delivery areas to 
local government, which in the past had not been empowered significantly enough to be effective. 
Linked with the transformation of government, and local government specifically, Gumede124 
looks at the dichotomy between the entrenchment of democracy and the establishment of a 
developmental state in South Africa. The concern here is the extent to which the promotion and 
effectiveness of public participation enables or hinders the establishment of a developmental state, 
whose focus is the improvement of the living conditions of the citizens through growth and 
development.  
The structure of local government in South Africa reflects the political issues of the past and the 
aspirations to address such issues. Key to this is notion that local government has to have certain 
responsibilities, as the government sphere closest to the people.125 In this regard, Cashdan126 
identifies 10 indicators of the context of local government that defines their responsibility: a 
history of discrimination, worsening poverty and inequality, geographic segregation, rising 
unemployment, service backlogs, persistent non-payment, popular dissatisfaction, a financial 
crisis, pressure from business, and restructuring. Davids states, “Local government, as the sphere 
of government closest to the community, was tasked with facilitating the process of ‘bringing 
people back into’ local governance.”127 It is on this basis that local government in South Africa 
                                                          
123 Stanton, Anne. 2009. Decentralization and Municipalities in South Africa: An Analysis of The Mandate to Deliver 
Basic Services. University of KwaZulu-Natal, Pietermaritzburg. 2009. See also Pillay, Pundy. “Decentralization and 
Service Delivery.” In Mc Lennan, Anne and Barry Munslow (eds.) The Politics of Service Delivery. The Wits P&DM 
Governance Series. Wits University Press, Johannesburg. 2009. Pp. 137-154  
124Gumede William M. 2009. “Delivering the Democratic Developmental State in South Africa.” In McLennan, Anne 
and Barry Munslow (eds.) The Politics of Service Delivery. The Wits P&DM Governance Series. Wits University Press, 
Johannesburg. Pp. 43-103 
125Maphazi, N. 2012. A Critical Analysis of the Role of Public Participation in Governance and Service Delivery with 
Specific Reference to the Buffalo City Municipality. Unpublished Thesis for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophiae. 
Nelson Mandela Metropolitan University. Port Elizabeth. 
126Cashdan, B. 2000. “Local Government and Poverty in South Africa.” Background Research Series Municipal 
Services Project. Online: www.queensu.ca/msp/pages/Project_Publications/Papers/Local.Pdf Accessed April 2012 
127Davids, Ismael. Deepening Public Participation in Democratic Local Government: what can be done? 
Unpublished.  
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has a broad mandate of promoting local development,128 delivering basic service to 
communities,129 promoting local democracy through public participation.130 
 
Scholars such as Nyangula131 look at the role and effectiveness of Ward Committees in enhancing 
public participation at local government. Some of this interest in the subject arises out of the rather 
large number of public protests over service delivery. Buccus, on Rethinking the Crisis of Local 
Democracy132, states that it has been reported that there were over 6000 service delivery protests 
in South Africa in 2006. However, he is of the view that these protests are not necessarily a 
reflection of the public’s frustration on the lack or slowness of service delivery; rather these are 
protests over the level of community involvement in governance. Fakir133 supports this view by 
stating that the major problem in service delivery lies in the nature and level of public participation. 
The problem is in the socio-economic conditions of the society, inherited from its Apartheid and 
colonial past, which continue to advantage the wealthy and disadvantage the poor.  According to 
Bohman, the major problem with public participation is the inequalities. He asserts that there are 
three types of inequalities in this regard: “power asymmetries (which affect access to the public 
sphere), communicative inequalities (which affect the ability to participate and to make effective 
use of available opportunities to deliberate in the public sphere) and ‘political poverty’… (which 
makes it less likely that politically impoverished citizens can participate in the public sphere at 
all).”134 These inequalities are indeed characteristics of the South African society. For the South 
African Human Rights Commission the problem is the public’s access to information on local 
government service delivery.135   
                                                          
128Shaidi, E.W. 2013. Investigation into Causes of Service Delivery Protests in Municipalities: A Case Study of Nelson 
Mandela Bay Municipality. Unpublished Thesis for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophiae. Nelson Mandela 
Metropolitan University. Port Elizabeth. 
129Thornhill, C. 1995. Local Government: Government Closest to the People. HSRC Publishers, Pretoria.  
130Bekker, S and Leildé, A. 2003. “Residents Perception of Developmental Local Government: Exit, Voice and 
Loyalty in South Africa.” Politeia 22 (1) Pp. 144-165  
131Nyalunga, Dumisani. 2006. “Crafting Active Citizen Participation Through Ward Committees.” International NGO 
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132 Buccus, Imran. 2011. “Rethinking the Crisis of Local Democracy.” In The Mercury. Wednesday, May 4.  
133Fakir, Ebrahim. 2003. Political Participation in South Africa. Paper Presented to the 5th Conference of the 
International Network- Education for Democracy, Human Rights and Tolerance, Foreign Ministry, Berlin.  
134Bohman, James. 2000. Public Deliberation. Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press. Pg. 110  
135 McKinley, Dale T. 2003. The State of Access to Information in South Africa. Centre for the Study of Violence and 
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In addition to this, Hicks136 argues that although many government departments and institutions 
embrace public participation, the institutions and mechanisms that are designed towards deepening 
and widening public participation, such as Ward Committees and Development Committees, are 
often ineffective and lack resources to function properly. There are also local political dynamics 
that affect the effectiveness of these institutions.137 
 
2.4 Conclusion 
It is clear from the review of the literature that the concept of democracy is not only ancient, it is 
also fluid and complex. Whilst it is understood and generally accepted that democracy concerns 
itself with the relationship between citizens and political power, there are vastly different views 
on the nature and extent of such a relationship. As a result, over time a number of theories on 
democracy have evolved and have been tested with different outcomes. Amongst the few that have 
been explored here, participatory was chosen the theoretical framework within which the research 
was conducted. Participatory democracy, as stated earlier, provides the right lens through which 
to view the involvement of citizens in local government, as required by the purpose of local 
government, especially in South Africa in the post-apartheid era. The following chapter looks more 
closely at the history, mandate and legislative framework of local government in South Africa—
especially in relation to citizens.  
 
 
 
 
                                                          
136 Hicks, Janine (2006) ‘Assessing the effectiveness of community participation based involvement”. In Critical 
Dialogue”. Public Participation Review. Volume 2 No. 1.  
137Piper, Laurence and Nonhlanhla Chanza. 2006. “Too ‘Raw’ to Represent: the Marginalization of Youth in Msunduzi 
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Chapter 3: Local Government: Design and legislative framework  
3.1 Introduction 
As it is with the rest of the country’s political history, local government in South Africa has its 
roots in colonialism which began in with the arrival of Dutch settlers in the Cape. It was through 
local government that colonialism and Apartheid were entrenched138. From the issues of ownership 
of land to limitations on the movement of black people in white urban areas, local government was 
used to reinforce the belief of superiority of one race over others. As such it came as no surprise 
that it was at the level of local government that the anti-Apartheid movement really took hold and 
was mostly fierce.  
A common mistake when dealing with local government in South Africa, particularly the historical 
elements of the subject, is to ignore the colonial period before Apartheid, which actually provided 
the foundations for Apartheid. Rather, commentators often choose to simply look at local 
government from the inception of Apartheid as a historical point of reference and a defining period 
for local government in South Africa. This provides only a limited appraisal of the local 
government system and its evolution.   
This chapter, therefore, explores the transformation of local government in South Africa from the 
colonial period to the post-Apartheid era. The purpose of the chapter is to provide a comprehensive 
discussion of the history of local government in South Africa and how the institution has evolved 
throughout its history. Specifically, the chapter looks at the colonial history of local government, 
local government in the era of Apartheid, and the different phases of local government 
transformation in the post-Apartheid South Africa. The design of local government through 
negotiations at the collapse of Apartheid is particularly important as it provides a background 
against which the legislative framework and issues affecting this sphere of government can be 
understood. This chapter claims that the design and legislative framework of local government has 
been substantially shaped by the turbulent history of the institution, particularly as it relates to 
                                                          
138 See Grest, J. 1989. “The crises of local government in South Africa”. In Frankel, P. et al. State, Resistance and 
Change in South Africa. Southern Book Publishers. Johannesburg. Pp. 87-117  
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segregation and service delivery. The chapter concludes that the history of local government in 
South Africa has, at its core, issues of race and ideology. 
 
3.2 Colonial History of Local Government in South Africa  
According to Mavhivha139 the College of Landdrost and Heemraden of Stellenbosch was the first 
local authority that could be regarded as a local government in South Africa. This began with the 
appointment of the Landdrost in 1685, after the establishment of Cape Town as the first urban area 
in the country. This body, having been established by the Council of Policy of the Cape of Good 
Hope, had inter alia, powers to collect taxes and perform certain functions that could be understood 
as municipal in nature and extent in the country’s districts - Stellenbosch, Draakensteijn, Land van 
Waveren, Swarte Land, the Colonie van Swellendam and other places such as Grootvadersbosch, 
AttaquasCloof, GouritsRivier, Sneeuwberg and the Caro. More and more urban areas were 
established as the settlers settled farther inland. These were the Transvaal, Natal and the Orange 
Free State.  There were traditional and, in certain instances, large African settlements already in 
the country, but they could not exactly be classified as cities in that they were not really urban or 
modelled on the European settlements. The urban/rural divide did not really exist prior to 
colonialism for a number of traditional African societies.   Amongst these were territories that were 
later known as Ciskei, KwaNdebele, QwaQwa, Bophuthatswana, Venda, KwaZulu, and 
Gazankulu.  
However, it was the Cape Municipal Ordinance No. 9 of 1836 that formally established the first 
official municipal structures. “This Ordinance provided for a board of commissioners for the 
various towns and they were elected by the property owners… it formed the basic paradigm for 
the Natal Municipal Ordinance 1847140 and it was later adopted by the Orange Free State and 
                                                          
139 See Mavhivha, E. 2007. Leadership and Governance Perspectives in Local Government Administration in South 
Africa: Limpopo Province. Unpublished. University of Pretoria.   
140 After the proclamation of Natal as a British colony in 1843, the Cape Municipal Ordinance [9 of 1837] was 
adopted as Ordinance in order to provide for the establishment of municipal government structures along the lines 
of the Cape Colony. This was found to be unsuited for the Natal colony and was the replaced with Ordinance 1 of 
1854. The latter ordinance introduced more democratic, albeit exclusive, processes and structures. These included 
the introduction for a voters’ roll, election of public officials, established town councils led by publically elected 
mayors and councillors. See Graythorne, Donald. L. 1977. The Role of the Town Clerk in Municipal Government in 
South Africa. Master of Public Administration Thesis. University of Cape Town. Pg. 18 
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Transvaal Boer Republics141 in 1856 and 1877 respectively, with minor modifications.”142 A 12-
member municipal board was established in Cape Town through the Provisions of the Cape Town 
Municipal Board Ordinance of 1839.143 These ordinances remained in place in the slightly varied 
forms in the different colonies until the unification of South Africa in 1910, through the Union Act 
of 1910 as passed by the British parliament.144 Before the Union Act of 1910, a Native Affairs 
Commission, appointed by Lord Milner in 1903,145 made several recommendations to deal with 
the question of race. Firstly, the Commission recommended that land ownership be classified 
according to race, with each race occupying its own designated space. Secondly, separate 
representative institutions should be established for the different races, elected by residence and 
having jurisdiction only in that specific area. Thirdly, townships should be established for the 
growing black urban population close to but not part of the white urban areas.146 
These recommendations laid the foundation for segregationist policies and legislation enacted after 
1910, beginning with the exclusion of non-white race groups in the power political power 
arrangements of 1910. Of course, by this time the violent resistance by black people had been 
finally crushed with the defeat of the Bambatha rebellion in 1906;147 although different forms 
                                                          
141 Up until the unification of South Africa in 1910, the country was largely divided into 4 separate areas: the British 
controlled Cape and Natal Colonies, and the Boer controlled Transvaal and Orange Free State republics. These four 
were unified under the Union of South Africa after the defeat of the Boer in the Anglo-Boer War in 1902.  
142Tsatsire, Israel. Et al. 2009. “Historical Overview of Specific Local Government Transformatory Developments in 
South Africa.” New Centre. No. 57. Pp. 129-147   
143Worden, Nigel. Et al. 1998. Cape Town: The Making of a City. UitgeverijVerloren.  
144 The Union of South Africa [Act of 1909] provided for the unification of the four main colonies of South Africa 
into a single colony, under British rule. The Act further provided for the reformation of the government structures 
such as the legislature, the executive and the judiciary. A key feature of the Act was the exclusion of black people 
from participating in the forming and shaping of the Union. Instead, a Governor-General in Council was given 
powers for the control and administration of native affairs.  
145Barichievy, 2006: 3   
146 Ibid. see also the South African Native Affairs Commission Report: 1903-1905.  
147 The Bambatha rebellion was an armed uprising of various clans within the Zulu nation, most notably the Zondi 
clan of kwaMpanza, led by Chief Bambatha kaMancinza in 1906.  The rebellion was precipitated by the imposition 
of a ‘Poll Tax’ of £1 (in addition to a Hut Tax and a Dog Tax) on all men from the age of 18. This compelled African 
men in particular to work for cash in order to be able to pay the tax, thus forcing them to seek employment in the 
mines and the agriculture sector. Assisted by a number of other chiefs, Chief Bambatha led a number of people in 
a series of guerrilla-style attacks against white forces in protest against this tax and colonial rule. The rebellion was 
eventually defeated in the battle of Mome. See Thompson, P.S. 2013. “Dinuzulu and Bhambatha, 1906: An invasion 
of Natal and an uprising in Zululand that almost took place”. Historia 58, 2. Pp.46-69. Thompson also argues that, 
whilst the Poll Tax was an underlying factor, there might have been other reasons for the rebellion, one of which 
was an attempt by Bambatha to be reinstated as Chief of the Zondi as he had been earlier deposed. Chief 
Bambatha mobilised for the rebellion in the name of King Dinuzulu in order to encourage support from the chiefs. 
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passive resistance persisted. After the unification of South Africa, the four colonies became 
provinces and local government functions were the responsibilities of these provinces of South 
Africa.148 
 
3.3 Local Government and Apartheid: 1948 – 1994 
Tsatsire149 observed that “South African local government structures have generally been designed 
to reproduce the urban system in accordance with the policy objectives of the government of the 
day…” As it was with the establishment of local government structure prior to 1948, local 
government structure between 1948 and 1994 were designed to advance the National Party (NP) 
policy of separate development for the different race groups in South Africa: what the NP referred 
to as Apartheid.150 The central principle of Apartheid follows from the recommendations of the 
Native Affairs Commission of 1903,151 which recommended - amongst others - that systems of 
separate development be implemented. This essentially meant that land ownership and occupation 
would be categorized according to race and ethnicity; and each race group to have its own distinct 
areas of residence and public institutions with jurisdiction only in the said areas. Through a number 
of pieces of legislation152 the National Party (NP) took this recommendation and turned it into an 
ideology and government policy. However, for the NP, separate development did not mean equal 
development; rather it meant cementing the perception or belief in the superiority of the white race 
over the non-white races. This meant that the so-called non-white institutions would be subjected 
                                                          
Thompson notes, however, that the actual role of Dinuzulu in the rebellion remains unclear. See Thompson, P.S. 
2003. “Bambatha’s Personal Rebellion.” Natalia 33. Pp. 59-66.  
148 South Africa Act of 1909.  
149Tsatsire, et al. 2009: 133  
150 See de Visser, Jaap. 2005. Developmental Local Government: A Case Study of South Africa. Antwerpern- Oxford. 
Pg. 51.  
151 The South African Native Affairs Commission was established in 1903 by the then High Commissioner with the 
task to enquire and to report on: (1) The status and conditions of the Natives; the lines on which their natural 
advancement should proceed; their education, industrial training; and labour. (2) The tenure of land by the Natives 
and the obligation to the State which it entails. (3) native law and administration. (4) The prohibition of the sale of 
liquor to Natives. (5) Native marriages. (6) The extent and effect of polygamy. The Commission consisted of two 
representatives from each of the colonies, Rhodesia and Basutoland. Godfrey Lagden was the chairman.  
152See Population Registration Act No. 30 of 1950; Bantu Authorities Act No 68 of 1951; Promotion of Bantu Self-
Government Act No 46 of 1959; Native Affairs Act No 55 of 1959; Natives (Urban Areas) Consolidated Act of 1952; 
Native Laws Amendment [Act 54 of 1952] 
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to the authority of the white institutions of similar functions. This was made possible through the 
enactment of the Population Registration Act 30 of 1950.  
The Population Registration Act of 1950 was the cornerstone of Apartheid in that it required people 
to be identified from birth as being either white, coloured or Bantu.153 The obscure definitions of 
the races were accompanied by often unscientific and arbitrary tests154 to determine race, in 
instances where it was not clear. In his book, Long Walk to Freedom, Nelson Mandela makes 
reference to this by stating that, “Where one was allowed to live and work could rest on such 
absurd distinctions as the curl of one's hair or the size of one's lips."155 A person’s racial 
classification could be reviewed and even reclassified by the Director of Census156 where there 
might be a dispute. Alternatively, a person could appeal for a review of their racial 
classifications.157 One of the reasons for the possibilities of reviews and classification was the very 
ambiguous definitions of the different race groups. Section 1 of the Act stated: 
  (iii) “coloured person” means a person who is not a white person or a native…  
(x) “native” means a person who in fact is or generally accepted as a member of 
any aboriginal race or tribe of Africa…   
(xv) “white person’ means a person who in appearance obviously is, or who is 
generally accepted as a white person, but does not include a person who, although 
in appearance obviously a white person, is generally accepted as a coloured person.  
 
The effect of this act was an imposition of restrictions on movement of black Africans outside of 
the so-called ‘homelands’. They were required to carry a pass book - aptly named Dom Pass by 
                                                          
153 This was a term used extensively during Apartheid to refer to black Africans native to Africa.  
154 One of the most widely used tests was known as the Pencil Test in which a pencil is pushed through one’s hair 
to determine the level of difficulty for the pencil to pass through. If the pencil fell to the floor easily, one was 
regarded as white and if not they would be classified as coloured. The idea behind this was that ‘white’ hair was 
the smoothest, ‘black’ hair the kinkiest and ‘coloured’ hair less kinky than black and therefore somewhere in-
between. See also Rasmussen, Birgit Brander. Et al. (ed.) (2001). The Making and Unmaking of Whiteness. Duke 
University Press.  
155 Mandela, Nelson. 1994. Long Walk to Freedom.  
156 The Office of the Director of Census was first established in 1910 through The Census [Act 2 of 1910] with the 
responsibility of conducting population-wide census every five years. The Director of Census was responsible for 
designing and administering the questionnaire used to gather the necessary data to compile a census. In 1911, the 
Director of Census, for statistical purposes, classified South Africa into three population groups: Europeans/White, 
Native/Bantu and Mixed/coloured. However, these classifications were not consistently applied in the reports and 
some groups were often bundled together. See Christopher, A.J. “The Union of South Africa Census 1911 -1960: An 
Incomplete record”. Historia (56), 2. Pp. 1-18  
157 See the Population Registration Act No. 30 of 1950  
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Africans as they thought it was silly for them to be required to carry it around - to produce on 
demand as proof that they had permission to be in white urban areas or walk in certain streets. This 
was necessitated by the enactment of the Group Areas [Act 41 of 1950] - which was amended as 
Act 36 of 1960. The purpose of this Act was to forcefully separate races by creating different 
residential areas for different races, in accordance with the Population Registration Act. 
Ultimately, this resulted in forced removals of people from their areas of residence to new groups 
areas.158  This, according to Mabin, “at least potentially extended compulsory general segregation 
to 'Coloureds'; centralized control over racial segregation, effectively undermining municipal 
autonomy; laid the basis for long-range, wide-scale land allocation planning; opened the way to 
greatly expanded (though of course strictly segregated) public housing provision especially for the 
poorer sections of the urban population; provided for retroactive segregation; and massively 
interfered with concepts of property rights generally.”159 Following from the Natives Land [Act 
27 of 1913],160 the Public Health [Act 36 of 1919],161 the Natives (Black) Urban Areas [Act 21 of 
1923],162 and the Prevention of Illegal Squatting [Act of 1951],163  the Group Areas [Act 41 of 
1950] added to the project of forceful removals of non-whites from land close to the city centers 
into the periphery and the so-called homelands. Continuing from the British colonial legacy, much 
of the fertile and mineral-rich land, as well as land close to city centers, was reserved for the group 
of people classified as white. Even within these over-crowded and often underdeveloped 
townships, non-whites were separated into Apartheid prescribed categories of race and ethnicity. 
                                                          
158 Approximately 3.5 million non-white people had been forcibly removed or ‘relocated’ by government between 
1960 and 1982. A further 2.7 million people were under threat of forced removals in 1983. See The Surplus People 
Project.  1983. Forced Removals in South Africa. The SPP Reports Vol 1 General Overview. Surplus People Project, 
Pietermaritzburg  
159Mabin, Alan. 1992. “Comprehensive Segregation: The Origins of the Group Areas Act and Its Planning 
Apparatuses.” in Journal of Southern African Studies. Volume 18, issue 2. June. Pg. 407.  
160 The Natives Land [Act 27 of 1913] provided for the allocation of only 7% of all arable land to Africans and the 
rest to white people, who constituted less than 10% of the population. Consequently, reserves were established 
for Africans and limits imposed on their ability to purchase land.  
161 This Act established a union Department of Public Health, whose responsibilities, amongst others, was the 
promotion of public health and prevention or control of infectious diseases.    
162 This Act provided for the establishment of locations for black people close to but not in urban areas, with local 
authorities exercising control regarding influx into these areas. Trading licences could also be granted to black 
people in these locations, without the right to freehold properties. This was subject to the need for labour by white 
people. The local authorities served as some form of local government. See DAVENPORT, T.R.H. 1987. South Africa: 
a Modern History. Macmillan, Johannesburg, Pg. 551 
163 This provided for the forced removals of those deemed to be squatting by land owners and authorities, through 
the destruction of homes.  
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These townships were deigned to house the temporary migrant laborers, which the Apartheid state 
could not have functioned without.   
Moreover, this Act was supported by a number of other Acts such as the Native Laws Amendment 
[Act 54 of 1952] and Natives (Abolition of Passes and Co-ordination of Documents) [Act 67 of 
1952]. The Natives Laws Amendment Act stipulated criteria on the basis of which permission 
would be granted to ‘bantu’ to be in white urban areas. Section 10 stipulated that a black person 
would have a right to permanently reside in town if: 
i. A person was born in a town and had lived there continuously for no less than 
15 years; 
ii. Due to employment, had lived in a town continuously for a period no less than 
15 years; 
iii. Had worked continuously for the same employer; 
iv. Was the spouse or child of a person falling into the abovementioned categories 
or; 
v. Had a permit for seeking work. 
Of course these restrictions only applied to black people, and any deviations or violations were 
severely punished. Black people found without these documents could be jailed or ‘deported’ to 
their homeland.  
Moreover, the National Party passed the Reservation of Separate Amenities Act No. 49 of 1953. 
This compelled segregation in all public amenities, buildings, transport and – together with the 
Bantu Education Act 47 of 1953 – enforced segregation even in public education. The common 
denominator and underlying factor of this was the difference in the quality of the facilities and 
services of whites and non-whites. It goes without saying therefore that the best available services 
and facilities were reserved for whites, while black people were subjected to sub-standard services.  
Earlier, in 1951, the NP government passed the Bantu Authorities Act No 68 which:  
 abolished the Natives’ Representative Council established by the 1936 Act and  
empowered the Governor-General to convene a conference of Native chiefs, who 
are themselves Government servants, to ascertain the feelings of the Native 
population. It recognized local authorities in the Native areas by establishing tribal, 
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regional and territorial councils with advisory functions and authority to make 
representations to the Minister of Native Affairs.164   
In essence, the Bantu Authorities Act provided for the establishment of 10 Bantustans (also known 
as homelands) for the various black ethnic groups in South Africa and the neighboring South West 
Africa (later known as Namibia).  
The Act was further supported by the appointment of tribal chiefs and headsmen with prescribed 
albeit limited powers.165 The central factor and the pillar of this Act is that the tribal, regional and 
territorial authorities had limited and mostly advisory powers. However, the government justified 
this Act on the basis that it sought to ensure that each Apartheid-prescribed racial and ethnic group 
would exercise control over its own territory until eventually all homelands would comprise a 
group of independent states.  
In addition, the Promotion of Bantu Self-Government [Act No. 46 of 1959] was enacted to 
“provide for the gradual development of self-governing Bantu national units and for direct 
consultation between the Government of the Union and the national units in regard to matters 
affecting the interest of such national units.”166 In this regard there was Ciskei and Transkei for 
the Xhosa, Zululand for the Zulus, Bophuthatswana for the Tswana, Lebowa for the Pedis and 
Gazankulu for Shangaans.167 It is important to note that these homelands or Bantu authorities, as 
a form of local government authorities, were designed to be a self-governing but not self-sufficient 
as the Apartheid rhetoric had articulated at the time. In fact, a report by the Tomlinson 
Commission168 set up to consider the question of the homelands, had earlier stated that the 
economic viability of these homelands was unlikely. Lack of infrastructure, land and finances 
meant that government needed to put more money and resources in order to ensure the self-
sufficiency of the territories. The commission had also recommended the consolidation of the 
                                                          
164 Cornell, Margaret. 1960. “The Statutory Background of Apartheid: A Chronological Survey of South African 
Legislation”. The World Today, Vol. 16. No. 5. Pp. 181-194.  
165 See Kahn, Ellison. 1951. “Notes on South African Constitutional Law”. Journal of Comparative Legislation and 
International Law, Third Series, Vol. 33, No. ¾. Pp. 88-97 
166 Promotion of Bantu Self-Government Act No. 46 of 1959.   
167 See Beinart, William. 1994. Twentieth-Century South Africa. Oxford University Press. Pg. 156  
168 The Tomlison Commission was established in 1950 to develop “a comprehensive scheme for the rehabilitation 
of the Native Areas with a view to developing within them a social structure in keeping with the culture of the 
Native based upon effective socio-economic planning.” See Houghton, D.H. “The Significance of the Tomlinson 
Report”. Africa South. Pp. 13-21. Online: http://disa.ukzn.ac.za/sites/default/files/pdf_files/asjan57.4.pdf in 
essence the Commission proposed separate development as a long term policy of the country.  
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homelands into seven Bantustans. Giliomee169 notes how the Tomlinson report was rejected by 
Verwoerd - who was the Minister of Native Affairs - and the National Party in 1954. Although the 
report was not rejected outright, the government of the National Party did not meaningfully 
implement any of its recommendations regarding the development of the so-called homelands and 
the black inhabitants. In fact, the development and self-sufficiency of these homelands may not 
have been so much the point as was the attempt to ensure a never ending supply of cheap labor for 
white capital. Visser states, “the homeland policy resulted in untold suffering and destruction of 
social fabric as migrant labour became the norm in South Africa. African men provided cheap 
labour in the urban industries and became hostel dwellers while their families lived in the 
homelands.”170 By the same token - in addressing the apparent refusal of the National Party 
government to empower the local authorities in the homelands through the provision of resources 
- Koornhof stated: 
The easier the living in the Reserves, the less the labour is available for outside 
employment. The temptation for European employer-legislators not to improve the 
living has, therefore, always been strong and it has been the economic force, 
represented by the demand for labour, which usually decides the issue.171 
 
The attempt to ensure that white government, particularly municipalities, did not bear the 
responsibility of servicing black local authorities was entrenched through the enactment of the 
Group Areas [Act 36 of 1966]. “The Group Areas Act restricted the permanent presence of black 
Africans in urban areas through the pass system, and reserved a viable municipal revenue base for 
white areas by separating townships and industrial and commercial development.”172 Earlier in 
1961, the National Party government had passed the Urban Bantu Councils Act No 79 of 1961, 
which created black councils in urban areas that were meant to be aligned to authorities responsible 
for the corresponding ethnic homelands. Moreover, the government had also enacted the Coloured 
Persons Communal Reserves Act No 3 of 1961 which ensure that there were certain areas 
designated for the occupation by the coloured people. The effects of this was the establishment of 
                                                          
169Giliomee, H. 2003. The Afrikaners: Biography of a People. Tafelberg, Cape Town.  
170 Visser, 2005. Pg. 51.  
171 Koornhof in David Harrison. 1982. The White Tribe of Africa: South Africa in Perspective. University of California 
Press, Los Angeles. Pg. 182  
172See Mavhivha, 2007: pg. 2 
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Indian and coloured management committees that served as advisory bodies to the white urban 
municipalities. Like the Indian and Coloured management committees, the Bantu Councils lacked 
any real powers in relation municipal functions.173 
The enactment of the Self-Governing Territories Constitution [Act 21 of 1971] provided for the 
formation of legislative and executive councils for the homelands. This made it possible for the 
self-governing territories to pass laws within their jurisdiction, but only with the concurrence of 
the South African government.174 Following the passing of the aforementioned legislation, 4 
Homelands were granted independence: Transkei, Venda, Bophuthatswana and Ciskei. Transkei’s 
independence, for instance, was formalized with the passing of the Status of Transkei [Act 100 of 
1976], which placed traditional leaders at the center of legislative and executive authority, and 
resulted in the installation of Chief Matanzima as the Paramount Chief of Transkei.175   
The establishment and de-establishment of different bodies for the different racial and ethnic areas 
was symptomatic of the lack of coordinated municipal structures aimed at providing services to 
people. In fact, the National Party government did not empower local government to the extent 
that it could be an arm of government capable of generating its own revenue and provide services. 
Only a few, white, municipalities had this capacity. What was clear and consistent, however, was 
that local government was designed to enforce the Apartheid system by ensuring that not only 
were the different racial groups physically separated from each other, but also that the concept of 
racial hierarchy and white superiority was entrenched through the skewed allocation of resources.  
Bekker and Humphries176 note how the government had to concede that influx control had failed 
- having earlier introduced community councils which replaced advisory boards that had replaced 
Urban Bantu Councils. In an attempt to implement the much needed reforms of Apartheid laws, 
particularly in urban areas, the government began to devolve power to the local government 
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174 Khunou, Freddie. 2009. “Traditional Leadership and Independent Bantustans of South Africa: Some Milestones 
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176Bekker and Humphries. 1985. Quoted in Brij Maharaj. “The Politics of Local Government Restructuring and 
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through the Local Authorities Act of 1982 and the Black Communities Act of 1984.177 Through 
these acts, there was a greater devolution of power from the central government to the different 
local governments. Such powers were however accompanied by the increase in rents and taxations 
as local governments could no longer rely on the funding from the central government. A further 
issue was the appointment of the representatives to serve on these local structures by the 
government. Although presented as self-governing and democratic, these structures were 
essentially accountable to the central government. Consequently, their legitimacy was rejected by 
the people, particularly in the townships.  
The rejection of the Black Local Authorities, the increase in the rents and taxation and the lack of 
real racial equality culminated in the revolt against local government in particular and Apartheid 
in general in the 1980s. The revolt was characterized by non-payment of rent and other local 
services by local residents and a demand for the Black Local Authorities to resign.178  This formed 
part of a call to render the country ungovernable in order to force transformation upon the National 
Party government, through activities such as Operation Vula.179 As a result, the Apartheid local 
                                                          
177Maharaj, 1997: 263 
178 See Stanton, 2006: 63  
179 In 1978, the National Executive Committee (NEC) of the ANC, operating in exile in Luanda, met to discuss 
lessons from the Vietnam socialist experience. Based on the report, the NEC established a committee of a small 
group of people, which was to be called the Politico-Military Strategy Commission, whose task was to put together 
a number of recommendations to the ANC NEC. The Commission consisted of Oliver Tambo (ANC President), 
Thabo Mbeki, Joe Gqabi, Joe Slovo, Joe Modise and Moses Mabhida. In all the Commission was tasked with 
reporting on 12 terms of reference contained in Annexure A of the ANC Meeting Statement, which was not 
included in the final report. Amongst the Commission’s terms of reference were the task to make 
recommendations on the elaboration of an overall strategy based on mass mobilisation; creation of the broadest 
possible national front liberation; strengthening the underground machinery by drawing into it activists thrown up 
in mass struggle; and the development of operations out of political activity, guided by the needs and level of 
political mobilisation and organisation. The report of the Commission, which was presented to the ANC NEC in 
1979 became known as The Green Book. The Green Book noted, amongst other things, that the Apartheid regime 
was largely founded on and used violence to and terror to subjugate black people in general and Africans in 
particular. Beyond using Bantustans to divide and conquer Africans through the perpetuating tribalism, the Green 
Book further noted that the Apartheid regime also prevented black people from organising themselves by banning 
black political organisations and the formation of black trade unions. Consequently, the Green Book argued that 
the given the use of violence against black people, national liberation can only be won through revolutionary 
violence of the people as whole, supported by mass uprisings. Such armed struggle has to be located within and 
amongst the people, guided by the leadership of the ANC. The armed struggle would be aimed at arousing political 
consciousness and actions amongst the oppressed. Following the adoption of the Green Book, the ANC employed a 
combination of strategies including paramilitary strategies, which involved targeted bombings of certain 
government facilities. The apartheid government responded to through police brutality, infiltration and military 
attacks of ANC camps in exile. This created a state of anarchy especially in some of the townships in South Africa. 
In order to strengthen its position, the ANC devised a plan through its armed wing, uMkhonto Wesizwe, to insert 
trained MK cadres and ANC, together with military equipment back into South Africa in order to prepare for an 
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government system collapsed as revenue was lost. As a last-ditch attempt to preserve local 
government, the National Party introduced Regional Services Councils, which had greater powers 
in terms of generating revenue and decision-making but still fell short on being democratic and 
therefore legitimate.180 The introduction of these councils did not quell the revolt. On the contrary 
the demand for equality and justice in the taxation in relation to local government grew more and 
more intense in the late 1980s. This inevitably led to discussions about the complete transformation 
of local government as well as government in general.  
 
3.4 Local Government Transformation  
The transformation of local government in South Africa followed a lengthy and complex process 
of negotiations between different political parties, civic organizations and the government of the 
National Party during the Multiparty Negotiation Forums,181 whose aim was to facilitate a 
                                                          
armed conflict with the Apartheid government. This operation was called Operation Vulindlela, more popularly 
referred to as Operation Vula. This was to be the final push against a seemingly weakening Apartheid regime. 
However, the Operation was never fully implemented because the negotiated settlement between the Apartheid 
government and the liberation organisations. See Garrett, R.K. and Edwards, P.N. “Revolutionary Secrets: 
Technology’s Role in the South African Anti-Apartheid Movement”. Social Science Computer Review, 4, (24). 
Online: https://www.sahistory.org.za/sites/default/files/GarrettEdwards-RevolutionarySecrets-prepress.pdf  See 
also ANC National Executive Committee. 1979. The Green Book: Report of the Politico-Military Strategy 
Commission. Online: https://www.sahistory.org.za/archive/green-book-report-politico-military-strategy-
commission-anc-national-executive-committee-aug 
180 See Stanton, 2006. In 1985, the government enacted The Regional Services Councils [Act 109 of 1985] in order 
to provide for the establishment of Regional Service Councils as extensions of local government to provide bulk 
services in metropolitan areas, specifically to ‘assist’ the financially constrained Black Local Authorities, and later 
extended to some rural areas. Pillay argues that the Regional Services Councils marked, to some extent, multiracial 
decision-making in a government forum, despite the fact that members were essentially nominated by 
government and not necessarily elected from the different race groups. See Pillay, Udeshtra. 2005. “The Regional 
Services Council debacle in Durban”. Smith, David (ed.) The Apartheid City and Beyond: Urbanization and Social 
Change in South Africa. Routledge, London. Pp.  194-206  
181 In 1990, following secret talks between a few leaders of the ANC, particularly Nelson Mandela, and those of the 
National Party, namely, P.W. Botha, then state President F.W. de Klerk announced the unbanning of liberation 
organisations and the release of political prisoners. Subsequently, in December 1991, representatives of a wide 
range of political organisations and civil society came together in what was to be called the Convention for 
Democratic South Africa (CODESA). The main aim of the gathering was to imagine and discuss a post-apartheid 
South Africa with democratic and social justice values of equality and dignity for all. Also amongst the central, 
discussions, through plenaries and working group, as an attempt to propose a transitional government system that 
would facilitate the transition from the previous Apartheid regime to a more democratic one. To this extent, 
CODEA adopted a Declaration of on Intent, through which the parties to the agreement committed themselves to 
working towards united South Africa based on common human values, to work towards healing the wound and 
divisions of the past racial segregation, to create an environment for peaceful constitutional change, to establish a 
constitutional democracy based on a multiparty system, amongst other things. The adoption of the Declaration of 
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discussion about the path to be followed towards a democratic, post-Apartheid South Africa. The 
question of the transformation of local government was viewed as particularly important in the 
creation of a democratic and prosperous society. The Apartheid system had manifested itself more 
rigidly in the sphere of local government. It was also in such a sphere that the most intense and 
most violent resistance to Apartheid took place. It was therefore very critical for discussions to 
take place on the path of transformation. 
In 1990, after the collapse of the Apartheid system and its local government spatial configuration, 
discussions began to take place between civic organizations and the authorities in different areas 
                                                          
Intent was anchored in the establishment of comprehensive consultations, negotiations and management 
structures, which would broaden the participation as widely as possible—towards the construction of a new and 
more democratic constitution. However, due to the volatile political context in the country which was mired by 
violence between the Inkatha Freedom Party and the African National Congress, with the involvement of the 
government. There was also a great deal of unhappiness from some organisations in what they perceived to be the 
ANC and the National Party’s attempt to control the negotiations. There were also other fundamental ideological 
differences between the negotiating parties to the extent that parties such as the Pan Africanist Congress 
withdrew from the negotiations entirely, whilst the Inkatha Freedom Party objected to the non-invitation of the 
Zulu Monarchy into the negotiations. Above all, the most pressing ideological difference was that insistence by the 
ANC to have majority-rule based unitary state, whilst parties such as the National Party, the Inkatha Freedom 
Party, the Conservative Party wanted a federal system—for the its part the Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging (AWB) 
wanted a separate state for the Afrikaners based on self-determination. In addition to the ideological differences, 
the question of the terms of reference and the duration of the transitional or interim administration, which would 
oversee the negotiations and the adoption of the new constitution, remained a thorny source of suspicion and 
accusations. With the signing of the Declaration of Intent, notwithstanding the ongoing ideological contestations, 
the CODESA plenary agreed that a second plenary session would be convened in 1992 to discuss the work of the 
working groups. Ostensibly this gave rise to the notion of the first round of negotiations being referred to as 
CODESA 1 and the second round as CODESA 2. See Sparks, Allister.1994. Tomorrow is Another country: The Inside 
Story of South Africa’s Negotiated Revolution. Struik Book Distributors, Sandton. Although CODESA 1 is considered 
a success, CODESA 2, which began in 1992, ended in a deadlock. The main points of disagreements with CODESA 2 
were on the composition of the interim government and the final shape of the constitution. CODESA 2 failed and, 
at the pressure of the international community, the Multiparty Negotiation Forum (MNPF) was constituted in 1993 
in order to try and resolve the differences of CODESA. A key feature of the MPNF was the involvement of eternal 
experts and organizations to facilitate the negotiations. In all, 26 organizations attended the MPNF in Kempton 
Park. However, the talks also almost collapsed when Chris Hani (a very popular leader of the ANC, was 
assassinated, However, the MPNF managed, through its different committees to set up processes and dates, 
including the date of the first democratic election based on universal suffrage and to adopt the 1993 Interim 
Constitution. See Jolobe, Zwelethu. 2014. Getting to CODESA: An Analysis on Why Multiparty Negotiations in South 
Africa Began, 1984-1991. Doctoral Thesis. University of Cape Town. It is Joe Slovo who is credited with proposing a 
solution to the deadlock, often referred to as the ‘Sunset Clauses’. Through these, Slovo proposed that the idea of 
a Government of National Unity (GNU) which would have term of five years, which would them be followed by a 
period of a simple majority rule process. The GNU would be composed of a number representatives from different 
political parties and would make decisions by consensus. The ‘Sunset Clauses’ also proposed that white civil 
servants would be able to keep their positions and pensions for a period of five years. See Teuteberg, S.M. 2015. A 
Framework for Constitutional Settlements: An Analysis of Diverging Interpretations of the South African 
Constitution. Doctoral Thesis. University of Stellenbosch.  
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regarding the democratization and overall reforms of local government. Key amongst the points 
of discussion was the issue of equal participation of citizens in the affairs of the local government 
as well as equitable distribution of resources and delivery of services to the people.182 In 1991, 
civic organizations decided to form the South African National Civic Organization (SANCO), 
which they used as a platform to engage with the Minister of Local Government with regard to the 
transformation of local government in the entire country.183 SANCO quickly established itself as 
important role player in the negotiation process by firstly pressuring the Minister of Local 
Government to establish the Local Government Negotiation Forum (LGNF), whose work would 
feed into the Multi-Party Negotiation Forums that followed the Convention for a Democratic South 
Africa on the transformation of the entire government system and configuration of the country. 
The establishment of the LGNF followed the passing of the Interim Measures for a Local 
Government [Act 128 of 1991] and the Local Authority Affairs Amendment [Act 134 of 1992].184 
The forum was composed of statutory members (national government, local government and 
municipal representatives), political parties and SANCO. “One of the most urgent issues facing 
the LGNF was to deal with the financial crisis of local government and non-payment of rent and 
service charges. This resulted in the Agreement on Finance and Services, which facilitated writing 
off arrears to black local authorities.”185 Bekker et al186 state: 
The spirit of the negotiations that led to these local government transitional 
arrangements reflected a shared belief in the importance of legitimate and effective 
local government, established through a transparent, inclusive, ‘bottom-up’ 
approach, drawing together all relevant stakeholders at local level, especially from 
sectors of local communities previously excluded from local government 
participation.  
 
Following extensive negotiations between the parties, the LGNF formulated the Local 
Government Transition (LGTA) [Act 209 of 1993]. This Act became the blueprint for crafting of 
                                                          
182Cloete, 1995: 3  
183 See Stanton, 2006: 68.  
184 Ibid  
185Van Donk, Mirjam and Edgar Pieterse. 2006. “Reflections on the design of a post-Apartheid system of (urban) 
local government.” In Udesh Pillay, et al (eds.) Democracy and Delivery: Urban Policy in South Africa. HSRC Press, 
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186Bekker, Simon. Et al. 1997. “Local government transition in five Eastern seaboard towns”. Politikon: South 
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a democratic permanent local government structure post-Apartheid. It is this Act that firmly 
established the autonomy of local government, which had been until then a department in 
provincial governments. According to the LGTA there were to be three phases of transition: the 
pre-interim phase, an interim phase and the final phase. The pre-interim phase entailed the 
establishment of local negotiating structures as statutory structures given the responsibility of 
appointing councils that would govern local government until the elections of 1995. In appointing 
these councils, locally negotiated methods and systems were encouraged. As a result, the processes 
yielded 843 local authorities that were very diverse in their structural and systematic 
arrangement.187 
 
The Interim-Phase (1996-2000) 
The interim phase was transitional in nature in that it formally established structures that would 
form the basis of a permanent arrangement. Transitional Local Councils (as opposed to local 
negotiation forums) were established as a single-tier authority in many urban areas, with the 
exception of metropolitan areas that had Transitional Metropolitan Councils and Metropolitan 
Sub-Structures.188 Following the vision of the LGTA, the interim phase was formally established 
by the 1996 Constitution.189 The period between 1996 and 2000 was very critical in designing 
South Africa’s local government system beyond the interim phase. The Constitution required that 
the local government must have a developmental outlook. Visser190 notes the importance of the 
classification of local government as developmental. He contends that for local government to be 
developmental it needs to strive for the improvement of the material needs of the people, driven 
by the people through their own choices leading to equity in the distribution and sustainability of 
resources. Section 152 (1)191  states that the objectives of local government as: 
a) To provide democratic and accountable government for local communities; 
b) To ensure the provision of services to communities in a sustainable manner; 
                                                          
187Pieterse, Edgar. 2007. “South African Local Governance: Ambitions, Experiences and Challenges.” In Trilateral 
Dialogue on the Role of Local Government Within a Developmental State: planning workshop with experts from 
Brazil, India and South Africa. 26th February – 3rd March 2007 (Germany)  
188 See Van Donk, Mirjam and Edgar Pieterse. 2006  
189 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa [Act 108 of 1996] 
190 Visser, 2005: 9 
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c) To promote social and economic development; 
d) To promote a safe and healthy environment; and 
e) To encourage the involvement of communities and community organizations in 
the matters of local government.   
Section 151 (3) and (4) state that the municipalities, of which local government consists, have the 
right to govern within their jurisdiction without impediment or hindrance from either the provincial 
or national government, although subject to the national and provincial legislation. Sections 151 
and 152 establish local government as an autonomous sphere of government with its own powers 
and responsibilities. This is significant in the overall transformation agenda in that, unlike during 
Apartheid, there was significant decentralization of government power from the national to also 
local government.  
The aforementioned, transitional councils were to be elected democratically following the 
amalgamation of racially based areas. The electoral system was a combination of a ward-based 
system and proportional representation system. Allocations of seats in the councils would be based 
on 60% ward and 40% proportional representation on party political basis.192 The mixed electoral 
system came about as a result of the differences between the National Party and the ANC and other 
parties to the negotiations, who insisted on the principle of ‘one city, one tax base’. The ANC 
wanted a unitary state and the disbandment of race based ward and municipal structures. The 
National Party was of the view that the PR system across the board would result in the voices of 
the minorities being very limited at local government level. The demarcation of the wards at the 
time was very racial and the previously white areas were better resourced than non-white areas. 
Therefore, the compromise was a mixed system, with the view, however, that parallel to locally 
based negotiations, demarcation boards would be established for each of the new nine provinces 
that had been established.193 Polunic, states that the LGTA provided for the criteria by which the 
provincial demarcation boards would make recommendations on the areas of jurisdiction for the 
                                                          
192 See Visser, 2005: 61 
193 The question of a mixed electoral process for local government was part of bigger debate during the 
negotiations regarding decentralization. Although many parties to the negotiations were in agreement as to the 
need for decentralization, they had completely different motives. The National Party and the Inkatha Freedom 
Party wanted a federal system with great powers being given to provinces. At the time the NP and IFP controlled 
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transform the society and governance, local government needed to be empowered to ensure service delivery and 
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local authorities.194 According to schedule 6 of the LGTA the criteria was “topography, and 
physical characteristics; population distribution; existing administrative boundaries; potential land 
use; development potential; economic functionality; financial viability; degree of common interest 
among residents.”195 
According to Thornhill196 the Local Government: Municipal Demarcation [Act 27 of 1998] was 
the first legislation to deal with the transformation of local government during the interim phase. 
Based on the LGTA and the framework provided by the Constitution of 1996, the Demarcation 
Board was established to determine the municipal boundaries for the whole country, in what is 
often referred to as “wall –to-wall” local government.197 This meant that municipalities needed to 
be established even in rural areas, which had been neglected in this regard during Apartheid. 
Consequently, in determining the boundaries, the Demarcation Board reduced the number of 
municipalities from more than 1000 in 1993 to 284 by the year 2000. Thornhill observes that the 
process had a lot of challenges. 
  The original determination of the boundaries of municipalities created a number 
of challenges. Some municipalities extended over existing provincial boundaries. 
The result was that legislation had to be passed to regulate the administrative 
consequences of such municipalities (Local Government: Cross-boundaries 
Municipalities Act, 2000 of (Act 29 of 2000)). These cross boundary municipalities 
proved to be unsuccessful as policies in different provinces differed and the Cross-
Boundary Municipalities Repeal and Related Matters Act 2005 (Act 23 of 2005) 
had to be passed.198 
 
 
Municipal Structure 
Section 155 (1) of the Constitution establishes the structural framework of local government 
through municipalities. The Constitution provides for the following categories: 
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197Zybrands, Werner. 2001. “Local government.” In Albert Venter (Ed.). Government and Politics in the New South 
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(a) Category A: a municipality that has exclusive municipal executive and 
legislative authority in its area. 
(b) Category B: a municipality that shares municipal executive and legislative 
authority in its area with a category C municipality within whose area it falls. 
(c) Category C: a municipality that has municipal and legislative authority in an 
area that includes more than one municipality.199 
Section 155 further provides for the enactment of national legislation to give effect to the 
provisions. Such legislation must stipulate criteria for the determination of the classification of 
municipalities in line with the established categories and the demarcation of municipal boundaries. 
In addition, the legislation must provide for a clear division of power and functions of the different 
municipal categories, especially with respect to areas with both category B and category C 
municipalities.  
In line with the aforementioned Constitutional requirement, parliament passed the Local 
Government: Municipal Structures [Act 117 of 1998]. The Act provides for the criteria for the 
categorization of municipalities into the three constitutional categories and the type of executive 
authority for each of the categories. Through this Act, six metropolitan municipalities (eThekwini, 
Nelson Mandela Bay, Cape Town, Tshwane, Johannesburg and Ekurhuleni), 231 local 
municipalities and 46 district municipalities were originally established. Section 7 of the Act 
identifies five types of municipal government systems: collective executive system, mayoral 
executive systems, plenary executive system, sub-council participatory system and ward 
participatory system.200 The decision regarding the typology of the municipality ultimately rests 
with the provincial government, through the Member of the Executive Committee responsible for 
local government.201 Moreover, the Act provides for the various process and procedures in relation 
to the electoral process and the composition of the various committees within the municipality, 
including ward committees. The ward committees are optional for category A and B 
municipalities202 are meant to be established in line with the ward demarcation in each 
                                                          
199 See Section 155 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa  
200 See Sections 7, 8, 9 and 10 of the Municipal Structures Act, 1998.  
201 See De Visser, 2005: 77; section 11 of the Municipal Structures Act 
202 Category C municipalities do not have wards as their coordinating municipalities in whose area there are several 
local municipalities. As such they cannot ward committees as they do not have wards.  
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municipality. These committees are meant to assist the ward councilor in representing the interest 
of the ward constituency.  
Chapter 12 of the Constitution also recognizes the authority of traditional leaders at local 
government level. Section 212 (1) states, “national legislation may provide for a role for traditional 
leadership as an institution at local level on matters affecting local communities.”203 Pursuant to 
the Constitution, the South African parliament enacted the Traditional Leadership and Governance 
Framework [Act No.41 of 2003]. Chapter 2 of this Act provides for the recognition of traditional 
communities, establishment of traditional councils, functions of traditional councils and the 
relationship between municipalities and traditional councils. Section 4 for the involvement of 
traditional councils in municipal affairs as part of their functions.204 
However, the concept of traditional leaders at local government is a controversial issue as they are 
historically unelected and they coexist with elected officials. There are some who are of the opinion 
that there is no space for traditional leaders in a democratic local government system as traditional 
systems often contradict modern democratic principles of equality.205 The notion of traditional 
leadership is based on hereditary practices that often excluded women from inheriting traditional 
leadership positions. However, it is important to note there have been instances where women have 
inherited the position of traditional leader, especially in circumstances when there is no male heir 
or the heir-elect is considered too young to lead. By the same token, there are circumstances in 
which the traditional leader is chosen by the community—making this not an entirely and always 
undemocratic process.206 In fact, Hammond-Tooke makes the following point:  
In pre-colonial times, traditional leaders were not as autocratic and tyrannical as is 
often suggested. Chiefs in Xhosa-speaking societies, for example, did not wield 
absolute and unchallenged power and their influence was mediated by the 
community at large in effect, by civil society. 
 
And  
Decisions affecting a tribe were generally made by traditional leaders in 
                                                          
203 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996  
204 Section 4 (1)(b)(c)(d)(f)(g)(h)(j) 
205Akume, A. 2013. “Egalitarianism, Traditional Authority and Local Governance in Nigeria: A Reflection.” 
International Journal of African and Asian Studies – An Open Access International Journal Vol. 2. Pp. 28-37 
206 Bekker, J.C. 1989. Seymour’s Customary Law in Southern Africa. Juta, Cape Town.  
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consultation with their councillors who broadly speaking, represented the 
interests of different sectors of the community.207 
 
However, an argument was made that not only is the institution of traditional leadership 
incompatible with democracy values and principles, in fact many of the traditional leaders were 
installed by and served as collaborators with the Apartheid government.208 Siting scholars such as 
Van Kessel & Oomen209, George210 and Khunou211, Mathonsi and Sithole make the point that 
whilst historically, traditional leaders have consistently, and to some extent stating the fact, that a 
number of them were at the forefront of resistance against apartheid (including their central role 
in the formation of the ANC in 1912 and the writing of the Freedom Charter of 1955), equally 
many of them have been collaborators with the apartheid regime and legitimized its segregation 
policies in the Bantustans. Where the chief or headman was seen as being counter-productive to 
the apartheid agenda, the apartheid government simply replaced these leaders with more amenable 
ones in order to use the traditional leaders to keep communities in line. In the end, a number of the 
chiefs were installed not in line with customary laws, but by the Apartheid government for their 
allegiance to the policy of segregation.212  
Furthermore, whilst the 1993 interim constitution had cemented the importance of tradition leaders 
in a post-apartheid democratic South Africa, three were significant challenges with respect to the 
roles and responsibilities of the traditional leaders vis-à-vis elected local government officials.  
                                                          
207 See Hammond-Tooke, W.D. 1975. Command or Consensus. David Philip, Cape Town. Pg. 17. In Ntonzima, L. 
and Mohamed Sayeed Bayat. 2012. “The Role of Traditional Leaders in South Africa a Relic of the Past, 
or a Contemporary Reality?” Arabian Journal of Business and Management Review (1), 6. Pp. 88-108 
208 See Ntonzima, L. and Mohamed Sayeed Bayat. 2012. “The Role of Traditional Leaders in South Africa a Relic of 
the Past, or a Contemporary Reality?” Arabian Journal of Business and Management Review (1), 6. Pp. 88-108  
209 Van Kessel, I. and Oomen, B. 1997. One Chief, one vote: The revival of traditional authorities in post-apartheid 
South Africa. African Affairs, 96:561–585. 
210 George, K. 2010. The Role of Traditional Leadership in Governance and Rural Development: A Case of the 
Mgwalana Traditional Authority. Dissertation Submitted in Partial Fulfilment of the Requirements of the Degree of 
Masters in Development Studies, Faculty of Business and Economic Science at the Nelson Mandela Metropolitan 
University, Port Elizabeth, NMMU. 
211 Khunou, F.S. 2011. Traditional leadership and governance: Legislative environment and policy development in a 
democratic South Africa. International Journal of Humanities and Social Science 1(9):287–290. 
212 Mathonsi, N. and S. Sithole. 2017. “The Incompatibility of Traditional Leadership and Democratic 
Experimentation in South Africa”. African Journal of Public Affairs. (5), 9. Pp. 35-46. The issue of possible 
collaboration between some traditional leaders and the Apartheid government was of the thorny disagreements 
between the ANC and the IFP, which contributed to the almost collapse of the pre-1994 multiparty negotiations.  
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The existence of traditional leaders may even be argued to add a fourth layer of government, which 
in turn could affect service delivery.213 However, in a 1995 study by the Traditional Authorities 
Research Group, it was found that many communities still regarded the role and positions of 
traditional leaders as sacrosanct. The Traditional Authorities Research Group (TARG)214 states 
thus:  
Traditional authorities are still recognized and respected by the different traditional 
communities interviewed. The idea of the abolishment of the institution of 
traditional authorities was received with resistance and it was mentioned by the 
communities interviewed that such a step will lead to chaos. The traditional leader 
is seen as one who is kgosi ke kgosi ka batho (“a chief is a chief through his people”) 
and he has a definite role to play in traditional communities. He or she is seen by 
many people as the embodiment of law and order, the upholder of values and as a 
provider for the needs of the community and, in some instances, even as an 
institution created by God. This idea was mentioned by men, women and youth 
members present during the research interviews conducted. 
The TARG further observers that according to the views of various communities across the 
country: 
Traditional leaders have a definite role to play at national, provincial and local 
levels of government. At national and provincial levels they should be more 
involved in the formulation and decision-making process regarding policy and 
planning. At local level their function is to see to the proper implementation of 
policy and planning, especially regarding development in their relevant areas. In 
district or rural councils where more than two traditional authorities are present, 
forums should be established to assist with the formulation of policy, decision-
making and planning at local level. Another opinion was that since the rendering of 
services is the function of local government, traditional authorities are not to be 
involved in the actual implementation of development projects. The traditional 
authorities and their communities are, however, to be consulted in this regard.215 
 
                                                          
213Beal, J. “Decentralisation and Engendering Democracy: Lessons from Local Government Reform in South Africa.” 
Crisis States Programme Working Paper Series No. 1. Pp. 1-21 
214 Traditional Authorities Research Group. 1999. “The Role and Future of Traditional Leaders in South Africa.” 
Koersjournal (64), 2/3, Pg. 297.   
215 Ibid, Pg. 298  
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Despite these and related criticisms of the traditional leadership, the Constitution, particularly the 
Bill of Rights, recognizes group rights (sometimes referred to as collectives rights such those of 
trade unions, political parties and traditional communities). It is from this recognition that 
traditional authority is recognized and protected by the Constitution, which gave rise to the 
formation of the National House of Traditional Leaders that is made of up representatives from 
the different provincial houses of traditional leaders. Established through the National House of 
Traditional Leaders [Act 22 of 2009], section 11 stipulates that the powers and duties of the House 
of Traditional Leaders are:  
(a)  to cooperate with the provincial houses of traditional leaders, to promote—  
(i) the role of traditional leadership within a democratic constitutional  
       dispensation;  
(ii) nation building;  
(iii) peace, stability and cohesiveness of communities;  
(iv) the preservation of the moral fibre and regeneration of society;  
(v)  the preservation of the culture and traditions of communities;  
(vi)  socio-economic development and service delivery;  
(vii) the social well-being and welfare of communities; and  
(viii)  the transformation and adaptation of customary law and custom so 
as to  
comply with the provisions of the Bill of Rights in the Constitution, 
in particular by—  
(aa) preventing unfair discrimination;  
(bb) promoting equality; and  
(cc) seeking to progressively advance gender representation in the 
succession to traditional leadership positions; and  
(b)  to enhance co-operation between the House and the various provincial houses 
with a view to addressing matters of common interest.  
(2) The House— 
(a)   must consider Parliamentary Bills referred to it by the Secretary to Parliament 
       In terms of section 18 of the Framework Act;  
(b) may advise the national government and make recommendations relating to any 
of the following:  
(i) Matters relating to policy and legislation regarding traditional 
leadership;  
(ii) the role of traditional leaders;  
(iii) customary law; and  
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(iv) the customs of communities observing a system of customary law;  
(c)  may investigate and make available information on traditional leadership, 
traditional communities, customary law and customs;  
(d) must, at the request of a member of National Cabinet, advise him or her in 
connection with any matter referred to in this section;  
(e) must be consulted on national government development programmes that affect 
traditional communities;  
(f) must complement and support the work of government at national level;  
(g) must form cooperative relations and partnerships with government at national 
level in development and service delivery 
 
Municipal Systems  
In addition to the Municipal Structures Act, government passed the Municipal Systems Act of 
2000. The expressed purpose of the Act is: 
To provide for the core principles, mechanisms and processes that are    necessary 
to enable municipalities to move progressively towards the social and economic 
upliftment of local municipalities, and ensure universal access to services that are 
affordable to all…to provide for the manner in which municipal powers and 
functions are exercised and performed; to provide for community participation; to 
establish a simple and enabling framework for the core processes of planning, 
performance management, resource mobilization and organizational change which 
underpin the notion of developmental local government.216 
 
It is the Municipal Systems Act that operationalizes the Municipal Structures Act. Section 53 of 
the Municipal Systems Act stipulates the roles and responsibilities of the municipal structures that 
are established by the Municipal Structure Act. Section 59 of the Systems Act provides for the 
delegation of some the municipal council’s authority to office bearers within the municipality. This 
is to ensure efficiency in service delivery and the smooth operation of the municipality through 
accountability.217 Section 16 (1) of the Municipal Systems Act, in line with the Constitution, 
stresses the importance of the participation of the community in the planning, budgeting, decision-
                                                          
216 Local Government: Municipal Systems Act, 2000 (Act 32 of 2000) 
217 See de Visser, Jaap. 2010. “The political-administrative interface in South African municipalities assessing the 
quality of local democracies.” Commonwealth Journal of Local Governance, Special issue, Bahamas. Pp. 86-101  
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making and even the performance management processes of the municipality. “Moreover, the Act 
states that municipalities have an obligation to build the capacity of the local communities to 
participate in these processes as well as the capacity of councilors and staff to foster community 
participation.”218 The Systems Act identifies the Integrated Development Planning (IDP) as one 
of the instruments through which public participation could be promoted.  
Derived from the Local Government Transition, Amendment Act of 1996, the Municipal Systems 
Act identifies parameters of the IDP as a tool for planning in a developmental local government 
level. The Department of Constitutional Development219 defines developmental local government 
as a “local government committed to working with citizens and groups within the community to 
find sustainable ways to meet their social, economic and material needs and improve the quality 
of their lives.” Central to the notion of developmental local government, which the IDP later was 
meant to give expression to were: 
 Maximizing economic growth and social development: local government is 
instructed to exercise its powers and functions in a way that has a maximum 
impact on economic growth and social development of communities.  
 Integrating and coordinating: local government integrates and coordinates 
developmental activities of other state and non-state agents in the municipal 
area. 
 Democratic development and public participation: local government becomes 
the vehicle through which citizens work to achieve their vision of the kind of 
place in which they wish to live.  
 Leading and learning: municipalities must build social capital, stimulate the 
finding of local solutions for increased sustainability, and stimulate local 
political leadership. 
 
In this regard, Harrison notes that the minimum contents of the IDP are: 
 A vision of the long-term development of a municipality; 
 An assessment of the current level of servicing, and of economic and social 
development, in a municipality; 
                                                          
218 Smith, Terence. 2008. The Role of Ward Committees in Enhancing Participatory Local Governance and 
Development in South Africa: Evidence from Six Ward Committee Case Studies. Community Law Centre. Issues 
pertaining to the participation of the public in municipal affairs are dealt with at length in Chapter Three of this 
dissertation.  
219 Department of Constitutional Development, 1998. White Paper on Local Government, Pretoria 
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 The municipal council’s development priorities and objectives for its elected 
term; 
 The local council’s development strategies (which must be aligned with any 
national or provincial plans); 
 A Spatial Development Framework (which must include guidelines for a land-
use management system); 
 Operational strategies; 
 Sectoral plans required by other legislation (e.g. water plans, transport plans, 
waste management plans, disaster management plans and housing strategies); 
 A financial plan; and 
 A set of key performance indicators and performance targets.220 
 
Through the IDP, and the aforementioned minimum contents, the Municipal Systems Act provides 
a framework within which municipalities must realize the objectives as set out in the constitution. 
By defining the systems and processes in terms of municipal functions, the Act ensures uniformity 
across the different municipalities as opposed to the varying systems for the different municipal 
authorities under the Apartheid era.221 
 
Municipal Finance 
Sections 227 and 229 of the Constitution provide for financial matters concerning local 
government. Section 227 (1) (2) state that the municipalities can generate income in three ways: 
first, municipalities are entitled to an equitable share of the revenue raised by the national 
government; second, municipalities can generate their own income through the imposition of rates 
on property,222 surcharges, levies, fees for services and duties within their jurisdiction;223 third, 
municipalities can generate income from intergovernmental transfers, which can be conditional or 
                                                          
220 Harrison, Phillip. 2006. “Integrated development plans and Third Way politics”. Democracy and Delivery: Urban 
Policy in South Africa. HSRC Press, Cape Town. Pp. 186-207. The IDP is dealt with extensively in Chapter Three.  
221 Some variations are still permitted due to the different categories and depending on the resources and some 
other variables for each municipality. However, the fundamental principles of the Municipal Systems Act still 
remain.  
222 Only the metros and local government municipalities can impose property rates. The district municipalities 
cannot charge rates on properties because they do not by themselves have constituencies or citizens. They are 
closer to coordinating structures in areas where several local government municipalities exist.   
223 Section 227 of the Constitution 
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unconditional. This empowerment of municipalities to generate their own income is part of the 
transformation to ensure that local government is not heavily dependent on provincial and national 
spheres of government and that the distribution of resources in a municipality is done fairly. This 
comes from the struggle slogan against the then local government structures of Apartheid: “one 
city, one tax base”.224 
In line with the transformation agenda on local government and following the bankruptcy of local 
governments in the 1980s, the Local Government: Municipal Financial Management [Act No. 56, 
2003] was enacted to “secure sound and sustainable management of financial affairs of 
municipalities and other institutions in the local sphere of government.”225 This Act deals 
particularly with the administrative aspects of municipal finances. These include processes of the 
drafting and approval of budgets, as well as the budget control and early warning systems of 
financial problems.  
 
The Final Phase 
The year 2000 marked the end of the interim phase and the beginning of the final phase as 
envisaged by the LGTA. Van Donk and Pieterse226 give an appraisal of the design of the post-
Apartheid local government in South Africa. They argue that in 2000 several decisions had to be 
taken before the elections that would finalize the shape of local government in South Africa. One 
of the main decisions was the redrawing of municipal boundaries. This processes resulted in the 
reduction of the number of municipalities from 883 to 284 (6 metros, 232 local municipalities and 
46 district municipalities) at the end of the re-demarcation process. The decision was 
predominantly influenced by 2 main points: the financial and economic viability of the 
municipalities (which had been considered during the interim phase) on the one hand, and the 
party-political ideologies that influenced policies at the time. “For example, the re-demarcation of 
municipal boundaries was in large part driven by an ideological perspective that redistribution is 
                                                          
224 See van Ryneveld, Philip. 2006. “The development of policy on the financing of municipalities”. Democracy and 
Delivery: Urban Policy in South Africa. HSRC Press, Cape Town. Pp. 157-184  
225 Local Government: Municipal Finance Management Act, 56 of 2003 
226 Van Donk, Mirjam and Edgar Pieterse. 2006. “Reflections on the design of a post-Apartheid system of (urban) 
local government.” In Udesh Pillay, et al (eds.) Democracy and Delivery: Urban Policy in South Africa. HSRC Press, 
Cape Town. Pp. 107- 134 
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best facilitated by linking municipalities with a tax base and significant institutional capacity to 
those that lack a proper tax base and adequate human resources.”227  Consequently, fewer but 
larger municipalities were established and the two-tier system for metros was scrapped in favor of 
single-tier metro municipal system. Ultimately, the decision regarding the demarcation of 
municipalities’ borders rested with the Municipal Demarcation Board (MDB) as established by 
the Constitution.  
However, as van Donk and Piertrse note, while the two-tier system was ended for metros, it was 
introduced for other municipalities. This meant amending several pieces of local government 
legislations. For instance, the Municipal Structures Act, 1998 was amended in 2000, 2002 and 
2003 to formally establish three municipal categories for different areas: Category A (Metros with 
an option of a mayoral executive system or collective executive system); Category B (two-tiered 
local municipalities, which would be coordinated by a district municipality in a given region); and 
Category C (which provided coordination functions for Category B municipalities in a given 
region).228 This configuration caused and continues to cause significant confusion amongst people. 
The amendments also established ward committees229 for the different wards in order to improve 
public participation. It was also the responsibility of the MDB to determine the number of these 
wards, which in turn could only be established once the Minister of Provincial and Local 
Government had determined the formula by which the number of councilors and an average 
number of voters per councilor could be established.230 Once this was done, it was declared that 
there would be a total of 8951 councilors in municipalities around the country.231 
 
 
 
                                                          
227 Ibid: 115 
228 Ibid: 114 
229 Ward committees are dealt with at length in the following chapters, as they are often at the centre of public 
participation in municipal affairs.  
230 See Cameron, Robert. 2006. “Local government boundary reorganization.” In Udesh Pillay, et al (eds.) 
Democracy and Delivery: Urban Policy in South Africa. HSRC Press, Cape Town. Pp. 76 – 106  
231 Ibid  
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3.5 Transformation of Local Government in KwaZulu-Natal   
The realization of the historical differences in the structures and overall powers of local 
governments in the country led to the decision that local forums, which were established by the 
LGTA, were responsible for negotiating the transformation of local government under the 
supervision of the provincial government. In KZN, such negotiations took place in an environment 
of acute hostility and political violence. The violence between the supporters of the Inkatha 
Freedom Party (IFP)232 and the ANC meant serious contestation in the design of the new local 
government system. There were a number of points that were to prove controversial between the 
negotiating parties in KZN, more so than in the other provinces.233 For KZN, a number of issues 
needed to be taken into account in during the transformation process: these included the vast 
differences between urban and rural areas; the type and size of transitional body; and the role and 
status of traditional authorities.234 
Polunic235 states that one the first major sources of contestation was the participation of the IFP in 
local negotiations as a non-statutory participant. The objection from the ANC and the Pan-
Africanist Congress (PAC)236 was that because the IFP had participated in the Black Local 
                                                          
232 The Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) was formed in 1975, by Principle Mangosuthu Buthelezi, as a largely a national, 
cultural liberation movement. Originally called Inkatha Yenkululeko Yesizwe, it was based on Zulu nationalism, as 
driven by the Zulu royal family to which Chief Mangosuthu belonged. Although it was not formed strictly as a 
political party, Buthelezi had in fact been a member of the African National Congress Youth League, and positioned 
the Inkatha to also pursue political agendas. “We in Inkatha see ourselves as committed to the ideals of the ANC – 
not as it operates now but to the ideals propagated by the founding fathers in 1912”. Mare, G. 2000. “Versions of 
Resistance History in South Africa: The ANC Strand in Inkatha in the 1970’s and the 1980’s”. Review of African 
Political Economy 83.Pg. 67. However, as Mottiar observed, the over time the balance between a cultural national 
liberation and a political party became difficult to define and maintain. The more the IFP, especially its leader, grew 
in strength, the more there was an ideological rift created between it and the ANC. Mottiar, Shauna. 2005. “The 
Turnover Of Power In Kwazulu-Natal A Growing Commitment to and Engagement with the Democratic Process”. 
Journal of African Elections (3) 2. Pp. 47 - 58 
233 See Polunic, 2008: 61 
234Khan, Sultan et al. 2006. “Transcending traditional forms of governance: prospects for co-operative governance 
and service delivery in Durban tribal authority areas” in Transformation: Critical Perspectives on Southern Africa. 
62. Pp. 84-117 
235 See Polunic, 2008  
236 The PAC was formed in April 1959 as a breakaway movement from the ANC.  In 1953, the ANC formed an 
alliance with a number of organisations, which came to be known as the Congress Alliance. The racial and 
ideological diversity of the Congress Alliance, based on a vision of a united South Africa, led to the drafting and 
adoption of the Freedom Charter in 1955. Amongst its provisions, the Freedom Charter stated that South Africa 
belongs to all who live in it, black and white. The formation of the Congress Alliance and the subsequent adoption 
of the Freedom Charter was viewed by some with the ANC—who considered themselves Africanists—to be a 
betrayal of the struggle for African people. Pan Africanisms or African nationalism was an exclusive form of 
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Authorities,237 which had been discredited by the anti-Apartheid movement, and the KwaZulu 
government,238  it should be part of the statutory participants. Of course the IFP and its supporters 
did not want this, so a dispute ensued ultimately leading the IFP to participate in the negotiations 
as non-statutory participant.  
Despite the tensions with regard to the participation, several Local Negotiating Forums were 
established for the different areas of KZN.239 The issue with which these forums had to grapple, 
particularly in urban areas, was the type and size of the transitional bodies that would run these 
areas until elections, as per the Local Government Transitional Act.240 The Act provided for a 
choice between three options: Transitional Local Councils (TLC) mainly aimed at “single-tiered 
government in smaller urban and in rural areas”;241 or the Transitional Metropolitan Council 
(TMS) with the Transitional Metropolitan Substructure (TMS) option as a two-tiered local 
                                                          
nationalism that was adopted by the PAC, who argues—through its leaders such and Robert Sobukwe—that the 
interests and needs of the African majority must take priority over those of any other racial group. The Freedom 
Charter, therefore, represents the betrayal of the material interests of the indigenous African people. After the 
banning of the liberation organisations in 1060, the PAC formed Poqo as its military wing 1961. In 1968, Poqo was 
replaced with the Azanian People’s Liberation Army (APLA), whilst the ANC had formed uMkhonto Wesizwe as its 
military wing. See Raboroko, P.N. undated. Congress and the Africanists: The Africanist Case. Pp. 24-32/ Online: 
https://www.sahistory.org.za/sites/default/files/DC/asapr60.5/asapr60.5.pdf; Delport, T. 2016. “Asazi ukuthi 
iyozala nkomoni1 : Robert Mangaliso Sobukwe’s historical imagination of the future”. PINS, 50. Pp. 35-52. Online: 
http://dx.doi.org/10.17159/2309-8708/2016/n50a3; Mafole, M. 2018. “Introduction to the Pan Africanist Congress 
of Azania.” Freedom Park. Online: 
https://www.freedompark.co.za/images/Heritage_Knowledge/publications/Introduction_To_The_Pan_Aricanist_C
ongress_of_Azania.pdf  
237 Black Local Authorities were established through The Black Authorities [Act 102 of 1982]. This Act provided for 
the establishment of local government structures, such as village committees and local committees for black 
people in urban or peri-urban areas. The black local authorities were elected from with their communities and 
used rents for their administration budgets. The authorities were themselves subordinate to the Bantu 
Administration Board that was mainly white and appointed by government.  
238 This was a black authority that was first formed in 1970 around the area of Nongoma, and later restructured 
into a wider area under the jurisdiction of the KwaZulu Legislative Authority in 1976. This formed part of the 
strategy to form and provide certain homelands with certain executive government powers. The KwaZulu 
homeland was part of that strategy and was afforded limited powers almost akin to self-government by the 
apartheid government, with a capital in Ulundi. The KwaZulu government was led by Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi 
as chief minister. See Vickerman, Rosemary. 2009. Buthelezi's Emergence as a Key National Politician in Apartheid 
South Africa and his Decline in Status Thus Far, in the Country's Democratic Context. Masters Dissertation. 
University of Cape Town. Online: 
https://open.uct.ac.za/bitstream/handle/11427/14080/thesis_hum_2009_vickerman_rosemary.pdf?sequence=1   
239Polunic, 2006 notes that by August 1994 only 12 negotiating forums had been approved by the MEC for Local 
Government, Peter Miller because most of the urban areas were late in their transitional processes.  
240 Ibid  
241Bekker, et al. 1997: 42  
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government arrangement for metropolitan areas.242 The third option that the Act proposed largely 
as a strategic political option was a Local Government Coordinating Committee (LGCC). This 
option was aimed at allowing predominantly white local governments in racially defined areas to 
continue operating in conjunction with LGNF until democratic elections were held.243 
Consequently, 61 TLCs and 1 TMS244  were established in KwaZulu-Natal in line with the LGTA.  
The second major challenge, arising out of the LGTA and the responsibilities of the TLCs, was 
the demarcation of boundaries. Polunic observes: 
In 47 out of the 61 KwaZulu-Natal TLCs, the provincial Demarcation Board 
proposed alternative boundaries to those proposed by the negotiating forums, which 
in 11 cases, included portions of tribal authority areas. The board made some 
contentious proposals, for example, combining Scottsburg and Umzinto (South 
Coast), joining Dundee and Glencoe (Northern Natal), consolidating Dalton and 
Cool Air (Midlands).245 
She notes further that after an agreement between the MEC and the Provincial Committee on Local 
Government (PCLG), 53 of the 61 TLCs were settled, leaving only eight cases unresolved. The 
problem with the resolution of such cases was part of the bigger debate about the role of traditional 
authorities in the post-Apartheid local government arrangements. At the heart of the issue, as 
Khan246 notes, is the party political disagreement between the IFP and the ANC about the role of 
the traditional authorities in the post-Apartheid South Africa.  
For the IFP, the traditional authorities have historically provided a strong base for party in rural 
areas. In the years following 1994, the IFP was strongest in the rural areas of KZN with traditional 
authorities. In turn, the IFP protected the interest of these authorities by arguing for the 
preservation and extension of the colonial, Apartheid and traditional powers they inherited.247 The 
                                                          
242 Ibid: 43  
243 See Cloete, 1995: 19 
244 Established for the city of Durban.  
245 See Polunic, 2006: 71  
246 Khan, et al. 2006 
247 However, as noted earlier, traditional leaders from various parts of South Africa were instrumental in the 
formation of the ANC. Mottiar, 2005, notes that the IFP was formed partly as a way to revive the ANC within the 
country. However, the IFP rhetoric was centred on somewhat Zulu nationalism and the IFP being a Zulu 
organisation. This would later be used to create tribal identities and conflict between the ANC and the IFP. The 
importance of traditional leaders, recognised by both the IFP and the ANC, was their ability to galvanise their 
communities around a specific course based on the respect the commended.   
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ANC, on the other hand, wanted to transform local government and also use this opportunity to 
weaken the strong traditional base of the IFP by democratizing the institution of traditional 
authority. This became one of the main points of contestations such that it contributed to the 
postponement of elections in KwaZulu-Natal until a compromise had been reached between the 
ANC and the IFP.248 What was clear, however, was that the constitution provided for the role of 
traditional leaders in the post-Apartheid South Africa. As such, the institution could not be done 
away with, despite the lack of clarity of the powers and functions.249 
The issue of the outstanding 8 cases was settled by an agreement reached between the MEC and 
the PCLG to leave these areas, at least for the time being, out of any TLC jurisdiction. This 
arrangement was only temporary for the purposes of minimizing political tension before elections.  
Having (temporarily) resolved the TLCs for the rural areas and other towns, the issue was on the 
formation of the TMC for Durban. Before ward boundaries could be determined for the Metro 
council, the boundaries of the Transitional Metropolitan Sub-structures needed to be resolved. As 
it was with the debate around the TLCs, there were two main issues that were at the crux of the 
debate. On the one hand, there was the party politics, particularly between the ANC and the IFP, 
that were based on the interest of political parties supporting a structure that would best consolidate 
their support in the metro. On the other hand, there was an interest in ensuring that the sub-
structures were economically viable and also racially inclusive, in line with the requirements of 
the LGTA. Khan et al specifically discuss the subject of how the ANC and the IFP accused and 
counter-accused each other of manipulating the boundaries of the city to consolidate support in 
their areas.250 
After taking into account factors such the balance of the population and the interest of the 
community including the political parties, the Demarcation Board for Durban proposed ten sub-
structures.251 These were to be Far West, West, iNanda/Ntuzuma, North, KwaMashu/Durban 
North, Pinetown, Inner West, uMlazi, Southern and Central. This proposal was vehemently 
                                                          
248 See Appiah, George, 2011; Khan, et al: 2006. They highlight crucial points made by several scholars about the 
role and perceptions of the traditional authorities from different perspectives. These points are aimed at debating 
the role of these authorities in service delivery in their jurisdictions.  
249Maharaj, B. 1997. “The Politics of Local Government Restructuring and Apartheid Transformation in South 
Africa: The Case of Durban.” Journal of Contemporary African Studies. Vol. 15 (2). Pp. 261-285 
250 See Khan, et al. 2006: 94  
251 Christianson, D. 1996. Perspective: Institutional Restructuring in KwaZulu-Natal. Report for DBSA.  
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opposed by the MEC for Local Government and Housing on the grounds that it essentially 
preserved the Apartheid character of the boundaries and that the establishment or promotion of 
Black municipalities in areas of uMlazi and iNanda/Ntuzuma would continue to disadvantage the 
historically disadvantaged areas as they had essentially no economic base and could not be 
economically viable and sustainable.252 Martens and Williamson253 state that having rejected the 
proposal of the Demarcation Board, the MEC in turn proposed six sub-structures with different 
boundaries. The PCLG, as Polunic254 notes, agreed with the MEC on the six sub-structures that 
were planned according to the following areas: 
I. Outer West: which included areas such as KwaXimba, Mpumalanga, Nchanga, 
Drummond, etc.; 
II. Inner West: which included Pinetown, Westville, Queensburgh, KwaNdengezi, 
New Germany, Claremont, KwaDabeka, etc.; 
III. South Central: which included Chatsworth, Cato Manor, uMlazi, Lamontville, 
Bluff, Berea South etc.; 
IV. North Central: Ntuzuma, KwaMashu, Newlands, Phoenix, iNanda, Durban 
North, Durban Central, Springfields, Berea North etc.; 
V. North: Redcliff, Verulam, Mt. Edgecombe, uMhlanga, Tongaat, etc.; 
VI. South: Illovo, Manzimtoti, Folweni, Magabheni, Southern Suburbs etc.   
 The question of the inclusion or exclusion of the rural areas, on the fringes of the Durban metro, 
into the metro resulted in further delays in the finalization of the process, which meant that 
elections for this area needed to be postponed till March 1996.255 Polunic notes how the Electoral 
Court process to resolve this matter actually helped in convincing IFP and the ANC to reach a 
compromise that would enable the elections to proceed. The same party political considerations 
that had affected the formation and boundaries of the TLCs in the rest of KwaZulu-Natal were at 
play in the dispute regarding the inclusion of rural areas in the Durban TMC. The IFP understood 
that the exclusion of rural areas from Durban would prevent the ANC from having substantial 
control of the province through the local government. The ANC on the hand, needed to win the 
support of rural areas to consolidate its power in KwaZulu-Natal. Ntsebeza256 notes how traditional 
                                                          
252 See Khan, et al. 2006: 94 
253 Martens, A. and Williamson, A. 1996. Urban Forum. JSC Rapid Action Programme, Durban Metro 
254 See Polunic, 2000: 77 
255 See Khan, et al. 2006 
256Ntsebeza, Lungisile. 2002. Structures and Struggles of Rural Local Government in South Africa: The Case of 
Traditional Authorities in the Eastern Cape. Unpublished PhD. Dissertation. Rhodes University, Grahamstown.  
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authorities complicated the negotiations by insisting that their powers (which included the 
distribution or allocation of land and adjudication of civil and criminal cases) be preserved and 
how, in some areas they ruled through fear, and supported certain political parties over others. This 
led to violence in some areas, with traditional leader being seen to be taking sides. 
The re-demarcation process of the Final Phase, which began in the year 2000, resulted in KwaZulu-
Natal having 10 districts municipalities, 50 local municipalities and 1 metropolitan. Following the 
re-demarcation process, the size of the Durban Metro grew exponentially in terms of the surface 
area and the population. Khan et al257state that before the local government elections of 2000, the 
surface are of the metro had increased from 1366 km² to 2297 km². This was achieved through the 
integration of several rural and semi-rural areas into the metro - some of which had initially resisted 
the idea of being integrated into the metro before.  The role of the traditional leaders was crucial 
in the integration of rural areas into the metro. The shift in some of their political allegiances meant 
that many were beginning to embrace the new local government setup, provided that space was 
open for them to retain their powers and functions as much as possible.    
As a way of accommodating these concerns, traditional authorities were allowed to exercise some 
traditional powers in certain areas that had recently been integrated into other municipalities, such 
as the Durban Metro. The Metro even resolved to ensure that 20% of all traditional leaders who 
resided in the tribal traditional authorities within the boundaries of the municipality would be 
provided with observer status in council.258 
 
 
3.6 Conclusion 
The history of local government in South Africa is a long and complex one. At the center of this 
history is the question of the role of race in the design and delivery of services in local government 
in the country. A close analysis of the many pieces of legislations promulgated during the different 
periods in South Africa’s political history indicates that ideological considerations have always 
shaped the laws relating to the structure and purpose of local government. Prior to the year 1994 - 
                                                          
257 See Khan, et all, 2006: 96  
258 Ibid: 99 
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especially during the Apartheid era - local government was used as an instrument for reinforcing 
the ‘principle’ of race differences with whites being considered superior to blacks. The 
transformation of local government began to receive attention towards the end of the Apartheid 
regime in the late 1980s. Through the discussion of the complex history of the transformation of 
local government in South Africa, this chapter has demonstrated how local government was 
considered instrumental in reversing the legacy of Apartheid by re-demarcating municipal 
boundaries and de-racializing municipal focus. An inclusive and non-racial local government was 
considered sacrosanct by the liberation forces. They perceived the democratization of local 
government central to the attainment of the values and goals of the Freedom Charter—chief 
amongst which was dignity and equality. It was, after all, at local government that the real effects 
of colonial and Apartheid segregation were felt. Black people were limited in or not permitted to 
run their own local municipal affairs through authorities that they have selected, and which have 
powers not limited by a white provincial authority.  Since the establishment of the first local 
government in the Cape, local government was established to serve largely the needs of a few. A 
post-Apartheid local government system needed to be inclusive and promote the participation of 
the citizens in the decisions pertaining to their welfare.    
In addition to addressing the race question, the chapter has also discussed the important 
consideration of the role of local government beyond segregation and service delivery. Parties to 
the negotiations considered the notion, a developmental local government, as defined by the 
Department of Constitutional Development. Whereas in the past the objective was to preserve 
‘separateness’, the purpose after 1994 was improving service delivery through development. Not 
only would local government be responsible for the delivery of basic services, in the post-apartheid 
era it is expected to also ensure the enhancement in the quality and distributional parity of such 
services. This means the mandate of local government after 1994 is to improve the quality life for 
the communities.   
The Chapter also discussed the difficult issue of the location of traditional leaders within a 
democratically transformed local government system. Suspicions about the role of some of the 
traditional leaders as collaborators with the Apartheid government and their perceived or real 
party-political allegiances, which was further complicated by the issues around retaining some of 
the historical traditional powers and functions, in context of elected local government officials.   
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However, this chapter did not discuss in detail the role of the citizens in local government. This is 
discussed substantially in the following chapter. The purpose of this chapter is to provide a context 
in which the role of the citizens in the ‘developmental local government’ can be discussed.     
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Chapter 4: Public Participation and Service Delivery at Local Government  
4.1 Introduction 
Historically, the question of public participation in South Africa can be considered from two 
perspectives: access and culture. The colonial and Apartheid regimes prior to 1994 had established 
limited avenues of public participation in government through the enactment of legislation259 that 
disenfranchised the African majority and other non-white race groups. This effectively limited the 
rights of the general public to participate in the governance of the country. This was exacerbated 
by the later establishment of homelands, which effectively derecognized Africans as South African 
citizens - declaring them as belonging to their respective homelands where they would enjoy civil 
and political rights as citizens.260 Consequently, black261 people in general, and Africans in 
particular, had very limited access to public institutions, especially public participation 
mechanisms. Their limited participation was largely through representation by white people or 
those appointed by the Apartheid government. In essence, black people had no access to public 
participation mechanisms pertaining to government in areas outside the homelands and their 
designated peri-urban areas later.  
On the other hand, the limited official spaces for public participation by black people inevitably 
created frustrations, which could be used and channeled by liberation organizations to recruit 
members and supporters. Through these liberation organizations, the culture of vibrant public 
participation was instilled by way of mass protest action. This mass participation was not formal 
engagement with the state on policy decision-making. Rather, it was participation against the state 
and its policies. This continued until and eventually contributed towards the collapse of Apartheid. 
From this, the culture of mass-based public participation was born and cultivated amongst the 
previously disadvantaged. It is to be noted, however, that up until the negotiation processes, 
participation by black people was still outside of formal government structures.   
                                                          
259 These included legislation such at the Groups Areas Act of 1950, which created different areas for different 
races and led to forced removals; the Separate Representation of Voters Act 46 of 1951, which led to the 
disenfranchisement of colored people; Bantu Authorities Act 68 of 1951, which established homelands and 
abolished the Native Representative Council.   
260 This was cemented by the Bantu Homelands Citizens Act of 1970.  
261 This denotes the non-white race groups that were previously disadvantaged (Indians, coloureds, Africans).  
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The purpose of this chapter, therefore, is to look at the theoretical foundations of public 
participation as well as the legislative and policy framework in South African local government. 
The chapter begins with a conceptual discussion of democracy and public participation. Of 
importance here is the critical debate on the value of participatory democracy particularly in 
relation to development. The chapter then looks at the various legislative foundations of public 
participation in local government. Reference is made to the global influences on not just the shape 
of local government, but also the mechanisms of public participation in local government.   
 
4.2 Legislative and Policy Framework for Public Participation  
With respect to public participation in local government, section 152 (e) of the Constitution of 
South Africa states that one of the objectives of local government is to ‘encourage the involvement 
of communities and community organizations in the matters of local government’.262  In realization 
of this constitutional requirement the Municipal Systems Act and Municipal Structures Act 
provide the actual framework for the structural arrangements for public participation in local 
government. With reference to the Municipal Systems Act, Barichievy argues that the first aspect 
of the public participation agenda, which perhaps is the most important in terms of the Act, is the 
definition of a municipality. Governing structures, the administration and people are defined as the 
municipality, and this, according to Barichievy, is testament to the importance of the people as is 
required by the constitution.263 The decision-making is no longer left to elected councilors and 
appointed officials only. Chapter 4 of the Municipal Systems Act provides for the “development 
of a culture of community participation.” Section 61(1) states, 
A municipality must develop a culture of municipal governance that complements 
formal representative government with a system of participatory governance, and 
must for this purpose (a) encourage, and create conditions for, the local community 
to participate in the affairs of the municipality… 
 
                                                          
262 The Constitution imposes this responsibility on other state institutions, especially the legislative institutions.    
263Barichievy, 2006: 23  
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Section 17 establishes the processes, mechanisms and procedures for the participation of the public 
in the affairs of the municipality. Section 18 compels the municipality to communicate information 
pertaining to the available mechanisms for public participation, the rights and responsibilities of 
community members regarding participation and matters on which community participation is 
encouraged. One of the mechanisms of community participation established by the Municipal 
Systems Act is the Integrated Development Planning process.  
 
a) Integrated Development Planning 
The 1996 Constitution extended the responsibility of municipalities from just service delivery to 
being at the very centre of development. Municipalities are tasked with the responsibility of 
promoting social cohesion and economic growth within communities through the prioritization of 
basic needs. They are also expected to promote public participation. Bekker and Leidlé observe, 
rather accurately, that the Integrated Development Planning (IDP) was created to drive this 
objective.264 Section 25 (1) of the Municipal Systems Act states: 
Each municipality council must, within a prescribed period after the start of its 
elected term, adopt a single, inclusive and strategic plan for the development of the 
municipality which— 
(a) Links, integrates and co-ordinates plans and takes into account proposals 
for the development of the municipality; 
(b) Aligns resources and capacity of the municipality with the implementation 
of the plan; 
(c) Forms the policy framework and general basis on which annual budgets 
must be based; 
(d) Complies with the provisions of this Chapter; and 
(e) Is compatible with national and provincial development plans and planning 
requirements binding on the municipality in terms of legislation.  
Section 26 of the Systems Act provides nine core components of the IDP. These components place 
emphasis on issues such as development, transformation, needs assessment, strategy alignment 
and financial planning, amongst others. Section 35 stipulates that the IDP is binding on the 
                                                          
264 See Bekker S. and A .Leildé. “Residents’ perceptions of developmental local government: Exit, voices and loyalty 
in South African towns.” Politea, 22(1). Pp. 144-165)  
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municipality and it serves as the guide for all development, planning and management decisions 
within a municipality.  
Harrison265 observes that the IDP was in fact influenced and shaped by a ‘global policy network’ 
consisting of various international agencies. The aim was to ensure that the new local government 
framework was in line with accepted international trends and norms of the time in terms of 
governance and administration. He refers to these as New Public Management approaches. At the 
heart of the New Public Management approach is the idea of ‘Third Way’ or ‘centre-left’ 
governance approach based neo-liberal principles, such as efficiency. Harrison observes that the 
aim was to adopt corporate culture into the public service.266 “Key elements of the approach often 
include professional and flexible management at the top of the public sector bodies; the separation 
of policy-making from operations; the disaggregation of public sector departments into 
corporatized units; the introduction of competition into service-delivery; outsourcing and 
competitive tendering; and an emphasis on output-based performance evaluation.”267 IDPs also 
serve as instruments for intergovernmental relations, particularly between local and district 
municipalities and between municipalities and provincial government.  
Bond concurs with the notion of an increased pressure on the African National Congress and other 
negotiating parties to adopt neo-liberal policies to appease the international community, 
particularly the financial institutions.268Gasper notes that this NPM approach emerged in places 
such as New Zealand, Australia, the United Kingdom and some parts of the United States.269 
Gasper states that, “dominant forces of capital and ideas have demanded privatization, as a general 
principle, insisting that it could slash the government deficit and depoliticize business 
decisions.”270 Therkidsen concurs by stating that “…donors are a major driving force in the reform. 
                                                          
265 Harrison, Philip. “Integrated development plans and Third Way politics”. In Udesh Pillay et al. Democracy and 
Delivery: Urban Policy in South Africa. HSRC Press. Pp. 186-229.  
266 Ibid, pg. 188.  
267 Ibid  
268 See Bond, Patrick. 2000. Elite Transition: From Apartheid to Neo-liberalism in South Africa. Pietermaritzburg, 
Natal University Press.  
269 Gasper, Des. 2002. “Fasion, Learning and Values in Public Management: Reflection on South African and 
International Experience”. Africa Development, Vol. XXVII, Nos. 3&4, Pp. 17-47.  
270 Ibid, pg. 20 
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They contribute substantial funds and technical assistance to most initiatives, often linked to 
demands for particular institutional changes.”271  
The heavy reliance of developing countries, especially in Africa, on foreign financial and human 
capital (based on the lack or scarcity of skills) limited the ability for these developing countries to 
properly contextualize the proposed governance approach to respond to their specific conditions, 
taking into account their unique histories and cultures. The impact on such reliance can be seen in 
the similarity of the local government policies adopted in the post-Apartheid South Africa with 
those of countries such as the United Kingdom. Harrison272 considers these similarities by pointing 
out that in the UK, as in SA, programmes and structures have been introduced to support 
decentralization. For instance, the concept of Area-Based Management in South African local 
government is quiet similar to the area-based Local Strategic Partnerships in the United Kingdom. 
Area-Based Management is essentially about the coordination of various stakeholders and 
resources in a given municipal area in order to improve the delivery of services and the 
identification local needs through broad-based participation.273 Local Strategic Partnerships, by 
the same token, were established in the United Kingdom from the early 1990s in order to “enhance 
community leadership, improve policymaking, improve services, increase stakeholder 
engagement, increase accountability and improve confidence.”274 
The IDP itself was designed to promote participatory development through the creation of spaces 
and platforms where ordinary citizens could meaningfully participate in the planning of municipal 
                                                          
271Therkildsen, Ole. 2001. “Efficiency, Accountability and Implementation: Public Sector Reforms in East and 
Southern Africa.” Democracy, Governance and Human Rights Programme Paper Number 3. United Nations Research 
Institute for Social Development. Whilst the argument can be made that the influence of donors played a role in 
shaping the ideological position of the ANC, in particular, the ANC’s own ideology was also not very decidedly clear. 
The adoption of neoliberal policies was also a result of pragmatic thinking within the ANC and other organizations, 
based on lack of experience with democratic local government and the need for international benchmarks.  By the 
same token, it reasonable for a donor to make certain demands regarding how they wish their funds to be utilized. 
The Cold War was based on the idea of alignment of ideology and material support from either the West or the 
Soviet Union.  
272 Harrison, pg. 190 
273 See Pillay, Collin. 2015. “Area Based Management (ABM): Understanding ABM in a Transforming Local 
Government Context”. Municipal Institute of Learning. online: 
http://www.mile.org.za/QuickLinks/News/Documents/ABM%20BACKGROUND.pdf  
274 See Russell, H. et al. 2010. “The role of Local Strategic Partnerships and Local Area Agreements in promoting 
equalities.” Equality and Human Rights Commission Research report 63. Online: 
https://www.equalityhumanrights.com/sites/default/files/research-report-63-the-role-of-local-strategic-
partnerships-and-local-area-agreements-in-promoting-equalities.pdf  
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programs and projects. The idea is that through public participation, there would be a nurturing of 
local government transparency and accountability. Participation through the IDP would enable the 
municipal officials to draw on the experiences of the citizens; the citizens on the other hand would 
be exposed to information regarding the intricacies of service delivery at local government level 
and the municipal budgeting. The plans drawn would not only consider the bureaucratic, grid and 
spatial issues; they would also consider the social issues such as economic development, poverty, 
social cohesion and safety and security.275  
Unlike the previous South African planning system with its emphasis on land-use 
management and structure planning, strategic planning provided a broader strategic 
and developmental focus on the planning and management of the city as a whole.276  
Such a strategic focus is based on the need to prioritize objectives in line with an integrated vision 
of the municipality in a given timeframe and available resources.  
In addition to efficiency, the IDP, as observed by Cash and Swatuk,277 was adopted as a tool 
through which the objectives of the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP)278  would 
be achieved. These objectives included primarily the need to drive towards social and economic 
equality. As noted in Chapter Two, prior to 1994, local government planning followed the 
Apartheid policy position; reinforcement of the spatial and amenities differences along race lines 
was what drove local government before the transformation. 
 
                                                          
275 Coetzee, Johnny. The Transformation of Municipal Development Planning in South Africa (post-1994): 
impressions and impasse.   
276 Ibid, pg. 12  
277 Cash, Corrine and Larry Swatuk. 2010. “Integrated Development Planning in South Africa: Lessons from the 
Dwars River Valley.” Urban Reform(2011) 22: 53-73  
278 The Reconstruction and Development Programme, better known as the RDP, was conceived as a 
comprehensive socio-economic policy framework of the ANC and its alliance partners, aimed at giving expression 
to the ideals of the Freedom Charter and provide a roadmap, as a programme of government, for the post-
Apartheid South Africa. The Reconstruction and Development Programme: A Policy Framework states that the RDP 
“seeks to mobilize all our people and our country's resources toward the final eradication of apartheid and the 
building of a democratic, non-racial and non-sexist future.” Pg. 4. The RDP was founded on six basic principles: an 
integrated and sustainable programme; a people-driven process; peace and security for all; nation building; linking 
of reconstruction and development; democratization of South Africa. Over the years, the RDP was replaced by a 
number of socioeconomic policies such as the Growth, Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) policy and the 
Accelerated and Shared Growth Initiative of South Africa (ASGISA).  
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b) Ward Committees  
The Municipal Structures Act also provides for the establishment of Ward Committees for 
category A and Category B municipalities279 to augment participation in local government. The 
Ward Committees are to be elected from amongst residents of a ward and the committees are 
chaired by the ward councilor. The ward committees have a primary responsibility of making 
recommendations to the ward councilor and the municipalities must make the necessary 
administrative arrangements to enable the ward committees to function effectively and 
efficiently.280  In 2005, the then Department of Provincial and Local Government promulgated the 
Guidelines for the Establishment and Operation of Municipal Ward Committees. “The guidelines 
state that the object of ward committees is to enhance participatory democracy in local 
government.”281 Certain powers and functions are provided to municipalities to delegate to ward 
committees.  
Ward Committees are required to meet regularly and ensure that ward meetings, involving the 
whole community, also occur as frequently. These meetings are aimed at ensuring that the Ward 
Committees, and the ward councilor, are always in touch with the concerns of the community 
through free public participation. In order to promote effective public participation, the elections 
of ward committees must take into account the demographics and the geography of the ward in 
order to ensure fair representation. 
The election procedure for members of the ward committees can be through either 
sectoral or geographic representation. In the case of the former, the different interest 
groups in the ward are first identified and then organizations and individuals 
representing each sector are invited to stand for election onto the ward committee. 
In the case of geographic representation, the municipality identifies the different 
geographic areas, villages or clusters of farms that will represent an equitable 
geographic spread of the residents of the ward, and then calls for nominations from 
each area.282 
                                                          
279 Category C municipalities are District municipalities with no specific wards, as they have local municipalities - 
with wards - that fall within their jurisdiction.   
280 See Part 4 of the Municipal Structures Act 117 of 1998 (as amended).  
281 Smith, Terence and Jaap de Visser. 2009. Are Ward Committees Working? Insights from six studies. Community 
Law Centre, University of the Western Cape. Pg. 10.  
282 Smith and de Visser, 2009: 12 
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One of the key provisions of the guidelines is that the ward committees must not be politically 
aligned. This is to allow for fair representations of diverse views and interests with regard to 
service delivery issues. Party politics has a way of strangling public participation through the 
limitation of access to the ward committee engagement for some people deemed to be non-
members of the dominant party. In addition, ward committees do not only facilitate democratic 
engagement, they also provide transparency and a platform for accountability.   
In addition and linked to Ward Committees, Operation Sukuma Sakhe283 - a flagship program of 
the KwaZulu-Natal provincial government - calls for the establishment of War Rooms (Ward Task 
Teams) in each ward in order to address different aspects of service delivery through public 
participation and integration. War Rooms are comprised of provincial government departments, 
local government, community based organizations, business and civil society. These structures are 
parallel to Ward Committees and are coordinated by the ward councilor with the assistance of a 
secretariat, who would be a Community Development Worker.284 The idea of war rooms is 
premised on using members of the community, such as Youth Ambassadors285 who are paid a 
stipend by the provincial government, to solicit information and concerns of the community by 
visiting each household in the ward and then consolidating these concerns to be referred to the war 
rooms and the provincial task team. This exercise is a form of public participation by members of 
the community in governance. It is believed that through this integration, service delivery could 
be more efficient, in terms of the objectives of Operation Sukuma Sakhe.  
 
 
                                                          
283 Operation Sukuma Sakhe was launched in 2011 by the premier of KZN. Its specific goal is “to rebuild the fabric 
of society by promoting human values, fighting poverty, crime, diseases, deprivation and social ills, ensuring 
moral regeneration, by working together through effective partnerships. Partnerships include civil society, 
development partners, communities and government departments, to provide a comprehensive integrated 
service package to communities.” See KZN Provincial Government. 2011. Operation Sukuma Sakhe: KZN Service 
Delivery Model. Online: http://www.mile.org.za/QuickLinks/News/PresentationsILO%20IE%202018/Day%201-
Operation%20Sukuma%20Sakhe.pdf. The programme has 6 main objectives, which include the establishment of 
tasks teams at various levels within the province; the profiling of communities and households at ward level; and 
the development of a stakeholder engagement plan.  
284 Operation Sukuma Sakhe has several aspects and structures designed to drive the operation at different levels 
of government and society in the Province.  
285 These are young people selected from communities as part of job creation to partake in various activities such 
as household surveys, and serve as mentors to young people in communities. 
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4.3 Conclusion  
The design of local government in South Africa in the post-Apartheid era is based on the theory 
of participatory democracy and the need for democracy to facilitate development. Although 
participatory democracy is a complex theory that engenders robust debate, the fundamentals of 
citizen involvement in government are sacrosanct. In this case, public participation is critical in 
addressing the structural issues of Apartheid local government, in relation to the legitimacy and 
responsiveness of government to the needs of the community.  
Given this understanding, this chapter has briefly discussed the legislative and policy framework 
that underpins public participation in local government in South Africa. Central to this framework 
is the Constitution of South Africa, which stipulates the autonomy of local government and the 
requirement that this sphere of government must promote public participation. In line with this, 
the Municipal Systems Act and the Municipal Structures Act respectively establish institutions 
and mechanisms through which public participation can be promoted at municipal level. From the 
Integrated Development Program to the formation of ward committees, these mechanisms are 
designed to enhance public participation and encourage government responsiveness.  
However, this chapter has also highlighted the fact that much of the structures and mechanisms of 
local government in the post-1994 South Africa were influenced by global public planning trends. 
The involvement of international bodies and planning experts limited the possibility for South 
Africa to develop a more organic local government framework that would most appropriately 
address the historical peculiarities of local government. This has implications on the functionality 
and appropriateness of these mechanisms and structures and how these affect the efficiency of 
service delivery in local government.   
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Chapter 5: Public Participation versus efficient service delivery 
5.1 Introduction  
At the center of this dissertation is the question of the relationship between democracy, through 
public participation, and efficiency in service delivery at local government level. The dissertation 
attempts to discover if the relationship between public participation and efficient service delivery 
is an antagonist one or whether these can coexist. The burden placed on local government by the 
Constitution is such that they are required to strike a seemingly precarious balance between 
delivering basic services to communities efficiently whilst simultaneously effectively promoting 
the participation of the community in local government governance. Given the numerous 
challenges facing local government, does public participation hamper or improve the efficiency of 
service delivery? What impact do the public participation mechanisms and processes, mentioned 
in the previous chapter, have on the ability of the municipalities to deliver services?  
This chapter continues the themes from Chapter Three beyond the public participation 
mechanisms, by considering the challenges and effectiveness of these in achieving the goals of 
participatory democracy, in the post-Apartheid South African local government context. More 
specifically, the focus is on Ward Committees, Community Development Workers and Ward Task 
Teams, otherwise known as War Rooms, as these are the structures designed to enhance public 
participation at community level. It is important to focus on these in order to understand the 
relationship between municipalities and the communities with respect to engagement and service 
delivery.   
 
5.2 Efficiency in Service Delivery 
Barichievy286 notes that in dealing with service delivery, often there is an interchangeable and 
incorrect conceptual use of effectiveness and efficiency. Efficiency is defined by the Merriam-
Webster dictionary as “the ability to do something or produce something without wasting 
materials, time or energy.” Whereas effectiveness is defined as being able to produce a result that 
                                                          
286Barichievy, 2006: 31 
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is wanted.287 From this we can, therefore, deduce that although these terms are often be employed 
interchangeably, they in fact mean different, albeit, related things. Efficiency is essentially about 
the mechanisms (time and resources) by which a result is arrived at. In other words, efficiency is 
mainly about how quickly and economically the result was produced.  
Conversely, effectiveness is not so concerned about the time and resources, as it is about the impact 
of the result. For something to be effective, it must simply produce the desired goal. Such goals 
are measured in terms of quality as opposed to quantity that, to a large extent, would be a measure 
of efficiency. Consequently, as has been noted by Barichievy,288 with regard to governance and 
service delivery, it is possible to be efficient without being effective; or be effective without being 
efficient. A programme could have the desired outcomes with a wasteful use of resources. 
Alternatively, it could be economical in the use of resources without sufficiently meeting the 
outcomes.  
Given the scope of this thesis and context of South African local government, the dichotomy 
between efficiency and public participation is the focus here in relation to service delivery. More 
often than not, the concerns raised by the protesting communities and researchers are that there are 
clear problems of efficiency in the delivery of services.289 Borge et al290 claim that efficient 
provision of services is now a concern of many governments and that the functions of political 
systems are critical in considerations of efficiencies. And it is now generally agreed that public 
participation is essential for effective service delivery. The involvement of citizens legitimizes the 
service delivery and targets areas that members of the public have raised as priority areas. 
However, the question of efficiency remains unresolved.  
Whilst a distinction between effectiveness and efficiency can fairly easily be made, it is very 
difficult to measure efficiency, particularly in the public sector. This is particularly challenging 
because of the differing preferences and priorities by the citizens and other stakeholders, such as 
business, trade unions and non-governmental organizations. Again Barichievy291 elected to use 
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289 It has to be noted that some of the problems identified with regard to inefficiency pertain to issues of 
corruption and lack of technical and managerial skills at local government.  
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time as a variable with which to measure efficiency. His premise is that the involvement of citizens 
in decision-making, invariably affects the amount of time it takes to arrive at a decision; which in 
turn affects efficiency. The structure of decision-making bodies, in as far as the involvement of 
citizens is concerned, in local government is what this research focuses on.  
 
Decentralisation  
Against the Apartheid backdrop of a centralised government system in which local government 
had very little decision-making powers and resources, South Africa opted to decentralise local 
government powers to municipalities. The purpose of this was to improve efficiency and 
accountability through the involvement of the public in the provision of services. Such an 
involvement of citizens in public affairs is seen as an essential aspect of good governance. “The 
benefits of decentralization are considered to include improved efficiency in public service, 
provision, more appropriate services, better governance, and the empowerment of local 
citizens”.292 With respect to efficiency and effectiveness, Stanton293 states, “the argument was that 
decentralising the delivery of public services removed public service monopolies, introduced 
competition, as well as improved the allocation resources”. In fact the United Nations294 defines 
decentralization as:  
A process through which powers, functions, responsibilities and resources are 
transferred from central to local government and/or other decentralised entities. In 
practical terms, decentralization is a process of striking a balance between the 
claims of the periphery and the demands of the centre. Decentralisation, when 
appropriately structured, provides an arrangement through which the crucial issues 
(such as those of national unity and indivisibility, how to safeguard national 
interests and ensure coordinated and even development, equity in the distribution 
of resources and local autonomy) can be recognised.   
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The premise of this principle is the notion that local governments are best positioned to understand 
the preferences of the people on the ground and can respond to those needs much more efficiently 
than national or provincial governments. The autonomy of local government enshrined in the 
Constitution allows for them to be in direct control of their budgets and revenue. This in turn 
increases a sense of responsibility in relation to service delivery expenditure. Thus promoting 
efficiency in service provision.295 
One of the ways in which decentralisation is said to improve efficiency in service delivery is 
through competition between local governments. Azfar et al296 postulate that competition between 
local governments to provide good quality services efficiently can also be driven by the 
phenomenon of people “voting with their feet”. This phenomenon describes a situation where 
voters show their preferences or level of dissatisfaction by moving to a municipal jurisdiction 
where services are perceived to be of better quality and where delivery is more efficient. The 
possible loss of citizens to other municipalities encourages competition for citizens and therefore 
revenue. As a result, efficiency and responsiveness improve. At least this is what the Public Choice 
Theory postulates.297 
In addition Azfar et al identify what they refer to as three ways in which decentralisation improves 
service delivery: allocative efficiency of resources, the reduction of corruption and the promotion 
of public accountability. These are linked to various dimensions of decentralisation: political 
                                                          
295Oates, W. 1999. “An Essay on Fiscal Federalism. Journal of Economic Literature. Volume 37, 3. PP. 1120 – 1149.  
296Azfar, O. et al. 1999. Decentralization, Governance and Pubic Services: The Impact of Institutional Arrangements, 
a review of the literature.  Iris Center, University of Maryland.  
297 Carefully considered, Public Choice Theory does not seem to take into account several factors that contribute to 
municipal efficiency in relation to participation through leaving. In order for “voting with feet” to be an effective 
tool of motivation towards improved efficiency, the socio-economic conditions of the competing municipalities 
must allow for some form of parity of economic resources between municipalities. If two municipalities are very 
different in terms of efficiency, largely as a result of unequal resources, the departure if citizens from the poorer 
municipality to the richer one would not help to improve efficiency in the former. Secondly, there is an assumption 
that municipalities pursue service delivery efficiency and compete with each in order to attract citizens. Whilst 
certainly municipalities can draw revenue from more citizens, its obligations and challenges with respect to 
efficient service delivery to all the citizens also increase. This burden can be observed in the rapid urbanisation, 
which puts pressure on certain municipalities, such as eThekwini, Msunduzi, Tshwane, Jo’burg, to provide more 
services such as housing, sanitation and electricity to increasing numbers of people—many of which are too poor 
to contribute meaningfully towards the municipality’s revenue. Lastly, the Public Choice Theory makes the 
assumption that citizens want to and can afford to change their municipal residencies based on service delivery 
concerns. This may be an elitist view that in fact defeats the purpose of advancing the agenda of effective public 
participation in local government in order to enhance the efficiency and effectiveness of service delivery.  
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decentralization, market decentralization, administrative decentralisation and fiscal 
decentralization.298 
Allocative efficiency is closely related to fiscal decentralisation. The idea here is that providing 
local government with fiscal autonomy improves efficiency in service delivery as local 
government can allocate resources more quickly and more effectively. Priority areas can be more 
easily identified through engagement with communities by the authorities as part of the Integrated 
Development Plans of municipalities. This further creates as sense of ownership on the side of the 
community, which minimises opposition and protests against plans and use of resources, provided 
that the allocation is per the agreement and in line with the identified priority areas.  
The local government structures are empowered by legislation to exercise substantial budgetary 
and fiscal responsibilities autonomously. Over and above the subsidies from the central grants, 
municipalities are also able to raise revenue through taxes, property rates user charges. In some 
instances, municipalities may even have the authority to borrow money from financial institutions 
in order to meet their service delivery needs. All of this is geared towards ensuring allocative 
efficiency through direct control of the municipal purse.  
However, Sow and Razafimahefa warn that fiscal decentralization can result in inefficiency if 
economy of scale is important. “Devolution of public service delivery to a small-scale local 
government can decrease efficiency and increase costs if economies of scale are important in the 
process of production and provision of some specific public goods.299  The size of the municipality 
and the population could affect efficiency. The smaller the municipality the less likely fiscal 
decentralization would lead to allocative efficiency because of the small revenue and skills 
availability to ensure the efficiency. It was perhaps this realisation that led to the adoption of the 
two tier system for category B and category C municipalities. Category C municipalities (district 
municipalities) have a responsibility of providing bulk services within the areas of their influence, 
thereby assisting the smaller local municipalities they coordinate.  
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Siddle and Thomas propose the following as the definition of political decentralisation, having 
taken into account the various definitions posited by others: 
Political decentralization is the process whereby the sub-national governments, 
elected by local participants, are established within the constitutional framework 
and granted political power and authority to govern over particular geographical 
areas. In short, it is the transfer (whether whole or partial) of the political power 
and authority from central to sub-national governments, and therefore involves 
balancing the exercise of power between various levels of government.300 
Such a definition captures an aspect of what political decentralization is. Authority is conferred 
upon local government through legitimate elections by the local community and transference of 
powers and responsibility from the central government. The local governments have authority to 
legislate in the form of bi-laws; to make policy decisions in relation to their jurisdiction in line 
with the constitutional framework; to deliver services in accordance with the municipal plans; and 
to foster effective public participation. Fostering effective participation is a crucial pillar of 
political decentralization as it encourages accountability and responsiveness from the elected 
officials.301 The knowledge that citizens themselves elect officials encourages efficiency and 
responsiveness, for fear of losing votes during elections.  
However, Kauzya302 contends that such an understanding of political decentralization is limited in 
that it places emphasis on the vote. A more comprehensive and effective understanding of political 
decentralization also focuses on the “voice” of the people. That is to say, over and above the 
mechanism put in place for electing representatives, there should be structural arrangements geared 
towards empowering people with respect to decision-making. The people must be able to influence 
“implementation, monitoring, and evaluation of decisions that concern their socio-political, 
economic wellbeing and to constantly demand accountability from their local leaders.”303 
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Political decentralization is also meant to create an environment of transparency and openness in 
governance. This in turn would minimize corruption and fraud. To this extent, the legislative 
framework provides for the establishment of a number of structures with various responsibilities 
and terms of reference in order to facilitate political decentralization. 
  
5.3 Public Participation Structures and Decision-making 
Integrated Development Plan  
As noted previously there are a number of public participation structures and mechanisms 
established by way of legislation and policies. Chief amongst these is the IDP process, which is 
designed to promote participatory development through the creation of spaces and platforms where 
ordinary citizens could meaningfully participate in the planning of municipal programs and 
projects. The IDP is the primary tool through which the needs and concerns of the citizens can be 
taken into account during decision-making. As such, there is a requirement for the IDP to enhance 
public participation and improve the efficiency of service delivery in local government.  
Binns and Nel304 posit that there two central pillars of the IDP are the  centrality of citizen 
participation - at grassroots level - in democratic planning; and the move towards refocusing the 
mandate of local authorities towards development over and above service delivery: hence the 
legislative requirement to link the municipal budget with the IDP.305 
The IDP is an all-encompassing process in which all aspects of local government issues are 
considered in relation to each other and in relation to the needs of the people they affect, with the 
involvement of the said people in identifying and addressing them. It is for this reason that the IDP 
is a compulsory tool, as prescribed by the Municipal Systems Act of 2000. Van Rooyen states,  
The planning process, which results in structured integrated development plan, 
indicates a local council’s medium and long-term development strategy. The plan 
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is a collective vision of the development that is envisaged for the municipality. It 
provides guidelines for resource utilization to ensure sustainability.306  
The IDP is developed to coincide with a term of office of the municipal council, which is five 
years. By the same token, “a municipality is required to review its IDP annually. Reviews allow 
the municipality to expand up or refine plans and strategies, to include additional issues and to 
ensure that these plans and strategies inform institutional and financial planning.”307 
However, there are several scholars who have raised concerns about the extent to which, through 
the IDP, public participation has been enhanced and the efficiency of service delivery improved. 
Mohamed states that “the IDP processes are still far from achieving full community involvement 
in policy-making as stipulated in the legislation - they remain very much  top-down and the 
communities are merely allowed to comment on proposals developed by city officials rather than 
being invited to contribute to the content before its drafting.”308 Naidu309 concurs by stating that 
the reading of the IDP documents demonstrates a disjuncture between contextual realities and the 
plans as drawn up by the elites and bureaucrats. The powers of the citizens, in so far as decision-
making is concerned, is limited to consultation. Mohamed310 further holds that even during such 
‘public participation platforms’, there are large sections of the population that remain excluded 
from the purposes. 
Furthermore, giving impetus to the aforementioned argument, a number of municipal IDP’s are 
drafted by professional consultants311, whose approach to service delivery and public budgeting is 
not adequately informed by the history and socio-political context of the municipalities. The 
outsourcing of the IDP drafting process results in the perpetuation of the disconnect between the 
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municipal officials and the communities: between the intended beneficiaries of the IDP and those 
who are tasked with the responsibility to implement it. Outsourcing dilutes the very purpose of 
participatory democracy in that it removes the sense of ownership of the construction of the IDP 
by the citizens and their elected officials. This further results in the production of IDPs that do not 
reflect the aspirations and priorities of the communities for which they are intended. It is, in certain 
instances, a technocratic de-contextualized exercise.  
However, the outsourcing of the IDP and the relative exclusion of the community in the conception 
and implementation of the process means that the IDP can be drafted rather quickly by the 
consultants, with the technical knowhow. In such instances, the public consultation forums are 
merely to rubberstamp the process and the plan.   
 
Ward Committees  
As noted in Chapter 4, the Municipal Structures Act provides for the establishment of Ward 
Committees in all municipal wards to serve as platforms to assist the ward councilors in service 
delivery. These are critical as platforms for citizen participation, as their constituted by residents 
of the wards. Naidu312 makes the following point that:  
A ward committee is meant to be: an advisory body; a representative structure; an 
independent structure; and an impartial structure that must perform its duties 
without fear, favour or prejudice. The ward committee system is an attempt to 
ensure that democracy not only is the preserve of a central parliament but that 
citizens have a stake in governance at the local scale. Ward committees are 
instruments through which the Freedom Charter clause ‘the people shall govern’ 
may be realized. 
 
The notion of ward committees was established to respond to the constitutional principle of local 
government driving the broader participation of the citizens over and above electoral processes. In 
other words, they were established to ensure that local government becomes the sphere of 
government in which vibrant citizen participation takes place, closest to the needs and contexts of 
the people. Key to this vibrancy and effectiveness, ward committees are meant to be representative 
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of the community in which they operate. They also have a duty to promote wide participation of 
citizens in their wards and liaise between the municipality and the ward community.  
The broader powers and duties of ward committees are defined through the Municipal Systems 
Act, read together with the Municipal Structures Act. Nominated by the community members, 
ward committees are meant to function in a non-party political manner. That is to say, their primary 
interest must be to the citizen and therefore not be aligned to political parties. Instead they should 
act as an advisory body to the ward councilor, who also chairs the ward committee, driven by the 
views and needs of the ward citizens.   
Beyond advising, the ward committees have very limited decision-making powers and duties, 
except those specifically delegated by municipal councils.313 Section 74(b) of the Municipal 
Structures Act states that ward committees have “such duties and powers as the metro or local 
council may delegate to it in terms of section 32.”314 This makes it possible for municipalities to 
empower ward committees in terms of decision-making, enhance their efficiency and 
effectiveness, provided that such delegated powers do not include executive powers. Through this 
legislative provision, it becomes clearer to see the centrality of ward committees—at least 
intentionally—in deepening democracy at local government level through enhancing participation 
by citizens. Although limited by the legislation, progressive municipalities could empower the 
ward committees with the necessary powers to assist the ward councilor in the delivery of services, 
beyond just mere advising. This would be possible as ward committees represent the diversity of 
views and interests within a ward and are informed, through deliberative engagement, with the 
citizens of the ward.  
The importance of ward committees as instruments of public participation at local government is 
based on the transformation of local government as envisioned by the Freedom Charter. In 1955 
the Congress of the People, as organized and convened by the Congress Alliance, adopted the 
Freedom Charter, which was a vision of South Africa, informed by the wishes of the people to 
reverse the legacy of Apartheid and colonialism. One of these legacies, amongst many, was the 
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disempowerment of the black majority in terms of participation in the overall governance of the 
country. In response to this reality, the Freedom Charter315 stated: 
The People Shall Govern! 
Every man and woman shall have the right to vote for and to stand as a candidate 
for all bodies which make laws; 
All people shall be entitled to take part in the administration of the country; 
The rights of the people shall be the same, regardless of race, colour or sex; 
All bodies of minority rule, advisory boards, councils and authorities shall be 
replaced by democratic organs of self-government 
 
It was therefore imperative that during the overall post-Apartheid transformation, democratic 
principles of public participation and representation are infused in all spheres of government. 
Consequently, in line with the principle of a wall-to-wall municipal system, the view was that 
municipalities must be organized according to wards, to which each citizen would belong. Each 
ward would have a councilor to represent its interest at a municipal level. And to assist the 
councilor and also provide an additional mechanism for public participation, ward committees, 
consisting of 10 people elected by the community elected by citizens, were established. As of 
2015, 4277 ward committees had been established across the country.316 Msunduzi Local 
Municipality has 37 “functional ward committees”317 whilst eThekwini Metropolitan Municipality 
has 102 functional ward committees.318 
 
 
Effectiveness of Ward Committees 
In terms of the effectiveness of ward committees in fostering meaningful public participation as 
intended by legislation, substantial research by several scholars has, over the years, unfortunately 
concluded that there are significant challenges. A few issues appear as common across the country, 
although to varying degrees depending on the context of the municipality. Naidu319 argues, using 
the work of Smith and De Visser,320 that the issues can be broadly grouped to the following themes: 
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representivity; powers and functionality (including levels of skills); access to information and 
influence on decision making; and relationship to other structures. Given that these are broad 
themes, it is only logical to align the argument along them, in no particular order.  
 
a) Representivity 
The first major issue is that of representivity. The legislative framework provides that ward 
representation is the responsibility of the ward councilor. By the same token, ward committees are 
there to provide assistance and advice to the councilor, who also chairs and convenes the ward 
committees. Having being elected by the community, ward committees are meant to deepen 
democracy through deliberation and representation of the diversity and the different sectors within 
the ward. Piper and Deacon321 make an astute observation around the inherent flaw in the design 
of the system. Quoting Yunus Carrim, they state: “essentially, the system overall seeks to provide 
a balance between giving residents the fullest space to participate in municipal affairs and ensuring 
the right of councilors to ultimately govern,” The flaw is illustrated by Steyn322 who argues, using 
research conducted by Friedman,323 that often ward committees are undermined or sidelined in the 
processes. In some instances they are simply used for compliance purposes, with decisions having 
already been taken at a municipal government level. In this regard, only the voice of the councilor 
is given credibility in terms of the representation of the ward. 
 
Part of the problem regarding representivity is the issue of the way in which the ward committees 
are constituted in some places. Whilst committee members are supposed to be elected by the 
community during a community meeting to represent the different interests within the ward, there 
is evidence of ward committees being deeply politicized along party lines. Evidence suggests that 
ward committees are hotly contested party political spaces. More often than not, most, if not all, 
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of the ward committee members will be aligned to the same political party as the ward councilor. 
Ward issues are often conflated with party issues. And given that the councilor chairs the ward 
committee meetings, and often councilors also chair the political party branch in that ward, the 
meetings of the ward committee can be confused with the branch meetings of the political party.324 
In such instances, often it is the views of the dominant party members or supporters that are often 
prioritized. Consequently, the diversity that exists within wards is at times not comprehensively 
represented in the ward committees, making them less democratic than intended in the legislation.  
 
Despite the local government electoral system that allows citizens to vote directly for their ward 
councilor, the party political system of the country heavily influences the nature and scope of 
participation. Ward councilors are the only government representatives that are elected directly by 
citizens. The other municipal councilors are elected through the Proportional Party Representation 
System. Section 46 of the Constitution of South Africa provides for an electoral that: (a) is 
prescribed by national legislation; (b)is based on the national common voters roll; (c) provides for 
a minimum voting age of 18 years; and (d) results, in general, in proportional representation. This 
means political parties compile internal lists of candidates, in order of priority, for the various 
legislatures. Voters vote for the party (not the individuals nominated by the party) and the number 
of seats allocated each political party in the legislatures is in proportion to the number of votes that 
party receives during the elections. The Electoral [Act 73 of 1998] as amended, regulates the 
general electoral process in the country.  
 
In line with the Constitution of South Africa and the Electoral Act, municipal elections are 
regulated by the Local Government: Municipal Electoral [Act 27 of 2000]. This Act provides for 
the election of ward councillors as well as councillors to serve as proportional representative 
councillors. Organisations are permitted to submit a list of candidates nominated for municipal 
council and or names of nominated individuals to contest as ward councillors. Moreover, 
individuals can also contest ward councillor elections through either being nominated by an 
organisation or by a citizen in good standing in the specific ward. The seats in municipal councils 
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are allocated in proportion to the number of votes each contesting organisation received during the 
elections.    
 
In many cases, candidates contesting for ward councilor, often align themselves with certain 
political parties and campaign, as individuals, under the banner of those parties. This results in the 
dominance of party political interests in terms of how municipal councils engage with citizens. 
The party lines, depending on how debates are structured in the dominant party within that 
municipality, binds the ward councilors, who in turn have to do their best to ensure that their ward 
committees follow suit. In other words, the quality of the work of ward committees is dependent 
on the decisions taken at a party level, which councilors, as members of those parties, are expected 
to implement.  In such instances, ward committees are not sufficiently representative of the 
communities in which they are located. The different sectors in communities may find it difficult 
to have a voice in community affairs because of the often competing party-political agendas. 
 
b) Powers of Ward Committees  
One of the more serious challenges of ward committees is the notion that, although municipal 
councils could delegate certain powers to ward committees, they rarely ever do so, which leaves 
ward committees with no powers to effectively conduct their business of representing the various 
views and interests of ward citizens. Of this Naidu states, “Hamlin’s (2005) study of ward 
committees in the city of Johannesburg noted a high level of frustration among ward committees. 
They indicated that many of their ideas and proposals were not taken seriously.”325 Steyn326 
concurs, referring to Msunduzi municipality, that: 
 
The evidence shows that where ward committees are functional they remain under 
the influence of the local party branch –the party remains the dominant player. In 
this way, party political influence not only impinges on the autonomy of ward 
committees, but also serves to ostracize a broader repertoire of different voices.  
 
Even when there are vibrant and more inclusive discussions at a ward committee level, ward 
committees have no powers in relation to their municipal councils. Because the ward councilors 
                                                          
325 Naidu, Pg. 4 
326Sreyn, Pg. 9 
98 | P a g e  
 
chair the ward committees, they are expected to represent the interest of their wards in the 
municipal councils. The extent to which they are able to do this effectively depends, in many cases, 
on their rank in the party political structures. “One of the key impediments to ward committees 
appears to be the limited power most ordinary ward councilors have within the deliberation 
processes of municipal councils. This becomes especially evident when a ward councilor is not a 
member of the majority party.”327 This therefore means that not only do ward committees have no 
power to take binding decisions in relation to their communities; they also have no power to hold 
the elected municipal officials accountable. They are simply advisory bodies that serve at the 
behest of the ward councilor and are constituted for municipal compliance or party political 
agenda.  
… a ward committee is not a structure with a mandate to govern in the ward. This 
duty rests solely with the ward councilor. Members of the ward committee do not 
carry any mandate from constituency…Ward committee members are merely 
people within a community, that know sectors of the community well, and are thus 
able to assist the ward councilor around certain issues of governance.328 
 
 
c) Access to information and influence on decision making 
In addition to the absence of power, some ward committees, depending on the socioeconomic 
profile of the ward itself, have very little skills to engage effectively with the information related 
to municipal functions, particularly service delivery. Masotho329 and Madumo330 opine that such 
lack of skills is often due to the absence of effective training, financial and political support for 
ward committees by either the municipalities or the provincial government. In some instances a 
lack of higher education leaves some space open for deliberate exclusion of ward committee 
members through the use of sophisticated and technical language by municipal officials. This 
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http://ul.netd.ac.za/bitstream/handle/10386/1100/mosotho_ma_2013.pdf?sequence=1 
330Madumo, Ongkopotse S. 2011. The Role of Ward Committees in Facilitating Public Participation with Particular 
Reference to Mamelodi, South Africa. Unpublished. Online: 
http://www.repository.up.ac.za/bitstream/handle/2263/28524/dissertation.pdf?sequence=1 
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results in a lack of proper understanding of the roles and responsibilities of ward committees, as 
well as the understanding the complexities of municipal processes and functions. For instance, 
Everatt et al331 argue that the quality of public participation in IDP forums is severely hampered 
by the technical and sophisticated language used in the process. Even ward committee members, 
especially in poor wards, often find it difficult to engage effectively with draft IDP documents; 
often choosing to simply adopt the draft without serious scrutiny. This in turn could mean that the 
views of the community (which may even be contrary to what is proposed) are not taken into 
account in the final IDP, which affects service delivery in such wards.  
 
This is perhaps a consequence of flawed process design, which ensures that public participation, 
through ward committees, remains ineffective, even though the impression of public participation 
has been created. In some instances, even municipal officials also lack the necessary technical 
skills to engage with and interpret the IDP document, and other municipal documents, for the 
general public. This is so as consultants are often employed to draft the IDP documents, without 
sufficient consultation with citizens, through structures such as ward committees. Ndletyana and 
Muzondidya332 argue that the shortage of skills within municipalities affects their ability to deliver 
service including promoting public participation and strengthening ward committees. For 
participation to be effective, communities must understand and shape municipal policies and 
decisions. This requires information to be accessible to them and to have informed forums that 
could provide them with more information where necessary. An interview responded of this 
study333 in Msunduzi Municipality stated: 
 
  In my ward, a lot of people do not attend meetings. I don’t even know  
  who the ward committee members are and what they do. Every time  
  when you attend a meeting nobody actually knows anything. 
 
 
                                                          
331Ibid  
332Ndletyana, Mcebisi and James Muzondidya. 2009. “Reviving Municipal Capacity in the Context of Local 
Government Reform: 1994-2009.” In Jackson, Paula et al. (eds.) South African Governance in Review: Anti-
corruption, local government, traditional leadership. HSRC Press, Cape Town.  
333Interview with civil society (MCS41) 
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d) Relationship to other structures 
The legislative framework of local government places the ward committee system at the centre of 
public participation.334 However, there are often other participation mechanisms that are effective 
in certain contexts, which the introduction of ward committees undermines. For instance, in rural 
areas there are Community Forums where broad community issues are discussed, with the 
guidance of the traditional leader. Ward committees in these areas become a parallel and 
sometimes adversarial structure.  
Furthermore, ward committees can be seen to undermine the community-based organizations that 
have long track records in working with communities and providing certain services, such as public 
education and providing lines of communication with the municipality. Their voices as 
organizations are suppressed through the much politicized ward committee structures.  
 
Community Development Workers 
In addition to the ward committees and the complexities thereof, there are also Community 
Development Workers (CDW). This initiative was intended to augment the identified gaps and 
challenges of the ward committees and the ward councilors by serving as information bridges 
between municipal officials and community members. They are meant to provide information on 
the various government programmes and resources; also provide municipal officials with 
information on the various concerns of the communities. This would be possible because, unlike 
ward committees, CDWs are selected and formally trained on how local government works. They 
are selected (not elected) from amongst the communities335. Ndletyana and Muzondidya state that 
the programme for CDWs was based on the following principles: 
 Popular participation and self-initiative to tackling community concerns. 
 Collective action and joint decision-making. 
 Initiatives based on the actual needs of the community. 
 Community awareness of their own problems and what government does. 
                                                          
334Naidu, Pg. 5  
335 DPLG, 2007: 10 
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 Promoting community leadership, and not expecting government to do 
everything.336 
Despite the many successes the CDWs have achieved in bridging the gap between community 
members and municipal officials, their existence creates a number of related challenges in terms 
of both efficiency and enhancing democracy. Firstly, CDWs occupy a peculiar space in local 
government. Whilst they are meant to improve the quality of service delivery and communication 
between communities and the municipality, in so doing their direct communication with 
government departments can be perceived as undermining the ward councilors and the ward 
committees. Their functions overlap significantly with the functions of the ward councilors and 
ward committees. By engaging directly with various government departments, the CDWs are 
perceived by some councilors and ward committee members as undermining the relevance and 
‘authority’ of the elected structures. Consequently, this creates a feeling of resentment and rivalry. 
The result is political interference in their work within communities. In some instances, this takes 
the form of party ‘deployment’ to CDWs in order to ensure that party line is toed. In other 
instances, the very existence of the CDWs is questioned through the budgeting purpose.  
Secondly, CDWs add another layer in an already cluttered and highly complex service delivery 
web in local government. They are based in communities, as are ward committees and ward 
councilors. As such, it is often confusing for ordinary citizens to understand the need to have 
CDWs, ward committees and a ward councilor operating in the same space, purportedly towards 
the same purpose of improving the efficiency of service delivery. Given that the CDWs are often 
more accessible and more effective than ward committees, the need to participate in ward meetings 
is negated, especially where party politics merge with ward committee functions. In places where 
there is effective coordination and cooperation between the different structures in a ward, questions 
can be raised about the relevance of having all structures. What is the point in having ward 
committees, which have no real powers and largely communicate with the municipality through 
the ward councilor, when the CDWs can bypass even the ward councilor and liaise directly with 
the relevant department?  
Furthermore, CDWs require significant amount of resources in order to discharge their duties 
effectively. One of the most important resources is transport in order to engage with the community 
                                                          
336 See Ndletyana and Muzondidya, 2009: 32  
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within their own context. The scarcity of resources affects the nature and availability of transport 
for CDWs that would enable them to initiate and sustain community programmes. This is 
especially the case in large rural wards where physical access to infrastructure is very limited. In 
addition to transport, there is also serious limitations in certain instances with regard to 
communication resources, such as mobile devices and internet access. By the same token, ward 
committees face the same challenges in engaging with community members in similar contexts. 
They too require resources, from the same source, dedicated to support their work. The duplication 
of resources creates competition between different ‘service delivery’ vehicles and strains the 
public purse.  
 
Operation Sukuma Sakhe (War Rooms) 
The provincial government of KwaZulu-Natal as led by the Premier, adopted Operation Sukuma 
Sakhe in 2009 as a mechanism for coordination of all government departments and municipalities 
to address concerns and needs more efficiently and effectively. The principle is to bring 
government as close as possible to the people on the ground in a single forum involving all 
stakeholders. The main goal of Operation Sukuma Sakhe is to rebuild the fabric of society through 
fighting poverty, crime and other social ills and promote human values through community 
partnerships involving civil society, government departments and citizens. These partnerships seek 
to integrate services and improve efficiency by promoting and widening public participation.337 
In terms of how the initiative is structured, the office of the Premier is generally responsible for 
the coordinating of the project. There are several hierarchal structures that are then meant to 
spearhead the operations at various levels. There is a Provincial Task Team (PTT) that is meant to 
coordinate the operation at a provincial level. That is complemented by the District Task Teams, 
for district coordination, Municipal Task Teams, which coordinate activities at municipal level 
and the Ward Task teams, otherwise known as the War Rooms.338 Government departments, 
community-based organizations, youth ambassadors, ward task teams, ward committees and 
                                                          
337 Province of KwaZulu-Natal. Operation Sukuma Sakhe: KZN Service Delivery Model.   
338 See Macwele, Benedict. 2014. Assessing the Impact of Integrated Service Delivery on Poverty and Employment 
Creation: a case study of Operation Sukuma Sakhe in the eThekwini Metropolitan Municipality. Unpublished   
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community development workers are supposed to be represented in all of these various task teams 
throughout the province to ensure proper integration. Deliberations and issues emerging out of 
War Rooms are then cascaded to Municipal Task Teams, followed by the Provincial Task team.  
Figure 1. Illustrates the complexity of the organizational structure on which the OSS is based. One 
of the key elements of OSS is the oversight setup between the different structures at the multiple 
levels. At ward level, the ward committees, which are chaired by the ward councilor, exercise 
oversight responsibilities over the Ward Task Teams (War Rooms) 
 
Figure 1. Operation Sukuma Sakhe Structure339  
 
In addition to the task teams, there are Community Care Givers and Youth Ambassadors. The 
Community Care Givers (CCG) are selected from amongst community members and trained to 
                                                          
339 Source: Province of KwaZulu-Natal. Operation Sukuma Sakhe: KZN Service Delivery Model.  
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fulfill various functions. They are regarded as fieldworkers who are primarily responsible for 
profiling households for the provincial government. They also serve as advocates for different 
programmes and campaigns of government. In other words, they are instrumental in relaying 
information about government programmes to communities, whilst at the same time assisting 
government in understanding the needs of each community through understanding the profile of 
the households in any given area. The Youth Ambassadors also perform similar functions with the 
CCGs. However, their focus is mainly on effecting positive behavioral changes amongst the youth 
in wards. This is in line with the goal of OSS to rebuild the fabric of society. Both these structures 
are designed to report to the War Rooms. 
 
War Rooms  
Operation Sukuma Sakhe envisages War Rooms as fundamental to the process in that they are the 
OSS structure closest to communities. Based in wards, the War Rooms are composed of officials 
from all government departments, community-based organizations, business, non-governmental 
organizations, traditional leaders, ward councilors, municipal officials and representatives from 
the Local Task Team. To structure their work, they have leadership in the form of a chairperson, 
deputy chairperson and a secretariat.340 And the Local Task Teams, together with the CDWs for 
the ward must mobilize resources for the War Rooms with respect to their functions. This includes 
providing training to the members.341  
It is in the War Rooms that the reports are received from the CCGs and Youth Ambassadors in 
terms of the profile of the needs of the households and the community in the ward. Through the 
involvement of several stakeholders, the War Rooms are designed to improve service delivery 
efficiency through integration and coordination. They serve not just as platforms for engagement, 
but also spaces of referral.  
However, there are a few challenges pertaining to the War Rooms and efficiency in service 
delivery. The first stems from the establishment and functionality of these structures. In a report 
                                                          
340Province of KwaZulu-Natal. 2012. Operation Sukuma Sakhe: Implementation Model, Guidelines for Coordination. 
341 Given the plethora of different interests represented through many structures, it is immediately evident to this 
researcher that the political and personal dynamics pose, perhaps, the biggest challenge these War Rooms face—
making their name apt.   
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by the Maurice Webb Race Relations Unit, only 11% of the 785 War Rooms in KwaZulu-Natal 
were fully functional.342 Amongst the reasons for this is the lack of sufficient resources support for 
the War Rooms. This includes lack of an appropriate venue, shortage or absence of office 
equipment to enable effective functioning of these structures, lack of real commitment from the 
various abovementioned War Room participants. 
The second challenge is one that pertains to the politicization of the War Rooms. Data collected 
on the OSS, particularly the War Rooms, by Macwele suggests that there is confusion regarding 
the role of the War Rooms with respect to service delivery.343 Given the interference by some 
politicians in the operations of the War Rooms, community members get confused about the role 
of these structures. Instead of discussing community-related issues, the agenda would shift towards 
focusing on party politics, particularly electioneering. This may be particularly acute in contexts 
where various political views are inserted into the deliberations.  
Moreover, the distinction and relationship between War Rooms and Ward Committees is not 
always clear. Both structures are aimed at improving service delivery efficiency through the active 
participation of community members. Each structure is meant to represent, albeit in varying 
degrees and focus, the different sectors or interests within the communities. For Ward Committees, 
such representation is through the elections of individuals within the communities for all 
community members. The engagement with the communities is mainly in the form of ward 
meetings where issues are supposedly discussed freely and openly for the ward councilor to take 
up. On the other hand, War Rooms structure representation in the form of groups. The involvement 
of community members is through engagement with Youth Ambassadors and CCGs, who largely 
collect information from individual households for the purposes of profiling. Such information is 
then transferred to Community Development Workers, who are also embedded in Ward 
Committees, and then transferred to the other structures of OSS until it reaches the premier’s office 
and the relevant government departments.  
In addition, there is the question of oversight. Figure 1 above suggests that Ward Committees have 
oversight responsibility over War Rooms. However, as stated earlier, Ward Committees have no 
significant powers. They are regarded as important, but ‘advisory’ bodies. Their agendas are set 
                                                          
342 Maurice Webb Race Relation Unit. 2012. Report on the Functionality of OSS in KZN for the Office of the Premier   
343 See Macwele, 2014: 93.  
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by the ward councilor, whom they are meant to assist in terms of addressing the service delivery 
issues of the ward. As such, the extent to which they are able to exercise oversight over the War 
Rooms, if at all, is limited by the political dynamics between the ward councilor and the leadership 
of the War Room. The efficiency of delivery of service may be limited by lack of real 
accountability and limited meaningful public participation.  
 
5.4 Conclusion   
In looking at the nexus between public participation and developmental planning in local 
government, Olivier344 makes a number of important observations regarding problems associated 
with structures or forums of public participation in local government. He postulates that structures 
create, amongst others, the following risks: the dominance of elites and special interest groups; 
undermining the political process by by-passing the elected officials; serve as platforms for 
opposition political mobilization; can be energy, resource and time demanding; and deepen social 
exclusion. More crucially for purposes of this chapter, he states:  
…The risk is that participatory structures demand and receive so many resources 
that development becomes impeded.  There is a widely held view that at 
government level that too much participation may be considered to undermine the 
capacity for development by putting too much strain on resources and institutions, 
particularly where mechanisms and structures are not sufficiently institutionalized.  
This perspective then argues that there might be too much participation i.e. a point 
beyond which community participation becomes self-defeating and fails to meet 
broad objectives.  A call has been made that this has indeed been the case in the 
most recent round of IDPs.   
 
Given the number of public participation structures at local government and the need to ensure 
their functionality, this argument about resource scarcity in relation service delivery has merit. In 
fact, Irvin and Stansbury345 argue that one of the disadvantages of public participation is in relation 
to costs.  
                                                          
344 Olivier, André. A Critical Review of Public Participation in Development Planning within South African Local 
Governments. ODA Occasional Paper. Pp. 17 – 18  
345 Irvin, Renee A. and John Stansbury. 2004. “Citizen Participation in Decision-making: Is it Worth the Effort?” 
Public Administration Review, Vol 64 (1). Pp. 55-65  
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Although comparative costs have not been subject to close scrutiny, the low end of 
a ‘per-decision’ cost of a citizen participation group is arguably more expensive 
than the decision-making by a single agency administrator, even if the citizen 
participants’ time costs are ignored.346  
 
The argument is that it can be cheaper and more efficient for a well-trained and politically astute 
official to arrive at the same decision that the community might also arrive at. The resources spent 
on the very process of public participation - which include organizing logistics for meetings and 
equipment for community forums - could in fact be spent on the implementation of service 
projects. Mayoral Imbizos are often very financially costly as they often also include entertainment 
to try and maximize attendance and possibly participation by community members. In some 
instances, such as in very large or rural wards, where transport is a problem, there are costs in 
terms of facilitating transport arrangements for community members to get to the meetings.  
 
However, despite the costs and inefficiencies with respect to public participation and service 
delivery, this chapter takes the position that the costs and inefficiencies can be also be attributed 
to the way in which participation is structured. There are various structures and processes ideally 
aimed at improving service delivery through enhanced coordinated service delivery. However, as 
the chapter has indicated, these processes place very heavy demands on very limited resources; 
they may cause confusion amongst citizens in terms of their individual roles and responsibilities; 
they provide multiple platforms for party political competition. With the multiple structures of 
public participation and service delivery at local government, there is increased redundancy, which 
creates bottlenecks in terms decision-making and service delivery efficiency. 
 
Flowing from the discussions in this chapter, the next chapter discusses the question of public 
participation and service delivery efficiency in the context of Msunduzi Local Municipality.  
 
 
 
                                                          
346 Ibid: Pg. 7 
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Chapter 6: The Case of Msunduzi Local Municipality  
6.1 Introduction  
The purpose of the chapter is to examine the central question of this dissertation and the discussions 
of the previous chapters within the context of Msunduzi Local Municipality. The chapter begins 
by providing a brief profile of the Municipality, which includes the history of political violence 
and the intraparty political squabbles that have at some point affected the Municipality’s ability to 
deliver services. The Municipality’s organizational structure, its ambitions to be declared a 
metropolitan municipality (Category A) are discussed specifically in relation to an underlying 
tension embedded in a multitier local government system and its impact on both service delivery 
and public participation.  Having discussed the municipal mechanisms in relation to service 
delivery and public participation and its over real or perceived performance based on official 
reports and opinions from interviews, the chapter concludes that there seems to be a positive 
relationship between effective public participation and improved efficiency in service delivery.  
 
6.2 Msunduzi Local Municipality Profile  
Msunduzi Local Municipality is Category B municipality, which was established in the year 2000 
in terms of Section 12 of the Local Government - Municipal Structures Act 117 of 1998 (as 
amended). The Municipality is located in the KwaZulu-Natal Midlands and serves a population of 
618000 (African= 81.1%, White = 6%, Indian/Asian = 9.8%, Coloured = 2.9%).347 The main 
centre of the municipality is the city of Pietermaritzburg, which also serves as the administrative 
and legislative capital of the Province of KwaZulu-Natal. The city also serves as the seat of 
uMgungundlovu District Municipality to which Msunduzi Local Municipality, as a category B, 
municipality belongs. It is the main economic centre of uMgungundlovu district - the second 
largest in the province, after eThekwini Metropolitan Municipality. Table 1 is the distribution of 
the population per ward according to the 2011 Census.  
 
                                                          
347 See Statistics South Africa 2011 Census  
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Table 1: Ward Population Distribution348 
 
One important point to note from Table 1 is the relative equitable distribution of the population 
across the wards. Although there variations in population sizes, there is no ward that is significantly 
larger than the rest. However, ward 21 is the only ward with a population less than 10000 people. 
However, the relative evenness (for lack of a better term) of the wards in terms of population sizes 
does not automatically translate to evenness in terms of political and economic influence. The full 
significance of the table can be better understood with a more in-depth analysis of each of the 
wards and the demographic profile of its residents.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
348 Source: Stats SA, 2011 Census 
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Table 2: Unemployment rate in Msunduzi349  
 
 
Table 2 illustrates the unemployment rate of 33%. The economy of the municipality is mainly 
driven by services, as many of the provincial government departments are based here. The strong 
manufacturing base has significantly shrunk, which contributes to the 33% unemployment rate. 
According to Stats SA, youth unemployment stands at 43.1%.350 
Msunduzi Municipality is a highly politically contested municipality because of its strategic 
political position as the seat of the provincial government and its influence in the uMgungundlovu 
District. The contestation takes several forms. Firstly, there is the party political contestation based 
on local government elections. During the last days of Apartheid and the transition period, 
Pietermaritzburg was one of the many places in KwaZulu-Natal that saw fierce political violence. 
Francis states that estimates of causalities of the violence in the province between 1984 and 1994 
                                                          
349 Source: Stats SA 2011   
350 Ibid  
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vary from 11000 to 16000.351 The violence was largely between IFP and the ANC, which were 
fighting for political influence and control of the province and its cities. The violence took the 
form of urban/rural divide, where the ANC seemingly controlled the urban or peri-urban areas and 
IFP, through traditional leaders, controlled the rural areas of the province.352 The rural areas 
reached very closely into the urban and peri-urban areas of Durban and Pietermaritzburg in a way 
that the interface between the two different lifestyles acted as a catalyst to the violence. Of this, 
Adam and Moodley353 state: 
  The A.N.C. ethos embodies the urban views of those who have left tribalism 
  behind. They dress in suits and ties on many occasions, and tend to watch and/or 
  participate in traditional ceremonies with amused smugness, in much the same 
  way as westerners enjoy folk dances. The A.N.C.'s internationalism and  
  cosmopolitan universalism limits its appeal to the African rural population. For 
  many of them, the A.N.C. appears as an elitist urban group whose leaders speak 
  English and look down upon the ethnic customs of the peasants. Many people in 
  rural communities and migrant hostels deeply resent the political crusades of 
  urban-based youths who are challenging a traditional order, in which children 
  'obeyed', and left politics to, their elders. The older generation views such  
  activism as ungratefulness, as well as wasteful of educational opportunities for 
  which the parents sacrificed so much. On the other hand, the latter are accused 
  by their children of having compromised themselves with the system. This  
  generational conflict has torn apart many families and pitted communities  
  against each other, particularly in the semi-urban settlements surrounding  
  Pietermaritzburg, where the squeezed rural lifestyle and the urban values  
  directly clash under conditions of great impoverishment. 
This urban-rural dynamic still exists in some form when it comes to local government elections 
and, to some extent, in provincial politics. On average, 6 political parties contest local elections in 
                                                          
351 Francis, Suzanne. 2011. Institutionalizing Elites: Political Elite Formation and Change in the KwaZulu-Natal 
Provincial Legislature, Afrika-Studiecentrum Series. Pg. 55. Online: 
https://openaccess.leidenuniv.nl/bitstream/handle/1887/18561/ASC-075287668-3104 -01.pdf?sequence=2 
352Certainly there were other factors that perpetuated the violence. These include the work of the Apartheid 
government to fuel violence between the ANC and IFP and characterise it as ‘black-on-black violence’ in order to 
make a case for its segregation policies.  The other factor was the political rhetoric from leaders from both the ANC 
and IFP that emphasised the issue of differences between the parties and exacerbated the violence. There were 
other issues related to village wars and taxi violence that masked themselves as political violence.  See Jones, N. J. 
2005. “News values, ethics and violence in KwaZulu-Natal: Has media coverage reformed?” Critical Arts Vol. 19 (1). 
Pp. 150-166 
353 Adam, Heribert and Kogila Moodley. 1999. “Political Violence, ‘Tribalism’, and Inkatha.” The Journal of Modern 
African Studies, Vol. 30 (3), Pp. 485-510 
112 | P a g e  
 
the municipality, with the ANC dominating the ballot. The IFP historically received most of its 
votes from wards in the rural areas, such as Vulindlela and Sweetwater. However, this is changing 
as the ANC has made significant inroads in rural areas over the years within the municipality since 
the year 2000. The IFP’s support declined from 17.63% in the year 2000 to 5.13% in 2016. The 
ANC on the other hand has had its support increase steadily in the municipality from 56.5% in the 
year 2000 to 65.35% in 2016.354 As a result of this, the way in which reforms or municipal projects 
are received by communities can also be linked to this dynamic, as it will be noted later with the 
establishment of ward committees.  
However, Francis cautions against oversimplifying the nature and root cause of the violence as 
being a conflict simply between the ANC and the IFP, which also led to the rural/urban divide. 
Citing several scholars, she states:  
The violence became diffused through other conflicts that made it incoherent 
(Johnston 1994: 188-189). These include conflicts over the regulation of, and 
access to, resources and services (such as minibus taxi rivalries and access to basic 
services such as water supplied through standpipes), clan or tribal conflicts over 
succession rights, vendetta type local rivalries, crime and intergenerational conflict. 
Minaar documents one such conflict between youth and their parents which 
escalated into a hostel versus ‘civic’ structure conflict, and then ANC-IFP conflict 
as those involved turned to political parties for assistance (Minaar 1992).355 
 
Furthermore, there are pronounced intra-party political squabbles - particularly within the ruling 
party - which inevitably affect the functions of the municipality. The Municipality is not only the 
capital city of the province of KwaZulu-Natal; it is also the seat of uMgungundlovu District 
                                                          
354 For a detailed comparison of the results, see The Independent Electoral Commission results dashboard: online: 
https://www.elections.org.za/LGEDashBoard2016/ The IFP failed to win any municipal ward in both 2011 and 2016 
local government elections. However, the decline in the IFP support over the years, in both rural and urban areas, 
cannot be attributed automatically to the growing popularity of the ANC and other political parties. Several factors 
can be associated with the IFP’s electoral decline, including the formation of the National Freedom Party, which 
broke away from the IFP led by the popular former Zululand Mayor, Zanele kaMagwaza-Msibi.   
355 See Francis, 2011. Pg. 55. She further argues that essentially there are four plausible possible causes of the 
violence. The first relates to the legacy of apartheid in terms of producing inequality and poor socioeconomic 
conditions. Secondly, the Apartheid apparatus played a role in pitying one side against the other in order to 
instigate and sustain the violence. The third is that the violence was a turf contest between the IFP and the ANC. 
The fourth reason, Francis states as “the breakdown of political institutions as regulating mechanisms, enabled 
emerging competing interests in opposition politics (and other non-political areas), autonomy in the self-regulation 
of force, at the same time as social and political cohesion broke down and new parallel structures of authority 
emerged.” Pg. 57  
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Municipality and Msunduzi Local Municipality. Consequently, there are several simultaneous 
layers of contestations taking place within the political parties regarding positions in the different 
government structures that reside in the Municipality. Intra-party contestations are often about the 
control of resources within the different government structures in the city. To control the dominant 
party in the region means to have considerable powers of deployment and patronage. This also 
means that there are issues around conflation and interference between the administrative and 
political officials, which, at times, can severely impact on the municipality’s effectiveness and 
efficiency in service delivery - as the elite within the ruling party seeks to control municipal 
resources.  
In accordance with section 139 of the Constitution for maladministration and financial 
mismanagement in 2010 the Msunduzi Local Municipality in KwaZulu-Natal was placed under 
administration for maladministration and serious financial mismanagement - having failed to 
collect over R500 million in debts.356 “In February it was reported that the municipality had enough 
money to function for a week. The municipality's net available cash fell from R120 million in 
2007/2008 to R1.7m in 2008/2009.”357 According to some respondents there are several reasons 
why the municipality was placed under administration. This meant that the provincial government, 
through the Department of Cooperative Government and Traditional Affairs took over the running 
of the municipality and appointed an administrator in accordance with section 39 of the 
Constitution of South Africa. In this regard, Piper and Africa state, “Unfortunately the quality of 
governance in the city has suffered since 2006 due to ANC factionalism and the rapid change of 
officials, although corruption and incompetence also contribute to instability in office.”358 Chief 
amongst these reasons was the internal political squabbles within the ruling party in the region. 
The contestation of positions within the ruling party and the subsequent blurring of the “boundaries 
between politicians and officials”359 in the municipality meant senior political figures in the region 
interfered with the administration of the municipality, which left the control systems vulnerable to 
exploitation. For instance, in 2011 the political squabbles regarding local government positions 
                                                          
356News24. 29 April 2010. Msunduzi Expects R600 mln Shortfall. Online: 
http://www.news24.com/news24/archives/witness/msunduzi-expects-r600-mln-shortfall20150430   
357IOL News.11 March 2010. Everything is in Turmoil Right Now. Online: 
http://www.iol.co.za/news/south-africa/everything-is-in-turmoil-right-now-473784 
358 Piper, L and Cherrel Africa. 2012. “Unpacking race, party and class from below: Surveying citizenship in the 
Msunduzi municipality.” GEOFORUM, 43. Pp. 219-229  
359 See de Visser, 2010.  
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within the ANC led to the unsuccessful burning of the ANC regional offices in uMgungundlovu 
District360 and “the dissolution of Executive Committees torn apart by struggles for mayoral 
nominations in the KwaZulu-Natal (KZN) municipalities of uMgungundlovu and Msunduzi.”361  
Furthermore, despite the internal governance and political challenges affecting the municipality, 
Msunduzi has ambitions of becoming a metropolitan municipality (a category A municipality). In 
2008 it emerged that the Council of Msunduzi Municipality wanted the Municipality to be declared 
a Metro. Not long after that, confusion began around the status of uMgungundlovu District 
Municipality,362 to which Msunduzi belonged, which also wanted a metro status if the latter was 
granted one. This resulted in a political debate which, amongst other things, halted the declaration 
of Msunduzi as a metropolitan municipality.363 In 2015, new calls for Msunduzi Municipality to 
be declared a metro, before the 2016 elections, resurfaced.364  However, the same questions around 
the makeup of the new proposed metro and the status of uMgungundlovu District Municipality 
remained thorny and unresolved.  
Several respondents365 further reported that one of the concerns regarding the declaration of 
Msunduzi as a metro was the ongoing problem of political interference in the administration of the 
municipality. A few municipal managers366 have been removed from their positions partly for 
refusing to ‘make resources available to political leaders’ or to follow external political 
instructions. With the larger budget that comes with being a metro, and the lack of proper financial 
prudency which led to the administration period, there were heated debates around the readiness 
of Msunduzi to be declared a metro. Consequently, a decision was taken to postpone the decision 
                                                          
360Mail and Guardian.01 July 2011. Rank and file at odds with ANC leaders. Online: 
http://mg.co.za/article/2011-07-01-rank-and-file-at-odds-with-anc-leaders 
361Masiko-Kambala, Pamela. 2011. Local Politics and Factionalism: local government as a site of 
contestation. Online: http://www.afesis.org.za/local-governnce/local-governance-articles/148-local-
politics-and-factionalism-local-government-as-a-site-of-contestation.html  
362 The Witness Newspaper. 2018. “Push for Midlands Metro”. Online: 
https://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/push-for-midlands-metro-20180812 
363Mthembu, Bongani. 08 September 2008. “Call for Another KZN Metro.” IOL News. Online: www.iol.co.za 
364 The Witness Newspaper. 2015. “No Metro Status for Msunduzi Anytime Soon.” Online: 
https://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/No-metro-status-for-Msunduzi-any-time-soon-20150514  
365Interview with municipal official (MO9) and interview with civil society (MCS49) 
366 For instance, in 2016, Mxolisi Nkosi was suspended and subsequently removed as the municipal manager “in 
what was ascribed to ANC factional turmoil in the province.” The Witness Newspaper. 2016. “Who is the new 
Municipal Manager?” Online: https://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/who-is-the-new-msunduzi-manager-
20160605  
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until year 2021.367 What complicates the issues even further is that uMgungundlovu District 
Municipality is located in the same city of Pietermaritzburg, which is governed by Msunduzi Local 
Municipality.  
Chapter 4 of the Municipal Structures Act provides for different executive leadership structures 
that municipalities can adopt, with certain provisos and in conjunction with Part 2 of the Act. They 
can choose between executive committee and executive mayor systems.368 Accordingly, Msunduzi 
is demarcated in 37 wards and has adopted an executive committee system composed of 9 
members.369 The functions of the executive committee system, according to the Municipal 
Structures Act:  
(2) The executive committee must- 
(a) identify the needs of the municipality; 
(b) review and evaluate those needs in order of priority; 
(c) recommend to the municipal council strategies, programmes and services 
to address priority needs through the integrated development plan and 
estimates of revenue and expenditure, taking into account any applicable 
national and provincial development plans; and 
(d) recommend or determine the best methods, including partnership and other 
approaches, to deliver those strategies, programmes and services to the 
maximum benefit of the community. 
(3) The executive committee in performing its duties must- 
(a) identify and develop criteria in terms of which progress in the 
implementation of the strategies, programmes and services referred to in 
subsection (2) (c) can be evaluated, including key performance indicators 
which are specific to the municipality and common to local government in 
general; 
(b) evaluate progress against the key performance indicators; 
(c) review the performance of the municipality in order to improve- 
(i) the economy, efficiency and effectiveness of the municipality; 
                                                          
367Municipalfocus. 19 March 2015. “Mergers”. Online: www.municpalfocus.co.za/mergers 
368Ss. 42-45 of the Municipal Structures Act states that should a municipality opt for the executive committee 
system, sufficient number of councilors must be elected to the committee, provided that no more than 20% or 10 
councilors are elected. The executive committee must reflect the proportional representation of the municipal 
council. By the same token, should the executive mayoral system be chosen, Ss. 54-60 stipulate that the council 
must elect an executive mayor and (with the approval of the MEC for local government) a deputy mayor within 2 
weeks of its election.  
369 See Annexure A 
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(ii) the efficiency of credit control and revenue and debt collection 
services; and 
(iii) the implementation of the municipality's by-laws; 
(d) monitor the management of the municipality's administration in accordance 
with the policy directions of the municipal council; 
(e) oversee the provision of services to communities in the municipality in a 
sustainable manner; 
(f) perform such duties and exercise such powers as the council may
 delegate to it in terms of section 32; 
(g) annually report on the involvement of communities and community 
organisations in the affairs of the municipality; and 
(h) ensure that regard is given to public views and report on the effect of
 consultation on the decisions of the council. 
(4) An executive committee must report to the municipal council on all decisions taken by 
the committee. 
 
Headed by the mayor, and reporting to the municipal council through various standing and 
portfolio committees, the executive committee is the decision-making body tasked with the 
leadership responsibility of the municipality. In this regard, the municipality adopted an 
administrative organizational structure which is aligned with the National Key Performance Areas 
for municipalities. "There are five Business Units in the Municipality, which mirror the committee 
portfolios and report to the Municipal Manager. These Business Units, each headed by a Deputy 
Municipal Manager, ensure that services are delivered to the people of the Msunduzi Municipality, 
and are structured as follows: 
 Infrastructure Services; 
 Community Services; 
 Economic Development; 
 Financial Services; and 
 Corporate Services”370 
Figure 2 illustrates the administrative structure of the municipality. In addition, and most pertinent 
for this study, the municipality also developed an Area Based Management model (ABM), which 
                                                          
370 Msunduzi Local Municipality. Draft Integrated Development Plan for the 2016-2017 to 2020-2021 Financial 
Year. Pg. 106 
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falls within the ambit of Community Services Business Unit. Msunduzi Municipality defines ABM 
as being about community facilitation, increasing participation, conflict resolution, community 
advocacy, relocation of communities, monitoring and speeding delivery through the decision 
tracker. It is this Unit that drives public participation through Ward Committees and other forums. 
There are two main approaches to ABM: hard-core ABM, which is about decentralization of 
functions and soft-core that focuses on community interaction. Msunduzi adopted the latter 
approach as it supposedly promotes service delivery integration, close proximity location of offices 
to communities and minimizes red-tape by creating a centralized service delivery centre located 
within communities to address certain needs without the need for citizens to engage with various 
municipal departments. 
 
Figure 2: Top Administrative Structure of Msunduzi Municipality.371 
 
 
                                                          
371 Source: Msunduzi Municipality IDP Review for 2015/17-2016/17 
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A closer analysis of the administrative structure illustrated above, Area-Based Management falls 
under the third tier management level under community service.  It is unclear how actual 
coordination and integration of service through ABM occurs within the context of the illustrated 
structure, at the same functional management level with the other community service-based areas. 
Based on the structure, in order for the ABM unit to be successful at driving public participation 
in integrated service delivery, it is almost entirely depended on the cooperation of the other units 
falling the Community Services business unit. This, in fact, may add to the inefficiency and the 
red tape. It is also unclear from this structure how ABM, specifically the unit, fits within the 
broader provincial Operation Sukuma Sakhe programme, in relation to public participation and 
service delivery integration.  
 
 6.3 Public participation in Msunduzi Municipality  
Public participation in Msunduzi Municipality is guided by the Msunduzi Municipality 
Community Participation Policy (the Community Participation Policy). The Community 
Participation Policy is based on the prescripts of the Municipal Systems Act, which require 
municipalities to encourage the involvement of citizens in municipal affairs, particularly in 
decision-making. To achieve this, the Municipal Structures Act provides for the establishment of 
Ward Committees as one of the mechanisms of public participation. In addition to the ward 
committees, the Community Participation Policy further makes provision for use of Izimbizo and 
Community Meetings as additional participatory mechanisms.  
The values underpinning the policy are that public participation leads to better service delivery, 
more effective decision making, priorities setting by staff and committees, an increase in 
community satisfaction, enhances community development, and leads to greater accountability. 
The policy makes no mention of efficiency in service delivery, except by way of a ‘better service 
delivery’ statement, which is not clearly defined. In fact, the Community Participation policy does 
not contain much by way of clear details on community participation.  
In general, a few key findings emerged from the interviews with both municipal officials and civil 
society with regard to patterns of participation in the Municipality. Firstly, levels of public 
participation in the municipality are generally low, as demonstrated by the responses from both 
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municipal officials and civil society. Table 3 is an analysis of the responses on the levels of public 
participation.  
Table 3: Levels of Public Participation in Msunduzi Municipality372  
 
 
Whilst public participation is generally low, the levels of participation are higher in more affluent 
wards and amongst more affluent people. This can be attributed to the differences in access to 
information and the tools to engage with the information more confidently. For instance, one 
respondent, a councilor of a ward, stated that residents of his ward participated better in 
comparison to other wards because they have multiple mechanisms for participation. Over and 
above regular ward meetings, they had access to the internet, personal transport and telephones. 
This allows them to engage with the municipality continuously online, through email or call the 
municipality to express their views and attend meetings. Such resources are not as easily available 
in poorer, mostly black, areas. Given the difference in economic resources, the nature and level of 
                                                          
372 source: SPSS analysis of interview responses on levels of participation   
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participation is lower in poorer wards. Residents of these wards often lack the resources, such as 
computers, telephone and transportation to engage with the municipality over and above ward 
meetings.373 
In addition to the socioeconomic dynamics, but closely related to it, race also seems to be a factor 
in the levels of participation. Some respondents observed that white people tended to participate 
more in municipal affairs, compared to other race groups. This is largely because white people 
generally have access to multiple mechanisms of participation and have easier access to 
information (through the internet, access to various forms of media and information and 
technology devices). This is further exacerbated by the issue of language. Although some 
documents do get translated into isiZulu, only a few documents actually get translated due to 
resource constraints. This means English remains the dominant language of communication at 
least in relation to official documents, of the municipality. Even in instances where meetings are 
conducted in isiZulu, some critical technical terms and concepts cannot be easily translated and 
therefore understood in isiZulu. This is perhaps more clearly observed budget-related discussions.  
Furthermore, multiple respondents both from the municipality and civil society stated that the 
levels of participation are much higher amongst women compared to men and the youth.374 This 
phenomenon was common across the socioeconomic class and race. There a number of possible 
reasons for this. These go beyond the remit of this study. However, it is noted here that perhaps 
the most likely reason is that women, particularly black women, are the group mostly affected by 
socio-economic inequality and poverty. Community concerns can hardly be divorced from family 
concerns. It is mostly women who are caregivers to their families, which, therefore means their 
interests are intertwined with those of the community. This is an area for further investigation 
through a more focused study. 
It must be noted that from personal observation the Msunduzi Municipality has multiple forums 
in which people can freely engage in municipal affairs. Meetings of municipal committees are 
open to the public and, upon request, the right to speak is afforded to the public. However, such 
opportunities are often utilized by organized formations (such as CBOs), politically astute 
individuals and people with in-depth knowledge of how the municipality functions. Ordinary 
                                                          
373Interview with municipal official (MO22).  
374Interview with civil society (MCS48) 
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citizens, many of whom are not highly educated, often find engagement intimidating and too 
technical. Often there is little attempt from the municipal officials to simplify the discussion to 
allow for a more open engagement.  
An additional point of frustration, particularly amongst the respondents from civil society -
including some opposition parties - is that in a politically contested space such as Msunduzi 
Municipality, public participation in municipal forums can be an exercise in compliance with the 
legislation as opposed to genuine engagement. The lack of decision-making powers for the public 
can be used to stifle debate, especially when, as it happens in some instances, decisions appear to 
have been taken at a party level and imposed in the committee. In such situations, influencing 
decisions at party level can be more useful, which defeats the very purpose of free and open public 
participation in local government. This imposition of external party decisions on the municipal 
committees has the effect of over-politicizing the municipality to the detriment of genuine public 
participation, and contrary to the spirit of the Constitution.   
 
6.3.1. Integrated Development Plan 
One of the ways in which public participation is fostered in the municipality is through the 
Integrated Development Plan (IDP). In line with the Municipal Systems Act, the municipality has 
to develop an IDP, which informs the municipal budget. The process must be an inclusive and 
open one, based on the participation of the public and the different stakeholders. In this regard, 
Msunduzi Municipality fulfills the public participation obligation in various ways. The first way 
or mechanism - in no particular order - is the IDP Representative Forum375. The IDP 
Representative Forum is composed of the following:  
 Exco Members, 
 Councillors, 
 Traditional leaders, 
 Ward Committee Chairpersons, 
 Stakeholder representatives of organized groups. 
 Advocates of unorganized groups, 
                                                          
375 See Msunduzi Municipality Integrated Development Plan (IDP) Review for 2015-2016. Pg. 181.   
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 Resource persons, 
 Other community representatives, 
 National and provincial departments’ regional representatives, 
 NGOs, and  
 Parastatal organizations 
This Forum has the responsibility, amongst other things, to: 
 Represent the interest of the municipality’s constituency in the IDP process; 
 Provide an organizational mechanism for discussion, negotiation, and decision 
making between the stakeholders inclusive of municipal government; 
 Ensure communication between all stakeholders representatives, inclusive of 
municipal government; 
 Monitor the performance of the planning and implementation process; 
 Institutionalize participation in integrated development planning; 
 Ensure geographic and social representation; and 
 Analyse issues, determine priorities, negotiate and reach consensus.  
 
The IDP process, is driven by the IDP Steering Committee, which consists of various municipal 
officials. These include the Mayor, City Manager, Strategic Executive Managers and union 
representatives.376  What is worth noting with the composition of the IDP Steering committee and 
the IDP in general is that the component of public participation is traditionally vested in the office 
of the Municipal Speaker in Msunduzi Municipality. However, the Speaker is not involved in the 
operations of the municipality, including the planning and implementation of the IDP, including 
the aspect of public participation in the IDP. Although this is to be expected and in line with the 
law, it does add to the complexity and even confusion regarding public participation in the 
municipality. This further adds to the point raised earlier regarding political interference. There 
are simply too many structures of participation with very little coordination. 
More importantly, although the structures and mechanisms for participation in the IDP process 
seem to have been effectively established, the levels of participation remain low. This is largely 
                                                          
376 The IDP Steering Committee functions are to: Provide terms of reference for all reviewing and planning 
activities; Commission IDP planning studies, programs, and projects; Process, summarize, and document outputs 
from subcommittees, teams etc.; Recommend amendments to the contents of the IDP; Prepare, facilitate, and 
document meetings and workshops; Ensure alignment and participation in the determination and prioritization of 
plans and programs in the spirit of cooperative governance. See Msunduzi Municipality Integrated Development 
Plan (IDP) Review for 2015-2016. Pg. 182.   
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due to poor communication with communities about these participation mechanisms. In fact, the 
Msunduzi Municipality’s own Living Conditions Survey 2016/2017 of community satisfaction 
concluded that most participants were not aware of the IDP workshops and therefore did not 
participate. Moreover, it was concluded that “We find that in the last year 77.6% of the respondents 
have NOT attended any other consultative meeting with the Municipality. Furthermore 70.9% of 
the respondents are NOT satisfied with the opportunities that they have for consultation on 
Municipal affairs.”377 Table 4 below is an illustration of the survey findings, which are in line with 
the findings from the interviews.378 
 
It is unclear from the research what causes the lack of awareness or lack of communication. The 
municipality contends that IDP processes and events are marketed throughout the municipality 
through posters, leaflets, community newspaper adverts and loudhailers. Evidence of this could be 
observed around the city. Nevertheless, the claim by the communities that there is lack of or 
inadequate communication from the municipality remains.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
377Msunduzi Municipality Living Conditions Survey 2016/2017. Pg. 30  
378See Table 2 
124 | P a g e  
 
Table 4: Public Participation in Msunduzi Municipality IDP379  
 
There seems to be an inconsistency in terms of what the municipality claims about communication 
and what the community states. It appears that public participation in IDP processes in Msunduzi 
is also affected by political frustration on the side of the citizens. The activities that led up to the 
placing of the municipality under administration, and the continuous political squabbles, have 
created a situation of mistrust between the municipality and its citizens. Feelings of hopelessness 
and being ignored are not uncommon in the municipality, as was specifically underscored by civil 
society respondents. “There is a feeling in the communities we are involved with that their voices 
are not and cannot be heard when politicians are busy enriching themselves and fighting amongst 
themselves.”380 The frustration is also caused by what communities refer to as ‘ukushela’ 
(courting)381, which refers to politicians engaging with communities more seriously towards or 
during local government elections or bi-elections and then disappearing afterwards. This does not 
                                                          
379 Source: Msunduzi Municipality Living Conditions Survey 2016/2017. 
380Interview with civil society (MCS45) 
381Ibid 
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only lead to frustration but also the depression of civic engagement and growth in apathy, 
especially amongst men and the youth. 
  
6.3.1.1 Ward Committees  
As mentioned earlier, the Municipal Systems Act provides for the establishment of ward 
committees for each ward in category A and category B municipalities. Given that Msunduzi 
Municipality has 37 wards, a corresponding number of ward committees had to be established. 
However, Hulane makes the point that the establishment of ward committees was difficult and 
highly contested.382 He states:  
The Msunduzi Municipality appointed Lavender and Associates as consultants to 
facilitate the process of establishing ward committees throughout the municipality. 
This team of consultants then went on a roadshow (mobile vehicles where 
information was provided to residents) in all wards to empower communities with 
the necessary knowledge on the role and significance of ward committees, and 
people agreed that they were ready to participate in the actual establishment of these 
committees. Follow up meetings were then arranged where elections were to take 
place. One of the key issues that had to be agreed upon with the communities was 
that there was a need for ward committees that were representative of the 
community, including gender and geographical conditions of the ward. It was at 
these meetings that communities voted for their ward committees. This proved to 
be a serious challenge as there was more interest from communities than originally 
anticipated which made counting a very daunting task.383 
As a result, several objections and reservations were made regarding the legitimacy of the process. 
And given the geopolitical divide in the municipality, acceptance of the ward committee system 
depended very much on urban-rural lines and party political allegiances. People living in urban 
wards, especially in townships dominated by the ANC, accepted the legitimacy of the process and 
the outcomes of the election of ward committees. For the people leaving in urban areas, especially 
suburbs dominated by the Democratic Alliance (DA),384  the process was viewed as having been 
                                                          
382Hulane, Zwelitithini. 2003. An Analysis of Communication in Development in the eThekwini and Msunduzi 
Municipalities. Masters dissertation. Unpublished.  
383 Ibid. Pg. 34.  
384 The Democratic Alliance was established though the amalgamation of the Independent Party, the Progressive 
Federal Party and the National Democratic Movement in 1989. In the year 2000, the Democratic Party became the 
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manipulated by the ANC to ensure control of most, if not all, ward committees in the municipality. 
On the other hand, people living in the rural wards of Vulindlela, which is largely under traditional 
authorities and previously dominated by the IFP, objected to the process as they saw it as an 
attempt at undermining the authority of the traditional leadership and entrenching the dominance 
of the ANC.385 Despite the initial objections, the city gradually established ward committees in 
most wards.  
However, Piper and Deacon386 found in their study of the ward committees in Msunduzi 
Municipality that there is a multitude of problematic issues with ward committees as instruments 
of public participation. One of the more critical issues pertains to the conflation of party politics 
and ward committee operations. Piper and Deacon state: 
In Msunduzi between 2001 and2006 almost all the IFP ward committees, many 
ANC ward committees and some DA ward committees appeared to be subject to 
their respective party’s control. Notably, the perception of the party politicization 
of ward committees seems to be shared by a range of respondents, ranging from the 
DA, and the African Christian Democratic Party (ACDP) to some Residents’ or 
Ratepayers’ Associations and the Speaker, Colin Gardner. In this regard the official 
in charge of public participation stated that the ‘politicisation’ of ward committees 
is especially a problem in historically-black areas. Noteworthy in this respect is 
that, of the 10 wards described as ‘politicised’ by Mngadi, seven ward councilors 
refused to talk to us, including four of five IFP wards. Indeed Mngadi claims that 
the IFP ward committees are seen as extensions of the IFP branch, and that 
individuals aligned with other parties, and principally the ANC, are simply not 
welcome.387 
                                                          
Democratic Alliance after merging with the New National Party and the Federal Alliance. The Democratic Alliance is 
a liberal organisations with strong antiapartheid struggle credentials, with roots dating the establishment of the 
Progressive Party in 1959. It is currently the official opposition at a national level and has grown steadily over the 
past general elections. However, the combination of its liberal ideology and its history, the DA struggles rid itself of 
the perception that it is a party of white liberals. However, recent history indicates deep-rooted ideological 
differences with the DA’s interpretation of liberalism in the context of the post-Apartheid South Africa. These 
revolve largely around the role of the state in addressing the challenging legacies of apartheid—driven by the 
demands and expectations of a growing black party membership. See Koekemoer, Anja. 2017. How the ANC, the 
DA and the EFF Construct South Africa as a Nation. Masters Thesis Stellenbosch University. Online: 
https://scholar.sun.ac.za/bitstream/handle/10019.1/102844/koekemoer_construct_2017.pdf?sequence=1&isAllo
wed=y 
385See Piper Laurence and Bettina von Lieres. 2008. “Inviting Failure: Citizen Participation and Local Governance in 
South Africa”. Citizenship DRC Special Issue Vol. I No. 1, January  
386Piper, Laurence and Roger Deacon. 2006. “Deepening Democracy, Enhancing Elite Control or Just Ineffectual? 
Ward Committee Politics in the Msunduzi Municipality.” CCS Grant Report.  
387Ibid. Pg. 15 
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In fact Piper and Deacon further make an example of how some ward meetings turned into political 
party branch meetings. This is possible largely because of the way in which ward committees are 
elected and how they function. In many cases, the leadership of the dominant party branch also 
becomes the ward committee. And the chairperson of a ward committee, the councilor, is 
predominantly also the chairperson of the branch of the dominant political party. This has serious 
implications on the accessibility and the functionality of the ward committees. Steyn388 makes the 
following observation:  
 
The evidence shows that where ward committees are functional they remain under 
the influence of the local party branch – the party remains the dominant player. In 
this way, party political influence not only impinges on the autonomy of ward 
committees, but also serves to ostracize a broader repertoire of different voices.  
 
This phenomenon continues to plague ward committees in the municipality. A number of 
respondents, particularly from civil society, reported that participation in ward committees is based 
on party political affiliation and influence within a particular party, which dominates the ward. 
Party discipline is enforced even in ward meetings to the extent that people cannot engage freely 
to the extent of criticizing their own ‘comrades’ in public meetings - lest they invite the fury of the 
party branch leadership. “If you are not one of them - their political party - they call you all sorts 
of names. And as soon as you say something they don’t agree with ‘point of order.’”389 This 
insertion of branch political party agenda in contributes to the low levels of participation in ward 
meetings and the low levels of functionality amongst wards.  
 
With respect to ward committee functionality, COGTA reported that in 2015, for instance, 23 of 
the 37 wards were non-functional. Table 5390 provides a summary of the report on the functionality 
of wards within Msunduzi municipality. The report states that part of the non-functionality can be 
                                                          
388Steyn, I. Towards Transformative Local Participatory Governance. Unpublished.  
389Interview with civil society (MCS51) 
390Department of Co-operative Government and Traditional Affairs. 2015. Msunduzi Municipality Ward Committee 
Functionality Verification Report.  
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attributed to a number of issues. These include the absence of a ward committee, non-compliance 
with reports to the municipality, and few or no ward committee/community meetings.  
 
Table 5: COGTA: Msunduzi Municipality Ward Committee Functionality Verification Report391 
Name of 
Municipality 
No of 
ward
s 
No of 
Function
al wards 
Functional 
wards 
No of non-
functional 
wards 
Non-
functional 
wards 
Comments  
Msunduzi 37 14 (7,8,9,11,1
6,18,19,23,
27,28,32,3
3,34,37) 
23 (1,2,3,4,5,6,
10,12,13,14,
15,17,20,21,
22,24,25,26,
29,30,31,35,
36) 
No ward 
committee/comm
unity 
meetings/ward 
reports 
 
The functionality of ward committees can also be affected by the very broader diversity of 
representivity. Because municipal wards are contested political spaces, ward committees are 
viewed as extended political spaces for inter-political party contestations. This is especially acute 
in mixed income wards with mixed racial and class demographics, such the wards in Northern 
Areas, CBD, Ashburton and Eastern Areas (e.g. wards 36, 35, 25, 29, 24). In such wards, class and 
race politics is often used to suppress different opinions or push certain ideologies without 
compromise. This is done mainly as a continuation of broader regional and national competition 
between political party differences - as opposed to genuine ideological differences. In this regard, 
one respondent stated, “If you allow the enemy to succeed in implementing their plans 
unchallenged in the ward, you are cementing their control of the ward. This is not acceptable.”392 
Whilst this strategy is intended to undermine the dominant party in the ward, in preparation for the 
next local government elections, it has clearly understood and politically acceptable (amongst the 
                                                          
391 COGTA: Msunduzi Municipality Ward Committee Functionality Verification Report 
392Interview with civil society (MCS45) 
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politicians) negative effects on service delivery and public participation in ward committee and 
community meetings.   
 
An additional challenge affecting public participation in ward committees, especially in wards that 
are diverse in terms of race and socio-economic class is the issue of language. Sebola393 posits that 
language, as communication tool, is critical in public participation processes. The ability to engage 
meaningfully in public participation processes is enhanced or hindered by the confidence of 
community members to converse in the language of the dominant elite in the process. In racially 
mixed wards in Msunduzi, English is the dominant language, which, given historical colonial 
legacy, is the preferred communication tool for the community members. In some instances, 
English is used as a way of including as many participants as possible, without giving any local 
language a preference over others. In other instances, it is deliberately used to exclude or limit 
public participation.394In the case of the racially and socio-economically diverse wards of 
Msunduzi, the use of English is based on the principle of inclusivity; however, given the literacy 
and poverty rates, it is one of the factors that contributes to low participation levels amongst black 
working class people. Referring to environment-related public participation processes, Hamann 
states:  
  For instance, representatives from poor communities criticized the fact that 
  meetings were held in the town centre in the evenings, which made attendance 
  difficult due to considerable distances from townships. Another concern was 
  that information provided during the participation process was too difficult to 
  understand for those with English as their second or third language.395 
 
Language can be used as a tool to provide access or barrier to information and to (dis)empower 
people. Perhaps the view above can also be extended to include unspoken language, which is non-
verbal communication by municipal officials and politicians towards community members. In this 
regard, the packaging of the information and structuring of the agenda for discussion in ward 
committee meetings go beyond the oral usage of the language. Even in instances where the medium 
                                                          
393Sebola, M.P. 2017. “Communication in the South African Public Participation Process: The Effectiveness of 
Communication Tools.” African Journal of Public Affairs Vol. 9 (6). Pp. 25-35 
394See Haase, A.Q. 2008. “Instant Messaging on Campus: Use and Integration in University Students’ Everyday 
Communication.” Information Society Vol. 24 (2). Pp. 105-115 
395Hamann, R. 2003. “South African Challenges to the Theory and Practice of Public Participation in Environmental 
Assessment.” South African Journal of Environmental Law and Policy. Vol. 1(1). Pp. 21-37    
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of engagement is commonly understood, the manner in which certain views are dismissed or 
ignored can be interpreted through the lens of language acceptance: that is to say, views that are 
aligned to thinking of certain people can be easily understood by such people at the exclusion of 
others.  
 
Furthermore, the notion of powerlessness of individuals and ward committees in relation to service 
delivery is a theme that emerged largely during the interviews. Ward committees have no decision-
making powers and can very easily be undermined by the ward councilor in their 
recommendations. The effect of this ripples down to individual members of the community, who 
can gradually lose trust in local government systems and feel disempowered to participate 
meaningfully.   
 
 
6.3.2 Service Delivery Efficiency  
In his comprehensive study of the relationship between democracy and efficiency in local 
government, Barichievy396 argued that Msunduzi municipality structured its operations in a way 
that takes full advantage of the law to improve efficiency through more streamlined and quicker 
decision-making processes. The Municipal Council delegated much of its powers to the executive 
committee to take and implement decisions, except for those that the law demands ought to be in 
the exclusive jurisdiction of the Council (approval of bylaws and budgets). To assist the executive 
committee, a number of sub-committees and portfolio committees are established in order to make 
informed recommendations to the executive council for implementation.  
Using the length of time it takes to make a decision, Barichievy concluded that the centralization 
of power in the executive committee, whose composition is proportional to political party 
representation in the municipality, does indeed promote greater efficiency as the executive 
committee is generally small in size. This is despite the fact that executive committee meetings are 
typically very long and the existence of a backlog, which can be attributed to excessive workload 
for the executive committee members.  
                                                          
396See Barichievy, 2006: 96 
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However, whilst the focus on time to arrive at a decision is an important measure of efficiency, it 
does not account fully for efficiency in service delivery in a local government context. Irvin and 
Stansbury397 argue that efficiency is also about better decisions being taken. Notwithstanding this, 
in the context of low levels of participation, a centralized model of decision-making is justified on 
the grounds of efficiency. Siswana opines, on the other hand, that “efficiency in the public sector 
means satisfying the most essential needs of the community to the greatest possible extent using 
limited resources that are available. Effectiveness on the other hand is more about the impact that 
has been or will be caused by a service delivered or to be delivered.”398 This means time in relation 
to decision-making cannot be a sufficient measure of efficiency by itself. The quality of the 
decisions, which is partly informed by the process by which decisions are made, resources and 
outcomes are critical in relation to efficiency in municipal service delivery. Such a view found 
expression amongst the respondents in Msunduzi.  
 
Perception  
The research into the perception of efficiency in the delivery of services by Msunduzi Municipality 
found that 61 percent of the respondents viewed the municipality as being inefficient. Some of the 
main issues identified as impeding on efficiency are political interference in the administration of 
the municipality, which is largely caused by party political infighting and corruption, as well as 
lack of consultation or effective public participation.  One responded stated: 
How can the municipality be efficient when you have municipal managers being 
changed haphazardly? People in political party structures demand access to 
resources and insist on giving instructions to the municipal officials…what led to 
the municipality being placed under administration was that people were fighting 
over resources and threatening officials that they would be dealt with at a party 
level for refusing to assist their ‘leaders’ with resources. Party leaders at the 
regional and provincial level, who were also employees of the municipality, were 
claiming huge amounts of money as overtime and travel reimbursements for party 
                                                          
397Irvin, Renee and John Stansbury. “Citizen Participation in Decision-Making: Is it Worth the Effort? Unpublished.  
398Siswana, Batandwa. 2007. Leadership and governance on the South African Public Service: An overview of the 
public finance management system. Unpublished Thesis. University of Pretoria. Pg. 55.  
132 | P a g e  
 
political work…people campaigning for positions in their parties with municipal 
time and resources.399 
Another respondent stated: 
You know when the municipality became bankrupt, no one was held accountable 
for that. Instead, you saw a number of politically connected people in the 
municipality and in the region accumulating and displaying wealth.400 
This suggests that corruption in the municipality, at least in terms of the perceptions of some, is so 
systemic that it also manifests in ward committees.  Ward committees are often used to pursue 
corrupt agendas by those that are politically connected or for the benefit of a political party. 
Systemic corruption that is politically connected is difficult to resolve because occurs within 
certain networks of partisan ward committees and other municipal structures: what Francis401 
refers to as networks of factions.  Ward committees therefore are breeding grounds for political 
and social elite networks. Francis states:  
This is suggestive of a system of social capital, of networks of trust and reciprocity 
established through past political action. These values expressed are not 
underpinned by any substantial substantive programme of action, but on notions of 
the state as the key arena of privilege or reward.402 
In the South African context, many municipalities are controlled by the dominant ANC, which 
also dominates other spheres of government. Such dominance has, in some instances, led to 
internal political squabbles for positions within the party and in local government. In 2011 the 
political squabbles regarding local government positions within the ANC led to the unsuccessful 
burning of the ANC regional offices in uMgungundlovu District403 and “the dissolution of 
Executive Committees torn apart by struggles for mayoral nominations in the KwaZulu-Natal 
                                                          
399Interview with municipal official (MO25) 
400 Interview with municipal official (MO39) 
401 Francis Suzanne. 2011. Institutionalizing Elites: Political Elite Formation and Change in the KwaZulu-Natal 
Provincial Legislature, Afrika-Studiecentrum Series. 
https://openaccess.leidenuniv.nl/bitstream/handle/1887/18561/ASC-075287668-3104-01.pdf?sequence=2  
402 Ibid. Pg. 221  
403See Mail and Guardian.01 July 2011. Rank and file at odds with ANC leaders. Online: 
http://mg.co.za/article/2011-07-01-rank-and-file-at-odds-with-anc-leaders 
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(KZN) municipalities of uMgungundlovu and Msunduzi.”404 In 2015 the African National 
Congress disbanded the Regional Executive Committee of Nelson Mandela Bay and replaced it 
with a task team. The mayor of the Nelson Mandela Bay Metro was also replaced. This was as a 
result of ongoing infighting in the ANC, which had, amongst other things, severely affected the 
municipality’s functionality, which included a R400 million budget deficit. In 2016 the Member 
of Executive Council (MEC) responsible for CoGTA in KwaZulu-Natal, Nomusa Dube, placed 
Ingwe Municipality under administration - ostensibly because of political instability and infighting 
that has left certain critical positions unfilled and the municipality dysfunctional with no approved 
annual budget. This demonstrates the effects of intra-party political squabbles in the region that 
spillover to the municipalities.  
 
The contest for positions in the regional structures of political parties, particularly those in charge 
of municipalities, is - more often than not - related to access to government resources in the form 
of municipal tenders and business contracts. Booysen observes that service delivery protests have, 
at times, been a continuation of intra-party political conflict by the different factions.405 The 
protests are used as a tool against councilors during or after internal political contestations, by 
exploiting legitimate service delivery concerns.406 The potential ripple effect of such intra-party 
political squabbles at a regional level are sufficiently substantial to affect service delivery in the 
entire district municipality, including its subsidiary local municipalities.  
 
The common policy of cadre deployment further affects the efficiency of service delivery and 
coordination between district municipalities and their local municipalities. “A particular 
manifestation of the conflation of party and state at local government level is the practice whereby 
party office-bearers populate the municipal administration.”407 Issues of service delivery through 
                                                          
404Masiko-Kambala, P. 2011. Local Politics and Factionalism: local government as a site of contestation. Online: 
http://www.afesis.org.za/local-governnce/local-governance-articles/148-local-politics-and-factionalism-local-
government-as-a-site-of-contestation.html 
405 The point about intraparty elite networks, which may be considered factions, is made very clearly by Francis 
(2011) where she argues that these networks are organised on the basis of a number of factors and are used to 
advance the interests of their members, according to whatever binds the elite network.  
406Booysen, S. 2001. “Beyond the Ballot and the Brick: Continuous Dual Repertoires in the Politics of Attaining Service 
Delivery in South Africa?” in Lennan, Anne and Barry Munslow (eds.) The Politics of Service Delivery. The Wits P&DM 
Government Series. Wits University Press, Johannesburg. 
407De Visser, J. 2010. “The political-administrative interface in South African municipalities assessing the quality of 
local democracies.” Commonwealth Journal of Local Governance, Special issue, Bahamas. Pp. 86-101 
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skilled and competent municipal officials are side-lined for political expediency. Members of the 
majority party in the municipal council are instructed to ensure the appointment of people that are 
approved by the party leadership. In turn this makes accountability and protocol observation all 
but impossible. Municipal councils find it difficult to hold the administration - populated by party 
political seniors or those approved by party leadership - to account as this would have career-
ending ramifications. This power dynamic also affects the relations between the various local 
municipalities within the district and the district municipality.408 
 
This echoes the sentiments shared by a number of respondents that part of the challenges facing 
Msunduzi Municipality with respect to efficient service delivery is the party-political squabbles 
within the governing party, which plays out in the municipality. “Service delivery efficiency 
suffers even worse during election years. This is why the ANC offices were burned in 2011.”409 
However, during such election years, it is also when the political parties and their candidates are 
most visible - canvassing for votes.   
 
There are two points worth noting with respect to perceptions on efficiency in Msunduzi 
municipality. Firstly, this study was conducted at the time when the municipality was recovering 
from its dire financial and management situation, which contributed to its being placed under 
administration by the provincial government. Coupled with this was a certain level of anxiety and 
frustration amongst the populace regarding the obvious corruption, mismanagement of the 
municipal resources and disappointment with party political squabbles in the regional ANC. As a 
consequence of this frustration, whilst many respondents acknowledged that the efficiency was 
improving, the section 139 intervention had instigated bad, albeit justified, perceptions of the 
municipality’s service delivery efficiency.  
 
Secondly, in line with the point covered above, there is substantial confusion or misunderstanding 
of the municipality’s responsibilities, particularly in relation to services such as RDP or low cost 
housing. Given that the municipality acts as the implementing agent for the provincial government 
                                                          
408See Nene, S. 2016. “Enhancing Service Delivery: A Review of South Africa’s Dual Local Government System”. 
Politeia. 35 (1). Pp. 19-40  
409Interview with civil society (MCS46) 
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with respect to housing, there is an expectation from some communities that it is the responsibility 
of Msunduzi Municipality to provide social housing from its own budget. As such, any challenges 
with resources for housing are often blamed on the municipality without the necessary 
understanding of the intergovernmental coordination issues involved with other spheres of 
government. Consequently, housing challenges contribute to the perception of Msunduzi as an 
inefficient municipality. This further relates to the sometimes misunderstood role of the district 
municipality in relation to the local municipality.  
 
The confusion regarding the functions and responsibilities of the local municipality 
is also coursed by politicians and political parties who make promises to the 
community, which fall outside of the structure they are contesting.410  
 
In some instances, even some municipal officials, especially ward councilors, do not understand 
the different functions and responsibilities of local government in relation to the district 
municipality and the provincial government. One of the reason for such lack of understanding is 
the manner in which candidates are nominated to contest local government positions. There is no 
stipulated requirement that candidates must first demonstrate a certain minimum understanding of 
municipal processes.  
 
Municipal Annual and Audit Reports 
In addition, if efficiency is about how the available resources are used to achieve the most in the 
best possible way, then it is also critical that in the assessment of service delivery efficiency 
consideration be made of the audit reports of the municipality. The analysis of the annual reports 
in relation to the Service Delivery and Budget Implementation Plan (SDBIP) provides the right 
springboard on which to assess the efficiency of the municipality in terms of service delivery 
efficiency and public participation. The SDBIP411 includes and applies to the Public Participation 
Unit, Community Service Units, Infrastructure Services Units and Economic Development Units. 
                                                          
410Interview with municipal official (MO13) 
411 The Municipal Finance Management [Act 56 of 2003] requires municipalities to develop the Service Delivery 
and Budget Implementation Plan (SDBIP), which stipulates in detail the service delivery implementation plan for 
the financial year. It requires that municipalities set key performance areas with clear deliverables. These are in 
turn set according to the performance or functional areas of the municipality.  
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Central to the SDBIP are the key performance indicators and the performance agreements that are 
signed by the managers. Table 6 below is a comparative review of Msunduzi Municipality’s 
performance for the 2014/15 and 2015/16 financial years, as analyzed through the SDBIP.  
 
Table 6: Msunduzi Municipality Performance412  
 
 
Table 6 indicates an improvement of 2.21% in terms meeting targets on all (133) projects from 
78.04% in the 2014/2015 financial year to 80.25% in the 2015/2016 financial year.413 The gradual, 
albeit slight, improvement in the service delivery performance is important given the history of 
poor performance that even led to the placement of the Municipality under administration. A 
curious observation with respect to the performance figures is that the improvement in the 2015/16 
financial year followed after a general election year in 2014.  
 
 
 
                                                          
412 Source: Msunduzi Annual Report 2015/2016 
413See Msunduzi Annual Report 2015/2016 Financial Year.  
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Figure 3: Graphical Representation of Projects414 
 
 
Figure 3 shows a 0.37% improvement in meeting targets on all (131) projects from 77.67% in the 
2013/2014 financial year to 78.04% in the 2014/2015 financial year.415 A total of 78% of targets 
were achieved for all (112) projects in the 2013/2014 financial year.416 The target achievement 
rate was lower in the 2012/2013 financial year with 63% of 278 projects.417 
The annual reports of the municipality are by and large supported by the findings of the Auditor-
General (AG) with respect to financial performance.418 The audit outcomes of the AG demonstrate 
a gradual improvement with respect to Msunduzi Municipality’s financial performance for the 
period between 2012 and 2015. In 2012 and 2014, the AG gave the municipality unqualified 
reports with minor findings that related largely to the 9.1% fruitless and wasteful expenditure in 
                                                          
414 Source: Msunduzi Annual Report 2015/2016 
415See Msunduzi Annual Report 2014/2015 Financial Year.  
416See Msunduzi Municipality Annual Report 2013/2014.  
417See Msunduzi Municipality Annual Report 2012/2013.  
418The correlation between service delivery and financial performance is critical in understanding efficiency, given 
that efficiency has to be considered in the context of use of available resources.  
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2014; in 2015 the report was unqualified with no findings. However, in 2013, the audit report was 
qualified. Amongst the issues identified by the AG was material under spending of the conditional 
grants and capital budget; material losses and irregular expenditure amounting to R34.91 million 
were largely found to be through weaknesses in supply chain management.419 
From the above, one can conclude that despite public participation challenges and the perceptions 
of some community members, the Municipality’s efficiency in terms of service delivery shows 
signs of gradual improvement. The systematic weaknesses that had been identified by the 
Administrator had been attended to and Municipality may also have developed mechanisms to 
insulate its processes from party-political interference.   
 
6.3.3 Service Delivery and Provincial Government  
One of the key issues around service delivery in local government is how the different spheres of 
government relate to each in delivering basic services. Section 40 (1) of the Constitution 
establishes three spheres of government, which are distinctive, interdependent and interrelated. 
Each sphere has its own jurisdiction and must respect the areas of influence of the other spheres. 
However, the different government spheres must coordinate their activities in order to deliver 
services to the communities. The Intergovernmental Relations Framework Act 13 of 2005 seeks 
to provide for mechanisms through which proper and sufficient coordination between different 
government spheres and structures should occur.  
In relation to Msunduzi, as a local municipality, there are two critical government structures that 
have an impact on service delivery: uMgungundlovu District Municipality and the KwaZulu-Natal 
Provincial Government. The relationship between the provincial government and Msunduzi 
municipality emerged as an important issue amongst some respondents in relation service delivery. 
Some respondents argued that service delivery in Msunduzi is also affected by political and 
factional interference, which can mask itself as provincial government intervention.420 The placing 
of municipalities under administration by the provincial government through section 139 
                                                          
419See Municipality Money. The Msunduzi Local Municipality in UMgungundlovu, KwaZulu-Natal. Online: 
www.municipalmoney.gov.za 
420This point was raised largely in confidence by respondents.  
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interventions, which has service delivery implications, is viewed by some as political interference 
- this was certainly the case with Msunduzi municipality. This view is echoed by Graffrath and 
van der Walt421 by stating that there is inconsistency in the way section 139 interventions are done 
throughout the country. Their argument is that it is not always the municipalities that are 
dysfunctional that are put under administration. Some dysfunctional municipalities in the Eastern 
Cape and Limpopo provinces are not placed under administration, and other less dysfunctional 
municipalities in KZN are placed under administration. The table below illustrates the intervention 
nationally between 1996 and 2015.  
 
Table 7: National Analysis of Section 139 Municipal Intervention: 1996-2015422 
 
With specific reference to Msunduzi, some respondents argued that “the intervention was 
politically motivated; the provincial government acted after the ANC in the province had issues 
with the regional ANC.”423 Part of the municipality’s challenges, with respect to service delivery 
inefficiencies and general dysfunction, is lack of funding and or insufficient coordination with the 
provincial government on capital projects that should be funded by the provincial government.  
                                                          
421Greffrath, W and G. van der Walt. 2016. “Section 139 interventions in South African local government, 1994-
2015.” New Contree, No. 75. Pp. 135-160   
422 Source: Municipal IQ, 2015 
423Interview with municipal official (MO16) 
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One area where the coordination between the provincial government and Msunduzi municipality 
impacts on service delivery is human settlement or RDP housing. The Housing Act 107 of 1997 
allocates certain functions and responsibilities to provincial government relation housing. Section 
7 of the Act states:   
7 (1) Every provincial government must, after consultation with the provincial 
  organizations representing municipalities as contemplated in section 163(a)
  of the Constitution, do everything in its power to promote and facilitate the
  provision of adequate housing in its province within the framework of 
  national policy. 
7(2) For the purpose of subsection (1) every provincial government must- 
  (a) Determine provincial policy In respect of housing development; 
     (b) Promote the adoption of provincial legislation to ensure effective 
   housing delivery;       
  (c) Take all reasonable and necessary steps to support and strengthen 
   the capacity of municipalities to effectively exercise their powers 
   and perform their duties in respect of housing development; 
  (d) Co-ordinate housing development in the province;   
  (f)  When a municipality cannot or does not perform a duty imposed by
   this Act (107 of 1997), intervene by taking any appropriate steps in 
   accordance with section 139 Of the Constitution to ensure the 
   performance of such duty; and     
  (g)  Prepare and maintain a multi-year plan in respect of the execution 
In the province of every national housing programme and every 
 provincial housing programme, which is consistent with national 
 housing policy and section 3(2) (b). 
 
Thus, “Housing delivery is the responsibility of the Department of Housing (DoH). The 
Municipality assists as implementing agent or contractor on behalf of the DoH.”424 The 
municipality has an estimated housing backlog of 7000 homes, with over 30 000 units having been 
built between 1996 and 2010. This is in the context of wider housing backlogs in the province of 
KZN coupled with funding shortages. In a 2003 study, Aiyer425 found that the provincial 
government was very often the source of problems with regard to the provision of RDP houses. 
The provincial government allocated both the land and the funding for housing and at times the 
                                                          
424Msunduzi Municipality Integrated Development Plan 2006/2007 to 2010/2011 and Beyond. Pg. 162 
425Aiyer, T.C. 2003. The Implementation of Housing Policy in Msunduzi Municipality. Masters Degree Dissertation. 
University of Natal. Unpublished.   
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identified land was unsuitable and funding insufficient. In some instances, the municipality would 
not be involved in the process of housing and land allocation despite being the relevant local 
municipality. The provincial government also acknowledges this by identifying a number 
challenges related to housing. These include high settlement densities, rapid urbanization, lack of 
adequate funding for bulk infrastructure and inadequate coordination and alignment with 
municipalities. In this regard, in 2011, the Democratic Alliance in KZN filed a complaint with the 
Office of the Public Protector426 to investigate irregularities in the tender processes related to the 
Vulindlela Housing Project,427 located within Msunduzi Municipality. The provincial government 
pressured Msunduzi municipality to cancel its own tendered processes related to RDP housing in 
the area, which affected service delivery in this regard.428 Appendix E shows the extent to which 
the municipality is reliant on funding from the provincial government in relation to the housing 
project for the 2011-2016 period.  
The challenge with this arrangement where some funding comes from the provincial department 
is that it places municipalities in positions where they are vulnerable to provincial party political 
squabbles finding expression in the provincial government. This is particularly acute in situations 
where regional and provincial leadership of a party that is governing bot the municipality and the 
province are divided at a party level. In such situations, government resources are used to punish, 
coheres or reward certain party political behavior.  
                                                          
426 The Office of the Public Protector is established by the Public Protectoctor [Act 23 of 1994] as amended, in line 
with section 181 of the Constitution of South Africa. The Public Protector is charged with the responsibility to 
investigate and report on any conduct by any state or government entity or officer in any sphere of government in 
relation to allegations or suspicion of improper conduct. The Public Protector also has the power to take remedial 
action with respect to the findings of an investigation.   
427 The Vulindlela Housing project was a planned project by the KZN Department of Human Settlement to build 25 
000 low cost house and related infrastructure in Vulindlela, Msunduzi Municipality at a cost of R2.1 billion. The 
Project was mired in controversy and suspected corruption. For instance, the Department of Human Settlement 
had entered into an exclusive contract with a company controlled by amakhosi (chiefs), without a proper open 
tender process. The Built Environment Support Group stated in its report that the Msunduzi Municipality’s idp 
“had been manipulated without public consultation while the Municipality was under provincial administration; 
with the effect that a project planned initially for 200 housing units across 4 wards underlying Vulindlela, suddenly 
increased to 25 000 units across all 9 wards.” See BESG. The Vulindlela Rural Housing Project – a housing 
intervention case study. Online: 
http://www.besg.co.za/images/Overview_of_the_Vulindlela_Rural_Housing_Project.pdf    
428Politicsweb. 2011. “ Why the Vulindlela tender stinks – DA KZN.” Online: 
http://www.politicsweb.co.za/documents/why-the-vulindlela-tender-stinks--da-kzn Accessed: 10 March 2014  
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From a public participation point of view, especially in such context as described above, the value 
of public participation at a municipal level can be eroded by the actions or decisions of the 
provincial government, which does not have answer directly to the communities in the way that 
municipalities have to. The case of the Vulindlela Housing Project provides a good example of 
how public participation may be negated through unilateral amendments of IDP documents, which 
are ideally based on the views of the public.  
Furthermore, the Municipality, like many in the province, has to absorb the shortfalls in the 
housing budget allocations from the provincial government. In this regard, Coovadia429 argues that 
the mandate from the provincial government in relation to housing puts municipalities under 
serious financial constraints. Table 8 shows the funding shortages related to housing in the 
province. 
 
Table 8: KZN Provincial Housing Shortfall: 2011-2016430 
 
 
The analysis and implication of the table 8 is more succinctly captured by Coovadia, where she 
states at length that: 
The capital budget for TMM has been approx. R223million for2011/12 (audited 
outcome), and is currently R460million (2012/13 capital budget), then grows to 
R475million for 2013/14 while it decreases to R254million in 2014/15 and 
                                                          
429Coovadia, Y. 2013. Housing – SEDis and CBD LAPS. Note prepared for Royal HaskoningDHV. Pg. 9 
430 Source: Coovadia, Y. 2013. Housing – SEDis and CBD LAPS. Note prepared for Royal HaskoningDHV 
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R242million in 2015/16. The value of current and planned housing project 
allocations for TMM from the Provincial department of Human Settlements for the 
medium term is higher than the total capital budget of TMM. 
And  
This implies that the creation of assets in TMM is externally driven (from a 
provincial capital grant) and may in most instances create non-revenue generating 
private assets given that many properties funded by housing capital subsidies are 
not billed for rates and also receive Free Basic Services (except for social housing). 
This is exacerbated by the fact that the capital subsidy currently represents an 
under-funded mandate imposed on municipalities by provincial and national 
government. For example, the actual cost of a ‘RDP’ house (land, services and top 
structure) is on average R140, 000 in metros, while the maximum capital subsidy 
is approximately R60, 000. Therefore, the metro absorbs the difference of R80, 000, 
but this figure does not include further public investment in public spaces and 
community facilities required within the development. In-situ upgrading costs can 
cost up to R6, 000 more than RDP development, and excludes the operating cost 
for the management of the informal settlement prior to and during upgrading. The 
structural fiscal gap is the term used to describe the difference between the capital 
subsidy and the actual cost of development. So while TMM is praised for providing 
social benefits to alleviate poverty and hardship it is at the same time planning for 
huge amounts of revenue foregone. This ultimately puts the municipality in greater 
financial difficulty and is fiscally and financially unsustainable.431 
 
6.3.4 Public Participation vs. Service Delivery Efficiency  
Having considered the results of the research in relation to the levels of public participation and 
levels of service delivery in Msunduzi Municipality, it remains central to this study to consider the 
relationship or correlation between public participation and efficiency. The central question of the 
study is whether public participation has negative effects on municipal efficiency in a sense that 
the time and resources allocated to public participation could be better utilized for actual delivery, 
especially in a resource-scarce context.  For instance, the Msunduzi Municipality spent R7, 958.87 
and R6, 769.80 in 2015 and 2014 respectively on ward committee costs.432 Some of these costs go 
                                                          
431Coovadia, Y. 2013. Housing – SEDis and CBD LAPS. Note prepared for Royal HaskoningDHV. Pg. 9 
432See Msunduzi Annual Report 2014/2015 Financial Year  
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towards organizing the logistics of the ward committee meetings and ward community meetings, 
in addition to the administration costs. Some wards are geographically very large and require that 
people must be transported to a central location for meetings to take place. This is especially the 
case with some of the wards of Vulindlela, which are predominantly rural. Of interest to this study, 
is whether this, for instance, would have any impact on the efficiency of service delivery within 
the Municipality  
To test this question, the respondents were asked to comment on their thoughts on the relationship 
between public participation and service delivery efficiency. Overwhelmingly, 73% argued quite 
strongly that high public participation leads to improved efficiency in service delivery, as it 
strengthens accountability and legitimacy. By the same token, 26% thought that there is no 
relationship between public participation and service delivery efficiency. 1% could not comment 
on this. Surprisingly, none of the respondents were of the view that public participation negatively 
affected service delivery efficiency, despite the costs associated with it.  
To explain this, one respondent stated: 
I can see why one would be tempted to think that public participation costs time 
and money, therefore inefficient. Does this not remind you of Apartheid, where 
government thought they knew what was best for us poor black people? We can’t 
repeat that mistake. The truth is that the municipality becomes efficient when it 
takes the right decision the right way, informed by the demands or needs of the 
people. The only way to be sure of the community’s views is by asking them. This 
increases the municipality’s ability to deliver the right service, at the right time for 
the right people. This is efficiency because, just imagine what happens when people 
want a community hall and the municipality decides to spend money on speed 
humps?433 
Other respondents argued to the effect that the question of resources and time does not even arise 
when it comes to public participation and service delivery efficiency because these are things that 
should be provided for in the municipal budget. After all, resources are linked to specific and 
identified municipal activities over a specific period of time.434 If the municipal budget is drafted 
in line with the legislation and includes meaningful engagement with the municipal citizens, it 
                                                          
433See interview with municipal official (MO24) 
434Interviews with municipal officials (MO15) and civil society (MCS54) 
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enables the municipality to implement its programmes, confident in the knowledge that the 
programme of action is based on agreements with and needs of the people. This in turn minimizes 
challenges that could delay the delivery of the services at a later stage.  
In line with the thinking of Hookana435, the research findings indicated a dispute of cost efficiency 
as an appropriate measurement for public service efficiency. Thus,  
Technical or productive efficiency refers to the use of resources in the 
technologically most efficient manner in order to obtain the maximum possible 
output(s) from a given set of inputs. When productive efficiency is determined in 
monetary terms, it is sometimes known as cost efficiency.436 
Cost efficiency analysis is an instrument that is largely a private sector tool that is aligned to 
quantifiable processes and productivity, with little consideration for quality and effectiveness. In 
a way, it is like an audit processes in that it considers compliance with regulations, adherence to 
plans and the outputs. This fails to account for the nuances in government, particularly local 
government. “The municipal culture is still quite far removed from business-oriented culture, and 
the processes are more functional- than process-based.”437 
Consequently, many respondents considered efficiency to be about the quality of the input and 
processes, as well as effectiveness of the output. Despite the improvements in the municipality’s 
technical efficiency, as demonstrated by the annual reports and the Audit-General’s reports since 
2012, the low levels of public participation inform the perception of inefficiency in service 
delivery. Municipal residents are not adequately informed about their municipality to see the 
efficiency. There is a substantial distance between the municipality and the community, which is 
particularly acute in relation to previously disadvantaged areas and informal settlements.438 This 
is exacerbated by the seeming low levels of trust439 in the municipality by the citizens, which is 
                                                          
435Hookana, Heli. 2011. “Measurement of Effectiveness, Efficiency and Quality in Public Sector Services: 
Interventionist Empirical Investigations.” Managing Sustainability? Proceedings of the 12th Management 
International Conference, Slovenia, 23-26 November. Pp. 491-510  
436van der Westhuizen, G. and B. Dollery. 2009. “Efficiency measurement of basic service delivery at South African 
district and local municipalities.” Journal of Transdisciplinary Research in Southern Africa, 5(2), Pp. 162-174 
437Ibid, Pg. 506 
438See Msunduzi Municipality Living Conditions Survey 2016/2017 for the results satisfaction levels amongst 
residents of informal settlement, which make up about 25% of the municipal population.  
439 However, it could be argued that the situation could be worse in the context where there complete absence of 
public participation mechanisms in a society that is founded on constitutional democratic values.  
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caused by the perceived tumultuous nature of political squabbles in the region440, lack of 
accountability outside of party political structures,441 the placing of the municipality under 
administration in 2011 and the technical problems such as the billing crises within the 
municipality.442 
Central to this gap is the dysfunctionality of ward committees, which are designed to bridge the 
gap between the elected representatives and the people. Since inception, ward committee have 
been touted as aiming to improve service delivery efficiency through public participation. Their 
weakness is a reflection of inefficiency in the municipality, as the service delivery plans ‘lack’ 
significant input legitimacy - even if there are other avenues for public participation. 
 
6.4 Conclusion 
The placing of Msunduzi Municipality under administration in 2011 has provided a negative 
reference point for citizens and observers in the measurement of the municipality’s performance 
amongst the municipal residents. The effects of this are still being felt in a number of functional 
areas of the municipality. This means that the findings of the research, particularly in relation to 
opinions and perceptions, have to be understood in the context of this experience.  
Nevertheless, this chapter provides an insight into the relationship between public participation 
and service delivery efficiency in the municipality. Msunduzi has low levels of participation, 
which is paralleled by low levels of efficiency - despite improvements in cost efficiency over the 
past few years. Based on the opinions of the respondents and the Msunduzi Municipality Living 
Conditions Survey, there is a link between public participation and service delivery efficiency. The 
relationship is a positive one: effective public participation has positive effects on efficiency. 
                                                          
440interview with municipal official (MO10) 
441Interview with civil society (MCS44) 
442When Msunduzi Municipality was placed under administration in 2011, it suspended its indigent policy, which is 
designed to cushion the poor. This, together with years of estimating metre readings for water and electricity, 
through a seemingly arbitrary formula, resulted in some people receiving bills of ranging from R2000 to R700 000. 
Some of these people were occupants of RDP houses, whose electricity was disconnected as a consequence. 
Although the indigent policy was reinstated, the billing problem remained and affected thousands of people. See 
News 24. “City’s murky electricity plan.” http://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/citys-murky-electricity-plan-
20170316; The Witness. “Msunduzi still has a long way to go.” 
http://www.news24.com/Archives/Witness/Msunduzi-still-has-a-long-way-to-go-20150430 
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Public participation increases transparency and public accountability. This in turn ensures that 
municipal resources are managed prudently and transparently; whilst the services are delivered in 
line with the wishes of the community within the commonly accepted resource and contextual 
parameters.  
The findings of this chapter seem to suggest that a symbiotic relationship exists between public 
participation and service delivery efficiency. Public participation apparently is an integral and 
critical aspect of service delivery efficiency in local government. It must be built into the systems 
and processes of the municipality to the extent that it is not considered a separate activity. 
However, no evidence of this is provided in terms of what actually characterizes the Municipality. 
This symbiotic relationship is expressed more in terms of the responses of the interviewees, which 
could also be viewed as a wish or vision of how the Municipality could be more efficient.   
On the other hand, the findings of this chapter highlight certain patterns in terms of participation. 
Although participation levels are generally low, women and people from comparatively affluent 
areas - mostly white people - have higher levels of participation compared to the other groups in 
the municipality. Yet it is the predominantly the poor and the youth that are most affected by 
service delivery inefficiencies. This speaks to the way in which the municipality communicates 
with the different groups and perhaps the manner in which different needs are addressed through 
service delivery. Although reference has been made to issues pertaining to access and opportunity 
to participate, participation in municipal affairs may have serious cost implications for individual 
municipal residents. These may include costs related to transport, particularly in large and mainly 
rural wards. This may help explain the very low levels of participation amongst the poor.  
Furthermore, the failure to minimize the phenomenon of party political control of ward committees 
will continue to contribute to low levels of participation and weaken the quality of participation, 
perhaps even the functionality of the municipality. The opportunity to engage freely in an open 
discussion, based on a reasonable expectation that the different views will be considered in 
decision-making, is a fundamental requirement for effective public participation. The absence of 
this will continue to fuel the perception of the municipality’s inefficiency in service delivery 
amongst the municipal residents, many of whom are not card-caring members of political parties 
that control participation forums.  
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However, accepting this gives rise to the question regarding the extent beyond which high levels 
of public participation could possibly become problematic. If all the structures and mechanisms of 
public participation functioned at the highest possible level, would this automatically lead to high 
levels of efficiency in service delivery by the municipality, given the different needs of different 
individuals and the time it could possibly take to reconcile these? This is addressed more 
meaningfully in the conclusion of this thesis.  
The following chapter (7) discusses in depth similar issues in relation to EThekwini Metropolitan 
Municipality.  
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Chapter 7: The Case of eThekwini Metropolitan Municipality 
7.1 Introduction  
The purpose of this chapter is to explore the central question of this study in the context of the 
eThekwini Metro and in relation the previous chapter on Msunduzi Municipality. The chapter 
begins by discussing the profile of the eThekwini Metro. Central to this discussion are the 
similarities and differences with respect to how these two municipalities are structured and 
function for purposes of service delivery. By looking at similar factors as the previous chapter, this 
chapter concludes that despite numerous challenges, eThekwini Metro is considered more 
efficiency than Msunduzi Municipality in terms of service delivery efficiency.  
However, despite having more formal and more sophisticated public participation policies and 
mechanisms, the level of formal participation in the municipality—through these formal 
mechanisms—is relatively low. Furthermore, it is within the eThekwini Metro context where the 
chapter finds the rural-urban public participation and tension between traditional and elected 
government officials more pronounced. This notwithstanding, the culture of participation through 
civil society and mass protest action is stronger and more effective in influencing service delivery.  
Having considered a number of factors, the chapter reaches the conclusion that service delivery 
efficiency within eThekwini Metro may come at a cost to public participation  
 
7.2 eThekwini Metro Profile  
Section 2 of the Municipal Structures Act443 provides for the establishment of a category A 
municipality in an area that has, inter alia, high population density; extensive development, 
multiple business districts and industrial areas; a complex and diverse economy; and strong social 
and economic linkages between different units. In line with these criteria, the Demarcation Board 
proposed the creation of eThekwini Municipality through the merger of several local authorities 
(Durban Metropolitan Unicity Municipality, uMkomaas Transitional Council and Ndlovu 
Regional Councils) in the year 2000, with the city of Durban as its center. eThekwini is the only 
                                                          
443 See Municipal Structures Act 117 of 1998 
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metro in the province of KwaZulu-Natal. It is also the largest city in the province - the third largest 
in the country - with a population estimated at 3.5 million (African = 73.8%, Indian = 16.7%, 
White = 6.6%, Coloured = 2.5%, other = 0.4%).444 This amounts to 33% of the population of 
KwaZulu-Natal and 7% of the national population. The estimated unemployment rate is 30.2%, 
with youth unemployment estimated at 39%.445  
With its strategic location on the coast of KwaZulu-Natal, eThekwini Metro is not only one of the 
important economic centers of South Africa, it also has the busiest port in the African continent 
and the Southern hemisphere by volume. It is partly this port that gives credence to the notion of 
South Africa being the gateway to Africa. Ranked 5th in the country in terms of combined personal 
earnings of people earning above R51 000 a month,446 the estimated Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP) of the Metro is R230, 8 billion. “Presently eThekwini’s GDP comprises 65.5% of KwaZulu-
Natal’s GDP and 10.9% nationally.”447 The capital budget of the municipality, which relates to 
service delivery, is approximately R6 billion, with an operating budget of R33 billion.  
It is for this reason that the Metro, like Msunduzi Municipality, is fiercely contested politically. 
The municipality is contested by several political parties, and more recently there is a growth in 
the number of independents. Often the contestation has manifested itself through political violence, 
especially in places such as Section A in KwaMashu and uMlazi townships. However, although 
there is some political violence in the municipality, this is not to say that it is all linked to municipal 
party political competition. Table 9 below illustrates the electoral representation of political parties 
in the Metro from 2011 to 2016.  
 
 
 
                                                          
444See eThekwini Municipality: 2015/16 IDP 
445 Stats SA, 2011.  
446See the Institute of Race Relations comfort/deprivation index of 2016 
447eThekwini Municipality: Draft 2015/2016 IDP. Pg. 43  
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Table 9: eThekwini Metro Political Party Representation 2011-2016448 
 
 
One of the major differences between Msunduzi Municipality and eThekwini Metro is on the 
stability of governance or administration. Since its formation, the Metro has had long-serving key 
office barriers such as the mayor and municipal manager. For instance the previous mayor, Obed 
Mlaba, served from 1996 to 2012 and the previous municipal manager, Mike Sutcliffe served from 
2001 to 2011. In that time, Msunduzi Municipality had had several municipal managers and 
mayors.449 This means the Metro has had better continuity in terms of leadership, which, although 
not automatic, can have a positive impact on policy certainty.  
The Metro was established as a collective executive system in terms of Notice 343 of the Kwazulu-
Natal Provincial Gazette of 2000. The executive committee is composed of 11 members from 
different political parties and reports to the city council of 219 members. In line with section 8(c) 
of the Municipal Structures Act, eThekwini Metro has collective executive system with a ward 
participatory system, which was effected through Notice 648 of 2005. To this extent, the Metro is 
demarcated into 103 wards, amongst the most of any metro in the country. In addition, ward 
                                                          
448 Source: eThekwini Municipality 2013/2014 Annual Report  
449See Piper, Lawrence and Lubna Nadvi. 2010. “Popular mobilization, party dominance and participatory 
governance in South Africa.” In Participatory Governance in South Africa.  
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committees were established to give effect to the community participation legislative 
requirement.450 
As with Msunduzi Municipality, the Metro has an administrative structure that is aligned with the 
National Key Performance Areas for Municipalities. Headed by the Municipal Manager (MM) the 
city management structure is based on a cluster model, with seven clusters. These clusters are 
headed by deputy city managers. Figure 4 below is diagram of the organizational structure of the 
Metro’s senior management. For purposes of clarity, the clusters are: 
1. Community and Emergency Services; 
2. Corporate and Human Resources; 
3. Finance; 
4. Governance and International Relations; 
5. Economic Development and Planning; 
6. Human Settlements, Engineering and Transportation; 
7. Trading Services; 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
450This is dealt with in depth later in the chapter.  
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Figure 4: Organizational Structure of Senior Management of eThekwini Metro451 
 
Each of these clusters coordinates the activities of different units. For instance, under the 
Community and Emergency Services cluster are the following units: Health, Security 
Management, Fire and Emergency, Safer Cities and ITRUMP, Disaster Management and 
Emergency Control and Parks, Recreation and Culture. Of importance for purposes of this 
research, is the Governance and International Relations cluster, which, inter alia, houses the 
Community Participation and Action Support Unit.  
 
7.3 Public Participation in eThekwini Metro 
Public participation in the Metro is informed by the Community Participation Policy: Creating an 
Enabling Environment for Citizens’ Involvement in Matters of eThekwini Municipality of 2006.452 
The stated main purpose of this policy is: 
                                                          
451 See eThekwini Municipality: Draft 2015/16 IDP.  
452 The policy was a result of a year-long (May 2004 to June 2005) consultative process named Citizens Action 
Support Programme. This was funded through the United States Agency for International Development.  
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Provide guidelines for increasing the level of active citizen participation in the 
decision-making process of local government and to create an enabling environment 
for civil society in which ordinary citizens and social groups may find platform upon 
which they voice out their concerns and take part in the fundamental decision making 
on issues affecting their lives.453 
In addition to the several objectives stated, amongst which is strengthening democracy and keeping 
local government abreast of citizens’ needs, the policy stipulates 9 practice principles for 
community participation. These are: structured participation, clarity of purpose, commitment, 
communication, flexibility and responsiveness, timelines, inclusiveness, collaboration and 
diversity. These principles are supported in the policy by a detailed discussion of citizen 
participation levels, including definitions of what the municipality considers active citizenship and 
the several roles of citizens in the municipality. Below is an extract from section H of the Policy, 
which is the section that details clearly with the roles of citizens in the municipality:454  
Communities shall participate at different levels that are appropriate for that given 
issue.  
Active citizenship  
34.    Active citizenship means sharing the authority on the basis of which 
administrative agencies carry out legislative mandates. It goes beyond voting, paying 
taxes, or using government services. The City shall through community mobilization 
programme encourage communities to be active citizens.  
35.        Communities shall ensure maximum democratic accountability of the elected 
political leadership for the policies they are empowered to promote. eThekwini 
Municipality shall partner with relevant service providers to ensure that eligible 
community members are voting.  
36.           As participants in policymaking, citizens shall express via different Ward 
Committees and stakeholder forums, their views before, during and after the policy 
development process in order to ensure that policies reflect community preferences 
as far as possible.  
                                                          
453eThekwini Municipality. 2006. Community Participation Policy: Creating an Enabling Environment for Citizens’ 
Involvement in Matters of eThekwini Municipality 
454 eThekwini Municipality. 2006. Community Participation Policy: Creating an Enabling Environment for Citizens’ 
Involvement in Matters of eThekwini Municipality. Pp. 19 – 22.  
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37.      Citizens are called upon to be more than voters, by helping to identify important 
issues, to help carry out solutions, and to judge whether results have been achieved or 
not. 
 
Citizens as owners or shareholders  
38.   Communities are viewed as the “owners” of government. Through their rates 
payments, citizens are investors in local government services and municipal owned 
assets.  
39.    Through their votes, citizens are shareholders who elect the “boards of directors” 
responsible for government performance. Councillors are the people’s stewards not 
only to manage finances but also to produce results. An “owner” wants to know 
whether government is getting the job done.  
40.     Through rates, they invest in public services and assets. Communities are 
shareholders: through their votes, they elect the board of directors or Councillors who 
govern. Representation through political party candidates shall cater for this. Citizens 
as customers or consumers  
41.     Communities are principal users and clients of municipal services and shall be 
treated as valued customers by the Municipality. This shall be done by practicing 
Batho Pele principles and through City’s Customer Care Centres. Citizens as policy 
makers and issue framers  
42.   Communities are vision builders: helping define desirable future and strategic 
plans. Communities through Ward Committees and other set up structures shall 
contribute by providing advice to municipal policymaking process. 
 
The policy further establishes various public participation structures in different levels of 
operation. These include ward committees, ward sector forums, ward forums, zonal stakeholders’ 
forum, regional network, stakeholders’ forum and citywide sectoral networks. The relationship 
and coherence between these structures is illustrated in the two diagrams below.  
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Figure 5: eThekwini Public Participation Process455 
 
 
                                                          
455 Source: eThekwini Municipality Community Participation Policy 
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The above figures have to be understood as forming an illustration of a single process. The bottom 
figure indicates that the basic unit of community participation is the ward committee, which is 
driven by sector forums, whose role is to inform and influence the ward committees. That 
engagement between the ward committee and sector forums representing different stakeholders in 
the ward is referred to as a Ward Forum. Ward forums are then clusters into zones in what is called 
Stakeholder Forums. These forums focus mainly on issues of common interests across the wards. 
As it is with ward forums, the stakeholder forums are clustered into five main regions called 
Regional Networks. Together with city-wide networks that represent the different sector, regional 
networks form part of the city-level engagement forum called Big Mama, led by the Mayor. 
Ideally, it is at the Big Mama forums that the views of the citizens across the different levels and 
communities of the city are consolidated into actionable programmes of service delivery.  
A key feature of the policy is the emphasis on community-based planning. The closest structures 
to the community are the ward committees, which are meant to be established in every ward. 
eThekwini Metro envisages ward committees to be the drivers of community-based planning. To 
ensure this, the Metro effected Rules Regulating the Establishment and Operation of Ward 
Committees. Informed by the Municipal Structures Act, the rules state that “the objective of the 
Ward Committee is to enhance participatory democracy in local government.”456 Amongst other 
things, the ward committee is impartial, not politically aligned, serves as an advisory body and “an 
integrative umbrella body responsible for coordination of ward developmental initiatives.”457 
Whilst ward committees are chaired by ward councilors, the Speaker of the municipality may, in 
consultation with the Whips458 of the different political parties, deploy PR councilors to serve as 
ex-officio members on ward committees.  
As instruments of community-based planning and public participation, the ward committees may 
form subcommittees based on the identified needs - ensuring representation of the diversity in the 
ward. Moreover, the ward committees must convene public meetings in order to engage the 
community on municipal issues affecting the ward. Available to ward committees, if they so 
                                                          
456See eThekwini Municipality. Rules Regulating the Establishment and Operation of Ward Committee. 
Unpublished.  
457Ibid. Pg. 3 
458 The whips are political party representatives within municipal councils, who are designated with the task or 
keeping party discipline amongst members of their parties with the municipal council. They are rule-enforcers for 
each party in the municipal council.  
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choose, is the right to establish Ward Sector Forums, which shall be composed of people or 
organizations with common interests. This is in addition to the Ward Forums, which serve as 
advisors to the Ward Committees and represent the ward in the IDP process. The Ward Forums 
are inclusive of the different civil society formations, school governing bodies, political parties 
and other civic groups.  
Furthermore, the Rules specifically state that there shall be no remuneration of ward committee 
members except for reimbursement of personal expenses incurred whilst performing ward 
committee-related work. In this regard, eThekwini budgets about R1000 monthly stipend for each 
ward committee member for the 103 wards. This amounts to a R1, 030,000 monthly budget 
dedicated to compensating ward committee members. On this, Nzimakwe and Reddy459 argue that 
the non-payment of ward committee members may be necessary to ensure the independence of the 
ward committees even though this might discourage certain people from availing themselves. It is, 
however, unclear how the non-payment of ward committee members would ensure their 
independence. The independence of the ward committees and other forums is more likely to be 
compromised by the political parties rather than the Municipality itself. In this regard, it is 
important to keep in mind the distinction between the Municipality (as a legal entity) and the 
political party that governs such an entity. Therefore, the stipend is unlikely to compromise the 
ward committees’ independence. However, it could have an impact, in the context of high 
unemployment levels, on the competition for ward committee positions.  
The task of providing support to ward committee members in the form of training and 
administrative support falls within the ambit of the Community Participation and Action Support 
Unit of the Metro. Specifically the administrative support includes: 
i. The promotion of Ward Committees in the community – informing the 
communities of the roles and responsibilities of Ward Committees. A practical 
example in this regard may be the provision of formal identification cards to 
Ward Committee members so that they are recognized as legitimate Ward 
Committee members amongst the communities; 
ii. To identify or arrange central meeting places in the ward where communities 
have access to information and where Ward Committees can meet; 
                                                          
459Nzimakwe, T.I. and PS Reddy. 2008. “Community Participation in eThekwini Municipality with Particular 
Reference to Ward Committees.” African Journal of Public Affairs (2)1.  Pp. 32-43  
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iii. Assisting with the translation of information and documentation for the 
community; 
iv. Developing and providing capacity building and training programmes for Ward 
Committees on an ongoing basis during their term of office; and 
v. Facilitation of Ward Committee elections.460 
 
In essence, the Community Participation and Action Support Unit is responsible for the formation, 
equipping and functioning of ward committees and the overall community participation policy of 
the Municipality. It is an administrative unit that should operate above party politics, but whose 
work has to consider these party politics in terms of how they manifest in different communities. 
The Unit must do all of these things as part of promoting the quality and level of community 
participation in the Municipality. This understanding is critical when considered in context of the 
findings below.  
In terms of the key findings of the study, with respect to the level of participation in eThekwini 
Metro, of the respondents interviewed 44.6% were of the view that participation levels were low, 
32.4% thought participation was average, 21.6% regarded participation as high, and 1.4% thought 
participation was very high. Table 10 below is a graphical illustration of these results based on the 
analyses of the interview responses.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
460See eThekwini Municipality. Rules Regulating the Establishment and Operation of Ward Committee. 
Unpublished. 
160 | P a g e  
 
 
Table 10: Level of Participation in eThekwini Metropolitan Municipality461 
 
 
These results are almost in line with the findings of the eThekwini Municipal Services and Living 
Conditions Survey Four Year Trend Report of 2015, which stated: “It is of concern that municipal 
financial viability and management as well as governance and public participation, despite 
showing improvement, have still received poor ratings for each of the four years in this trend.”462 
There are a few things to be noted from these results. 
 
Firstly, a number of respondents stated that while the levels of participation are generally poor, 
they were particularly so in rural areas when compared to urban areas. eThekwini has a very 
diverse population, with diverse ways of life informed by the four types of areas that form the 
municipality: urban, peri-urban, informal settlements and rural areas.463 The rural areas, although 
                                                          
461 Source: SPSS data analyses of interview responses  
462See eThekwini Municipal Services and Living Conditions Survey Four Year Trend Report of2015. Pg. 18. It is also 
worth noting that the survey is based on a four-year period. 
463Sutherland, Catherine, et al. 2013. Durban City Report. Online: http://www.chance2sustain.eu/63.0.html 
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growing in population and developing to varying degrees, are less densely populated and are 
largely located in the periphery of the municipality in the north, south and west. The rural areas 
tend to be geographically vast with poor infrastructure, particularly transport infrastructure. 
Moving from home to a meeting point is more expensive and more difficult in rural areas. The 
challenging geographic terrain of the Metro464 adds to this problem. This makes organizing and 
actually having community meetings very difficult. Often it is those closest to the meeting place 
and those with resources that participate in community meetings. According to Statistics South 
Africa, the Metro’s settlement patterns are as the table below.  
 
Table 11: eThekwini Metro Settlement Type465  
Municipal Area Type Percentage 
Urban 84.8% 
Tribal/Traditional  14.7% 
Farm 0.5% 
TOTAL 100% 
 
Moreover, the level of education and exposure to current and relevant information in rural areas is 
lower than in the urban areas. The best sources of information remain the radio and television. In 
some instances, word of mouth is still the best form of communication. These areas are more likely 
to suffer brain drain as the youth and educated people tend to move to urban areas for better access 
to resources and opportunities. South Africa’s problem of migrant labor466 also affects the family 
                                                          
464 The Metro, like much of the KZN province, has a mountainous and rough terrain. Some areas are not easily 
accessible vie motor vehicle transportation.  
465 Source: Stats SA. 2011 census  
466 The migrant labour system in South Africa can be traced back to the discovery of diamond and gold in in the 
1800s. Initially, it was designed to provide cheap labour to the mining and agricultural industries by recruiting 
largely unskilled workers from countries such as Tanzania, Zimbabwe, and Mozambique. Later the system was 
complicated by the Apartheid policies, which, on the one hand created Bantustans in order to control the number 
of black people in urban areas; on the other hand, by not developing rural areas and Bantustans, the need for 
urbanisation in order to secure better opportunities increased amongst the same Africans, which meant more 
population control measures need to be enacted. In order to ensure an abundant supply of cheap labour, the 
Apartheid government prevented black people from forming organised trade unions, limited the nature and level 
of skills gained through formal training of black people and concentrated economic industries in urban areas. As a 
result, and due to failure to rapidly and adequately develop rural areas, the phenomenon of urbanisation for 
economic reasons continues in the post-Apartheid South Africa. Job opportunities still are still better in urban 
areas than in rural areas—which compels many people to seek employment in urban areas, often leaving their 
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structures and demographic makeup of rural areas - which also has a negative impact on public 
participation.467 As a result of the legacies of colonialism and Apartheid, the rural areas were 
designed to be economically dependent on but, socially and physically, separated from urban 
cities. This means that they were not economically viable, resulting in the mass exodus of mostly 
men who worked in the mines and other urban industries in order to support their families in rural 
areas. A consequence of this is a disproportionate number of women in rural areas, who are left to 
be the primary care givers to their children, work on farms and engage in community activities - 
despite limited opportunities to do so freely and meaningfully.  
 
However, as noted by several respondents, there is a growing phenomenon of people moving from 
urban areas to rural areas due to comparatively cheap land and the low cost of living.468 This 
phenomenon creates, as a byproduct, tensions between ‘urbanites’ who, at times, have different 
perspectives than the traditional rural populace. This, consequently, affects the nature and level of 
participation in some areas. For instance, one councilor stated, “the urbanites tend to either stay 
away from community meetings or, if they do come, they tend to undermine other people. They 
consider the others as barbaric and do not respect the traditional ways.”469 For their part, the 
‘traditional’ rural populace views the ‘urbanites’ as arrogant and disrespectful. An example of such 
arrogance is the use of the English language in community meetings. This makes community 
meetings difficult to run, if and when they happen.  
 
The problem is exacerbated in situations where there is lack of synergy and coordination between 
the traditional leader and a ward councilor. The advent of democracy brought with it an inherent 
conundrum of elected public representatives, co-existing with unelected traditional leaders in rural 
areas. In instances where the traditional leader and the councilor are of different party political 
persuasions, the problem can be more pronounced to the extent that it creates a difficult 
environment for effective participation by the citizens who are conflicted between respecting 
traditional authority and exercising their democratic rights. Given the historical urban-rural divide 
                                                          
families behind. See Bank, Leslie. 2017. Migrant Labour in South Africa. Conference and Public Action Dialogue 
Report. University of Fort Hare. Online: http://www.hsrc.ac.za/en/research-data/ktree-doc/17864  
467Harington, J.S. et al. 2004. “A century of migrant labour in the gold mines of South Africa.” The Journal of The 
South African Institute of Mining and Metallurgy. Pp. 65-72.  
468Interviews with municipal official 
469Interview with civil society (MO36) 
163 | P a g e  
 
along the ANC and IFP lines, which manifested in political violence in the province and within 
the Metro, it is not uncommon for traditional leaders to be active in political parties that oppose 
the party of the councilor or vice-versa. To this effect, one respondent stated:  
 
Let me tell you my brother. This thing of having traditional leaders can be a serious 
challenge in some rural areas. The previous councilor in my ward had to ask the 
municipality to intervene because the traditional leader would sabotage his work. 
Whenever he called a ward meeting, the chief would call an imbizo on the same 
day. If not that, the chief would instruct the councilor on what services needed to 
be delivered where. He would publically reprimand the councilor and remind him 
that he is the chief and the councilor his subject.470 
 
Furthermore, participation tends to be differentiated along economic lines. The more affluent 
middle income areas have higher levels of participation compared to the poorer areas.471 As it is 
with Msunduzi Municipality, this is largely due to access to information and resources needed for 
participation. The residents of affluent areas are able to explore different methods of participation, 
in addition to the institutionalized mechanisms. This is mostly technology-enabled in the form of 
access to the internet, emails and phone calls. The growth in social media space has provided a 
further platform for effective participation by those with the resources and the technical skills. This 
is in contrast to poorer - especially rural - areas where the best route of participation is through 
community meetings, often held in open spaces due to lack of community halls. In these areas 
participation is strictly time-bound with limited informal civic engagement and the agenda remains 
in the hands of the councilor.  
 
The third factor influencing participation is the nature of public participation processes and 
structures. eThekwini’s public participation is highly regulated and institutionalized, in what 
                                                          
470Interview with civil society (TMCS50) 
471It is worth noting that although levels of participation are lower in less affluent areas, through engagement with 
a number of municipal officials and civil society respondents, it seems there are surprisingly high levels of 
participation amongst dwellers of informal settlements. This is collaborated by the findings of Selmeczi who details 
the conditions and experiences of residents of informal settlements in eThekwini. Their participation is driven in 
part by the feeling of exclusion and abandonment by the municipality. However, as it is noted later, their chosen 
methods of participation involve public mobilisation, public protests and land invasions. See Selmeczi, Anna. 2012. 
“We are the people who do not count”: Thinking the Disruption of the Biopolitics of Abandonment. Doctoral Thesis. 
Central European University, Hungary.  
164 | P a g e  
 
Galvin and Goldberg472 refer to as invited spaces. This refers to spaces or mechanisms specifically 
and deliberately ‘created’ to promote participation - often in a form of consultation and 
informing473 - between the citizens and their elected government representatives. These include 
the IDP processes, ward committees, ward forums, stakeholder forums and sectoral networks. 
There are a number of issues with regard to these ‘spaces’ that affect the levels of participation. 
The first is captured succinctly in the words of a responded who stated:  
 
…there are many of these ways or mechanisms for participation that the city puts 
in place. But if you look at them you realized that they are controlled by the city. 
The Ward Committee for instance is chaired by the ward councilor. The ward 
forums, where they might exist, have no powers and advise the advisors. When 
people get there, they are given a list of things to discuss and the discussion is 
controlled. The power is still very much with the municipality and its officials.474 
 
These mechanisms, as many of the civil society respondents stated, fail to promote genuine and 
in-depth engagement between the citizens and the municipality on critical issues. Members of the 
community do not feel that their views are actually taken into account by those making decisions. 
There is no clear connection between the discussions and the decisions taken in these forums. 
Essentially, the concern is that the views of the community members are not valued enough to 
actually become decisions. Central to this concern is the absence of clear and immediate feedback 
loops on how community views informed policies before the decisions were taken. In other words, 
communication is linear and not complex enough to provide multiple stages of engagement 
between citizens and the municipalities on matters governance and service delivery. When the 
municipality reports, it is after the implementation has already commenced, leaving no space for 
the community to verify and refine their contributions to the plans prior to their implementation.  
 
                                                          
472Galvin, M. and Goldberg, K. 2011. What is the Scope for Civil Society Advocacy Around Water Issues? 
Unpublished.  
473Anstein, 1969. Degrees of Citizen Power. In Anstein’s theory, there are eight different ascending levels of citizen 
participation. In this ladder, informing and consultation are third and fourth steps respectively. Informing is when 
the government simply informs or tells citizens of decisions without the chance of citizens influencing those 
decisions. Consultation, on the other hand, is when citizens are provided with an opportunity to influence 
decisions. But the decision still rests with government.  
474Interview with civil society (TMCS57) 
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This is further complicated by the multiple layers of participation mechanisms, as directed by the 
community participation policy. Given these layers, communities can hardly recognize their voices 
in the broader municipal plans. The smaller and poorer communities are the ones like to have their 
voices drowned out in the multilayered processes, especially if their concerns are at variance with 
interest of other more affluent communities. For instance, there have been a number of protests 
related to the provision houses for poor families located close to affluent areas of Westville, 
Morningside and Ballito. The protesters often argue that their needs are not considered when 
informal houses are demolished and settlements declared land invasion.475 In fact, these 
mechanisms can at times reinforce historical distributions of privilege, often to the disadvantage 
of the poor.476 
 
 
7.3.1. Integrated Development Plan 
The Integrated Development Plan is one such process that is indicative of invited spaces, as it is a 
regulated and scheduled process. The Municipal Systems Act, as noted previously, requires 
municipalities to formulate a development plan, which will inform their budgets, through a process 
that is inclusive and promotes active participation by the community. “It seeks to promote public 
participation in development planning, needs prioritization through strategic focus, integration and 
equity in the planning and allocation of scarce resources.”477 The eThekwini Metro’s approach to 
the IDP is through what it calls Community Based Planning (CBP). A key element of the CBP is 
“ensuring that people are active and involved in managing their development, in claiming their 
rights and in exercising their responsibilities.”478 The responsibility for driving this CBP, 
                                                          
475 See News24. 2018. “Durban motorists urged to be cautious in Springfield after violent housing protest.” Online: 
https://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/durban-motorists-urged-to-be-cautious-in-springfield-after-violent-
housing-protest-20180914 
476Burger, R. 2006. “What we have learnt from post-1994 innovation in pro-poor service delivery in South Africa: a 
case study-based analysis.” Development South Africa. Vol. 22(4). Pp. 483-500 
477Fuo, On. 2013. “A Critical Investigation of the Relevance and Potential of IDPs as a Local Governance Instrument 
for Pursuing Social Justice in South Africa”. PER/PELJ (16)5. Pp. 220-286  
478eThekwini Municipality: 2015/16 IDP. Pg. 144. There are several principles that inform the CBP. These are: the 
need to ensure that poor people are included in planning; Systems need to be realistic and practical, the planning 
process must be implementable using available resources within the district / local government; Planning must be 
linked to a legitimate structure; Planning should not be a once off exercise, but should be part of an ongoing 
process, with planning, implementation, monitoring and evaluation, and annual reviews; The plan must be people 
– focused and empowering; building on strengths and opportunities not problems; Plans must be holistic and 
cover all sectors; Planning should promote mutual accountability between community and officials; There must be 
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particularly in relation to the IDP process, is given primarily to the ward committees. However, 
unlike Msunduzi Municipality, the Metro did not establish the IDP Representatives Forum in line 
with the Municipal Systems Act—which also stipulates the composition of this forum. Instead, the 
Community Participation Policy provides for the establishment of, amongst others, Ward Forums 
and the citywide Stakeholders Forum, defined in the community participation process above. . 
These forums are meant to be central to the IDP process and represent the different community-
based plans, as agreed to primarily be at ward level, and be inclusive of political parties and a 
range of other stakeholders. Buccus emphasizes this point by stating: 
 
The eThekwini municipality does not convene IDP forums, but rather its own ‘Big 
Mama workshops’, which included many sectoral stakeholders, such as business 
forums, unions and civil society organisations, as well as geographically-based 
representatives. These workshops constitute consultative forums on the city’s 
development plan, and the budget process too.479 
 
For the Metro, the structured and coordinated participation process by which the IDP is formulated 
must feed into and be in line with what is referred to as the 8 Point Plan, which itself is aligned 
with the national and provincial government programmes and plans such as the National 
Government’s Outcome 9 Priorities.480 The 8 Point Plan contains the following points:  
 Develop and sustain our spatial, natural and built environment; 
 Developing a prosperous. Diverse economy and employment creation; 
 Creating a quality living environment;  
 Fostering a socially equitable environment;  
 Creating a platform for Growth, empowerment and skills development; 
 Embracing our cultural diversity, arts and heritage 
                                                          
commitment by councillors and officials to both plan and implement, and there must be someone responsible to 
ensure it gets done. 
479Buccus, Imraan. 2011. “Community Development and Engagement with Local Governance in South Africa: a 
view from KZN.” Good Governance and Learning Network. Unpublished Research Paper. Pg. 7.  
480eThekwini Municipality: 2015/16 IDP states, “The aim of Delivery Agreement: Outcome 9 is to ensure a 
responsive, accountable, effective and efficient local government system so as to restore the confidence of citizens 
in the local government sphere. As such municipalities need to ensure that the basic needs of communities are 
met; build clean, effective, efficient, responsive and accountable local government; improve performance and 
professionalism and strengthen partnerships between local government, communities and civil society. Whilst 
primarily there is a reporting line to Outcome 9, the municipality also reports on Outcome 8 which concentrates on 
human settlements.” Pg. 9 
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 Good governance and responsive local government  
 Financially accountable and sustainable. 
 
Each plan has a number of strategic focus areas, sub-plans, programmes, budgets and key 
performance indicators that form part of the review scorecard and are aligned to the National Key 
Performance Areas.  
 
To ensure the proper alignment of the IDP with the numerous other programmes and plans, and in 
an effort to promote public participation, the Metro develops a lengthy, comprehensive process for 
developing and reviewing IDPs. The process plan identifies the number of steps that are to be 
taken in the process, the timeframes envisaged, the roles and responsibilities of identified internal 
and external stakeholders, and the associated costs of the process. One of the central pillars of the 
process is the focus on public participation, especially at ward and regional level through budget 
hearings, the production of simplified IDP documents in isiZulu and English, mayoral imbizo’s - 
culminating in an IDP festival for the whole Metro.481 
 
Whilst the Metro has developed comprehensive policies and strategies with respect to the IDP -as 
an instrument of development and public participation promotion - there are several challenges 
with respect to public participation. Firstly, the IDP Review Process Plan does not seem to be 
clearly aligned to the public participation policy. The different structures established by the public 
participation policy are not reflected in the process plans. In fact, the Process Plan makes no 
reference to the public participation policy, which is supposed to guide all public participation 
processes in the municipality. The exact structures to be involved and the manner of involvement 
is unclear from the Process Plan. “The public participation process is varied and includes ward 
level participation to regional hearings with both written and verbal comments.”482 The Process 
Plan further states that “the mayor will also consider hosting an IDP festival as part of the 
participation process.”483 This emphasizes the misalignment with the public participation policy. 
                                                          
481See eThekwini Municipality Draft Process Plan for IDP Review 2016/2017.  
482eThekwini Municipality IDP Review Process Plan 2016-2017. 
483Ibid. Pg. 9 
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This also seems to give the mayor an inordinate amount of power to determine what comprises the 
IDP festival too 
Furthermore, the Process Document identifies internal and external stakeholders that are critical 
in the process. With respect to external stakeholders, the document identifies traditional leaders, 
civil society, cross border municipalities, national and provincial departments. Internal 
stakeholders include the Municipal Council, Mayor, Municipal Manager, Councilors and Plan 
owners. In both internal and external stakeholders identified there is no mention of communities 
or individual municipal citizens as critical stakeholders in the process. This is indicative of the 
Metro’s cavalier attitude with respect to community and individual citizen participation in the IDP 
process. Focus is placed upon established structures and organization, at the exclusion of 
individual citizens.  
 
Additionally, the other challenge is that the process is an ‘invited space’. Of invited spaces, 
Bucuss484 again argues that access to these is a privilege of a select few partly because they are not 
sufficiently advertised or accessible to marginalized people. Moreover, as Piper and Africa argue, 
“invited spaces of participation are ineffective and even sterile.”485 “In ‘invited’ spaces of 
participation, public authorities (or private developers) invite residents to raise their views or share 
their opinion on policies or projects, therefore remaining more or less in control of the agenda and 
the terms of the engagement.”486 On paper and for all intents and purposes, these processes 
improve political inclusion. However, this is not supported by any significant correlation in the 
distribution of resources.487 Moreover, invited spaces provide opportunities for municipal 
authorities to cherry-pick policy contributions from communities in a way that best suits their 
original agenda. Font and Smith offer one explanation of why cherry-picking happens in relation 
to local government public participation policy proposals. They state, “it is easy to understand that 
a single proposal supported by an overwhelming majority of the members of a community in a 
                                                          
484See Bucuss, 2011. Pg. 10  
485Piper, L., Africa, C., 2012. Unpacking Race, Party and Class from Below: Surveying 
Citizenship in the Msunduzi Municipality. Pp. 219-229. In Bénit-Gbaffou, C and Piper, L. “Party Politics, the poor 
and the city: Reflections from the South African Case.” Geoforum 43 (2), Pp. 173-177.  
486Bénit-Gbaffou and Piper, 2012. Pg. 175 
487Mitlin, D. and Jan Mogaladi. 2013. “Social movements and the struggle for shelter: a case study of eThekwini 
(Durban). Progress in Planning 84. Pp. 1-39 
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ballot has a much higher likelihood of being adopted than one of seventy ideas that emerged from 
a two-hour meeting involving twenty participants.”488 The majority in this respect often works in 
instances where voting is involved. Where discussions and debates are involved—having noted 
several challenges regarding the capacity and opportunity to participate—the views of the majority 
can be assumed and or bought. In certain instances, given the powers of the Mayor for instance—
these can be ignored.  
 
The sentiment about the IDP as an invited space was expressed by a number of respondents, who 
argued that although the Metro’s commitment to public participation - at least on paper - is 
commendable, the reality is that authorities still set and control the agenda. Community-based 
planning is not in reality a bottom up approach to planning; rather it is the process by which 
citizen’s views are sourced to legitimize the municipality’s proposed plans and budgets. Given that 
the Metro is substantially controlled by the ANC, community participation is essentially a way in 
which the community’s views are sourced to legitimize ANC plans and budgets. Evidence of this, 
they contended, is in the process plan which is drafted by the Metro and simply implemented 
without input from the community. The draft IDP plans are presented as drafts, which limits the 
extent to which the community can actually inform the process, as opposed to joining the process 
midway. As such, IDP planning is not really based on community planning. It often is a compliance 
exercise. Madzivhandila and Maloka489 state: 
 
The situation highlights the complexity around the relationship between 
government and citizens and, most importantly, the failure to satisfy some of the 
obligations that flow from such convolution. In fact, this is a real concern because 
municipal IDPs lack specific relevant information, which should be provided to 
households, about services in a given period of time. This implies that there is a 
lack of transparency. Concurrently, participation alone has not resulted in visible 
or desirable results as it so often reduced to a mere ceremonial presence of 
participants in local institution. Informed discussion and rational debates on the 
merits and demerits of specific planning programmes are literally non-existent, 
                                                          
488Font, J. and Graham Smith. 2013. “The Policy Effects of Participation: Cherry-picking among local policy 
proposals?”  Ponenciapresentada al XI Congresso de la AECPA, UPO, Sevilla. 
489Madzivhandila, T.S. and C.M. Maloka. 2014. “Community Participation in Local Government Planning Processes: 
A Paramount Step Towards a Successful Service Delivery.” Mediterranean Journal of Social Sciences, 5(16). Pg. 655  
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even though community participation features as a key component of planning 
programmes at the local level.  
 
Linked to this is the notion that these mechanisms are often susceptible to the control of or 
hijacking by political parties. Political parties stand accused that they seek to control the public 
participation spaces to further their agendas. To this extent, participation is limited for those who 
have not aligned themselves with a political party or who belong to a different political party to 
that which controls the structure. This susceptibility arises, partly, from the creation of leadership 
structures in the participatory system. Where there are leadership positions involved, competition 
for those overshadows the purpose of the structure - as it is with ward committees. Even in 
situations where leadership does not translate to control of resources, the very existence of a 
position perpetuates competition. In the light of historical socio-economic and political conditions, 
leadership positions in public participatory systems are about access to resources and 
opportunities, on the one hand; on the other hand, they are about party political control or influence 
in a specific spaces - largely and preferably - at the exclusion of other political parties. 
Consequently, debates around service delivery through the IDP are essentially party political 
debates on service delivery priorities and who gets to control the delivery process.  
 
Whilst it can be argued that political parties essentially agree on development goals, there are 
strong disagreements on the priority of the development areas and the instruments used to achieve 
these. Moreover, the question of who gets developed or where development occurs is one linked 
to what is the number one concern of every single political party or organization: to address, first 
and foremost, the interest of its constituency. For instance, the interest of Abahlali Basemjondolo 
is to address the concerns and needs of the informal settlement communities, whilst the interest of 
the Minority Front is to represent the interest of the minorities, particularly those of Indian descent.  
 
Finally, a few respondents raised an unexpected and yet fundamental critique of the IDP public 
participation process and the less than desirable participation levels in the eThekwini Metro. They 
argued, in relation the point made by Font and Smith above, that public participation meetings of 
the IDP are often held once in a specific place for a specific community. Such meetings typically 
last only a few hours, within which the community must discuss a wide range of issues arising out 
of the municipality’s proposals. “A few hours are not enough time to engage rigorously on issues 
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with the communities.”490 During this time, community members also want to take the opportunity 
to raise their personal problems, which tends to cloud the discussion. A few hours is often 
insufficient to ensure that community members fully understand the proposals from the 
municipality and to convince each other on the best argument. Consequently, the quality of 
engagement is such that no clear consensus on decisions emerges. For both municipal officials and 
community members, such forums can be a waste of time and resources. This leads to reluctance 
on both sides to take very seriously the IDP public participatory processes.  
 
 
7.3.1.1 Ward Committees  
eThekwini Metro put in place its ward committee system in 2006 with the adoption of the 
Community Participation Policy. However, it was only in 2012 that 102 of 103 ward committees 
were fully established and inaugurated in 2013.491 Initially the Rules Regulating the Establishment 
and Operation of Ward Committees stated that the ward committee members were not to be 
remunerated. Instead, they would be compensated for their out of pocket expenses. However that 
was later reversed and the Metro provides a monthly stipend of R1000 to each ward committee 
member, totaling R1, 020,000.00 per month. Ward committee members, according to the Metro, 
are provided with various training and capacity development opportunities in order to improve 
their effectiveness, through the Skills Development Unit. As noted earlier, additional 
administrative support is provided by the Community Participation and Action Support Unit. The 
Metro further reports that all 102 wards are fully functional and operational.492 
However, the 2015 Back to Basics Report attached to the 2015/16 IPD document states, for 
example, that in 2014 only 40 wards managed to hold the required number (4) of meetings per 
annum.493 In addition, whilst ward councilors - who also chair the ward committees - are required 
to convene at least 12 report back meetings in their wards, an overall total of 63 meetings were 
convened across the wards in the same year. This brings into sharp question the degree to which 
the wards committees are actually functional, especially in terms of the quality of their 
                                                          
490Interview with municipal official (TMO20) 
491Sutherland et al, 2013.  
492eThekwini Municipality: 2015/16 IDP.  
493Ibid, 416  
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functionality. In fact, the Ward Committee Functionality 1st Quarter Assessment report of the 
Department of Co-operative Governance and Traditional Affairs states that by the end of the first 
quarter of 2015, none of the ward committees were reported as functional.494 
This is supported by the responses of various municipal officials and civil society respondents. 
Despite the monthly stipend, the level of participation at ward level is relatively low in the 
eThekwini Metro. Part of the low level is the poor attendance of members of meetings. At times, 
the chairpersons themselves are not proactive in ensuring that meetings are convened.  There are 
a few factors that contribute to this. The first relates to the powers and responsibilities of the ward 
committees and their relationship with the municipality, especially in relation to the IDP. A 
number of respondents stated that the IDP process is designed in such a way that the community, 
through their ward committees, where they are actually functional, is simply consulted in the 
drafting and review of the IDP. There is no real meaningful engagement with the municipality to 
the extent that the community is not only consulted, but also gets to be involved in various aspects 
of the process. This includes the ability to actually make decisions, be involved in the 
implementation of IDP and service delivery projects, being able to monitor and evaluate the 
municipality and demand actual accountability. The ward committees are advisory structures 
whose advice can be ignored, even by the ward councilor who chairs it.495 
Secondly, ward committees are a form of invited spaces. As stated before, invited spaces are 
vulnerable to capture by political parties, especially in a context of a dominant party. In the 
eThekwini Metro the African National Congress dominates most of the wards. This dominance 
results in a conflation of the party and the municipality to the extent that municipal structures 
become extensions of the party. As it is with Msunduzi, ward committees are closely linked to the 
dominant party branch in the ward. For ordinary members of the community or those belonging to 
different political parties, participation in ward committees is often very difficult. There is often a 
deliberate attempt to minimize the dissenting voices through ensuring that only members of the 
dominant party are elected into ward committees, which then become accountable to the party 
branch as opposed to the community. “If one so happens to be somehow elected into ward 
                                                          
494COGTA, 2015. Ward Committee Functionality 1st Quarter Assessment. Interestingly, this report by COGTA is 
drawn from municipal records, which detail—amongst others—the number of times each committee met. The 
reasons for the contradiction is therefore unclear and the study, unfortunately, did not pursue this.  
495Interview with civil society (TMCS61) 
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committee without belonging to the ANC, life becomes difficult. Their views are dismissed and 
sometimes even pressured to resign.”496 In certain instances, decisions are taken elsewhere and 
then endorsed at ward committee level,497 which has as effect of demoralizing other ward 
committee members. This is something that Sutherland et al also found in their research. “The top 
down approach of the ANC and its control of communities through the ward structures that have 
been put in place plays a critical role in demobilising civil society.”498 It is discouraging for citizens 
who are not aligned to the dominant party to participate in structure controlled externally. 
Overtime, trust in the systems is eroded and participation is considered a futile exercise, unless 
one is part of the dominant network.499 
 
Furthermore, as stated above, access to ward committee meetings can be very difficult for the poor 
and those living in rural areas. The wards in rural areas tend to be geographically large, with poor 
transport infrastructure, which makes coordination of meetings challenging.500 The central meeting 
place for ward committee meetings can be difficult for some to reach, which means that often those 
elected onto ward committees are those living closer to the meeting place and those with access to 
better means of transport. Due to the relatively high levels of poverty in rural wards, even providing 
transport to the ward committee meeting can be a very expensive and unsustainable exercise. This 
severely limits the levels of participation of the community in ward committees. It also means that 
the delivery of services often differs substantially in a large single ward - with more or better 
services being concentrated in some place to the exclusion of the peripheral areas of the ward.  
There is also the question of meeting venues for rural wards, and some urban wards. The lack of 
community halls in some wards means community meetings take place either in school 
classrooms, churches or in an open field. Where an open field is the venue, the meetings are 
                                                          
496Ibid  
497Williams, J.J. 2006. “Community Participation: lessons from Apartheid South Africa.” Journal of Policy Studies. 27 
(3). Pp. 197-217  
498Sutherland et al, 2013. Pg. 47  
499 Francis Suzanne. 2011. Institutionalizing Elites: Political Elite Formation and Change in the KwaZulu-Natal 
Provincial Legislature, Afrika-Studiecentrum Series. 
500For instance, Ward 100 has an estimated population of 37300 in an area spanning 202 square kilometres. Ward 
100 is predominantly rural, with an estimated median annual household income of R14600, with an employment 
rate of 17.6%. Ward 105 is also a large predominantly rural ward with a population of 27600 with an area covering 
236 square kilometres.  The median annual household income is estimate at R15000, with an employment rate of 
12.7%. See Wazimap Online: https://wazimap.co.za/profiles/municipality-ETH-ethekwini 
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weather-dependent, more so than in wards where there are community halls, schools or churches. 
The varying degrees of development and remoteness of rural wards in the Metro, especially in the 
south west regions, means some rural wards have poor or no infrastructure for community 
meetings and events, except open fields.  
In addition, some respondents indicated that whilst levels of literacy have risen significantly over 
the years, and despite the translation of some documents into isiZulu, it is still difficult for many 
community members, including ward committee members and ward councilors in some instances, 
to fully understand the municipal documents and processes in order to engage meaningfully. This 
becomes very obvious when discussing issues of the municipal budget as it relates to the IDP and 
actual service delivery. Despite the induction and training that ward committees are supposed to 
get at the beginning of their term of office501, it can be difficult for them and some municipal 
technocrats to simplify the explanation of how the processes work. The technical language often 
used in the documents and discussions is often cited as a contributory factor in the exclusion of 
some in the community participation processes.502 This, as discovered during the interviews, can 
frustrate and demotivate people from participating in processes they cannot understand. At times 
they can feel that the processes are made deliberately complicated into order to exclude the rest of 
the community so that “the corrupt politicians can continue to be corrupt whilst we remain hungry 
and without services.”503 This view, whether real or perceived, has a detrimental effect on the 
levels of participation due to the lack of trust by the community of municipal structures and 
processes.  
It is partly this difficulty in engaging with municipal documents and processes that has led to the 
growth in the activism of civil society in the Metro. In some areas, citizens have formed 
movements or groups such as Abahlali Basemjondolo Movement504 and the Landless People’s 
                                                          
501Ngcamu, B.S. 2014. “Responsiveness of Community Participation and Action Support Unit’s Activities to Local 
Communities’ Needs: a case of eThekwini Municipality.” AdministratiaPublica. 22(4). Pp. 144-159. In this research, 
Ngcamu concludes that the Community Participation and Action Support Unit of the eThekwini Metropolitan 
Municipality provides poor quality capacity development programmes to communities. This is partly due to the 
shortage of skills and resources within the unit and political interference, which detracts the Unit from its core 
mandate.    
502Ndabeni, L.L. 2012. Ward Committee Systems as an Effective Public Participation Process. Gauteng Provincial 
Speakers’ Forum Strategic Session.  
503Interview with civil society (TMCS67) 
504 This movement began in 2005 in Durban. It essentially began with a protest action around Kennedy Road 
settlement after land promised to citizens for housing projects was sold for industrial development. Through road 
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Movement505 in order to have their voices heard. In other instances, professional organizations 
engage with community members on certain issues in order to better represent the interest of those 
communities in municipal affairs. Organizations such as Centre for Public Participation not only 
provide alternative space for community participation on service delivery, they also actively 
engage in public education projects to assist communities to better understand the municipal 
processes and documents and to access services. For the most part, civil society groups are seen 
not as susceptible to party political control as the formal invited spaces of public participation. 
Rather they form relations with the state or municipality in order to advance their specific issue or 
constituency. Social movements, according to Miltin and Mogaladi,506 are characterized by three 
elements: “sustained public effort (campaign), combinations of forms of public political action 
(demonstrations, petitions, meetings, media engagement), and public representations of the 
participants’ worthiness, unity, numbers and commitment to their cause.” A number of respondents 
agreed that generally civil society organizations were more effective in communities where they 
worked than structures such as ward committees, especially in relation to the provision of 
information and access to services. The Centre for Civil Society, for example, works with a number 
of civil society organizations and state entities to develop capacity in communities and provide 
information through research.507 The Metro also acknowledges the critical role that is played by 
civil society in service delivery and promoting public participation.  
                                                          
blockages and other forms of protests, the Movement quickly spread from Kennedy Road to beyond the eThekwini 
Metro borders. Its main objective is for the provision of land, housing and associated infrastructure for the poor. 
Part of this requires fighting against forced removals of land occupiers. It has also been instrumental in the 
founding of other issue-specific projects. However, throughout its existence, its leaders have been subjected to 
arrests, death threats and sometimes suspected murders. See Abahlali baseMjondolo, 2006. A Short History of 
Abahlali baseMjondolo, the Durban Shack Dwellers’ Movement. Online: http://abahlali.org/a-short-history-of-
abahlali-basemjondolo-the-durban-shack-dwellers-movement/; See also Selmeczi, Anna. 2012. We are the People 
who do not count. Doctoral Thesis. Central European University.  
505 The Landless Peoples Movement is a movement, with international affiliations, that seeks also to represent the 
interest of rural and informal settlement people. The Movement was formed in 2001 following a meeting of a 
number of organisation representing the similar constituencies. Like the previous movement, its objectives are to 
advocate for the provisions of housing and associated infrastructure to people of informal settlements. See 
Greenberg, Stephen. 2004. “The Landless People’s Movement and the Failure of Post-Apartheid Land Reform”. 
Globalisation, Marginalisation & New Social Movements in Post-Apartheid South Africa. University f KwaZulu-
Natal. Online: http://ccs.ukzn.ac.za/files/Greenberg%20LPM%20RR.pdf  
506Mitlin, D. and Mogaladi, J. 2013. “Socialmovements and the struggle for shelter: A case study of eThekwini 
(Durban)”. Progress in Planning 84. Pg. 24 Pg. 12 
507Interview with civil society (TMCS63) 
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The success of civil society movements in enhancing public participation can be attributed to a 
number of factors. The first is that they are better organized with very specific objectives, which 
they pursue relentlessly. For movement such as Abahlali baseMjondolo, their leaders are also 
victims of the injustice they are fighting against, often at great personal risk, without any financial 
compensation. Their interest really is about the people and issue they represent.  
Secondly, they often take the time and raise resources to educate their constituencies about not 
only the public participation mechanisms of the Metro, but they also educate their members of 
their constitutional rights and alternative platforms available to them to promote and protect their 
rights. This allows for more meaningful participation within the operations of the movements.  
Furthermore, these civil society organization are seen to be above or not impeded by party politics. 
Their members are from different political backgrounds and ideologies with a common goal: the 
provision of services for the poor and rural people at the same level as the rest of the municipality. 
Because of this political diversity, and the fact some are research and academic based, there is 
some level of insulation from party politics, which provides them with the clout of legitimacy in 
representing their interests through spaces and methods not controlled by the Metro.  
 
7.3.2 Service Delivery Efficiency 
Perception 
The result of the research into the efficiency of eThekwini municipality in terms of service delivery 
indicates a different picture in contrast to Msunduzi Municipality. Notwithstanding the differences 
in size and budgets, eThekwini is considered to be considerably more efficient than Msunduzi 
Municipality. 54% of the respondents stated that whilst there are significant challenges with 
service delivery, the municipality is, for the most part, efficient. The expected basic household 
services, such as water, electricity, sanitation, refuse removal are provided mostly consistently 
throughout the municipality: except in rural areas and in informal settlements, where some of these 
services - such as sanitation and refuse removal - are not provided at all or intermittently.  
However, the perception becomes more nuanced once other specific areas of service delivery and 
the different types of respondents are considered. For instance, the Metro has a substantial backlog 
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on the basic housing provision. “In 2013, there were approximately 262 000 households 
comprising just over a million people (assuming a household size of 3, 9 people) residing in 
informal settlements. This represent about 27% of the Durban population.”508One of the challenges 
in this regard is the exponential growth in the population as a result of urbanization and the 
expansion in the size of the Metro over the years. This means an ever increasing number of people 
needing basic low cost housing, which is not complemented by a corresponding increase in the 
resources base. This point was crystalized by one municipal official: 
 
 The challenge that the municipality has is money, land and an ever-growing 
 population. The city spends almost 100% of its annual budget, which includes
 housing budgets. Still the backlog remains because the number of people
 needing housing does not necessarily decrease accordingly. You can see this with
 informal settlements. We are finding it very difficult to end the spread and
 existence of informal settlements, which remain actively occupied regardless of
 the number of houses being built on an annual basis.509 
 
This view was further echoed by a number other respondents who argued that the challenges 
around issues of housing provision are not necessarily a reflection of the municipality’s own 
inefficiency. Whilst some inefficiencies exist, the main problems are funding and sufficient 
suitable land for proper and adequate housing, as well as intrinsic intergovernmental tensions 
between the Metro and the provincial government. The provision of affordable housing is 
traditionally mainly the responsibility of the provincial government. As such, the provincial 
government also sets policies and regulations that guide the municipality’s own policies in terms 
of housing. Following the passing enactment of the Elimination and Prevention of the Re-
emergence of Slums Act of 2007, which sought to upgrade and eradicate informal settlements, the 
Metro adopted a multipronged approach to housing provision without specifying a fixed housing 
policy. The main focus of this approach has been on the upgrading of informal settlements to 
ensure that essential services are provided as widely and as far as possible, in the context of a 
                                                          
508Sutherland et al. 2013. Pg. 30  
509Interview with municipal official (TMO13) 
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decline in the provision of new low-cost houses. This is further supported by programmes aimed 
at promoting the ownership of low-cost houses through subsidies for low income households.  
However, as noted by several respondents510, this approach, together with the policy framework 
of the provincial government led to unrest and protests by many communities around the Metro. 
In the quest to eradicate informal settlements and evict illegal occupants from mainly private land, 
there have been large scale demolitions of informal houses and the forced relocation of residents, 
who often complain that they are relocated to areas much further away from economic centres in 
the Metro.  This is why there are a number of civil society organizations that are working with 
communities in order to try and address the issue of housing. Some, like FedUP and Abahlali 
baseMjondolo511 facilitate schemes that assist residents of informal settlements access financing 
for housing. In other instances, civil society actively engages with the communities and the 
municipality to help improve the living conditions in informal settlements.512 
The perception of the respondents is further supported by the findings of the eThekwini Municipal 
Services and Living Conditions Survey of 2015, which indicated that the levels of dissatisfaction 
with service delivery were highest amongst people living in informal settlements or informal 
housing.513 Table 12 below illustrates the findings from the survey on satisfaction with municipal 
services by dwelling type, whilst Table 13 depicts levels of satisfaction with basic household 
services.  
 
 
 
                                                          
510Interviews with civil society 
511Mitlin and Mogaladi, 2013. Pg. 24 
512Extensive research has been conducted on the housing challenges in the eThekwini Metro (Miltin and Mogaladi, 
2013; Sutherland et al, 2013; Selemczi, 2012)  
513The 2015 Mercer Quality of Life survey ranked Durban as the city with the highest quality of life in South Africa 
and the second best in Africa, after Port Louis in Mauritius. The rankings are based on surveys of more than 200 
cities and based on a number of factors, including: political and social environment, economic environment, public 
services and transportation, housing, consumer good etc.  
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Table 12: Service Delivery Satisfaction by dwelling type514 
 
 
  
Table 12 indicates a general level of satisfaction with service delivery according to what might 
called class. Since 2011 to 2015 there has been a steady level of satisfaction amongst those living 
in formal houses, complexes, flats, and other sturdy structures. Such often also connected to 
utilities. On the other hand, those leaving in low cost house demonstrate a consistent level of 
dissatisfaction.  Beyond issues of the size of the dwellings, the quality of the buildings themselves 
have also been very substandard in some areas. There are genuine safety concerns about some of 
these dwellings. The safety and security concerns about the habitat structures also extends to 
people leaving in informal and rural settlements. One unexpected and interesting outcome is the 
very high level of dissatisfaction amongst dwellers of informal houses behind formal houses. The 
survey report does not provide clear explanations for this, especially in the light of Table 13 below.   
 
 
 
 
                                                          
514Extracted from eThekwini Municipal Services and Living Conditions Survey Four Year Trend Report of 2015 
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Table 13: Basic household services Satisfaction515 
 
 
Despite the differentiation in terms of satisfaction with service delivery by settlement type, this 
table indicates a general satisfaction with basic household services across the Metro. These results 
bring into question actual reasons for dissatisfaction from informal settlement dwellers. A closer 
analysis of the eThekwini Municipal Services and Living Conditions Surveys may be necessary to 
understand some the results.  
One of the issues that emerged from engagement with different respondents was the awareness of 
the differences between Msunduzi Municipality and eThekwini Metro with respect to party 
political interference in service delivery. A number of respondents, particularly municipal 
officials, stated that although party political dynamics have an influence on the programmes and 
priorities of the Metro, their negative impact is minimized by the strong and professionalized 
structures and processes of the municipality. Conversely, respondents from civil society argued 
that these structures and processes also fail to promote and enhance community participation in 
municipal affairs to the extent that the municipality can be accused of being highly technocratic 
and exclusionary in the way it implements supposed community-based planning or public 
participation process linked to service delivery.   
A point of convergence for many respondents, in relation to service delivery efficiency 
perceptions, particularly on housing, is the issue of corruption and quality. Whilst eThekwini 
Metro has been widely celebrated for the biggest housing rollout of all the municipalities in the 
country, there is also widespread corruption in the awarding of tenders, allocation of houses to 
                                                          
515 Extracted from eThekwini Municipal Services and Living Conditions Survey Four Year Trend Report of 2015 
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recipients using illegal lists and the selling or subletting of low-cost houses by recipients.516 Some 
of the housing projects, and other service infrastructure, have been of such poor quality that the 
Metro has had to spend more time and money repairing or rebuilding homes.  
In sum, the responses from the interviews and findings from different research literature indicates 
that, in general, most people regard or perceive the municipality to be relatively efficient in service 
delivery in that many basic services are delivered. However, such an understanding of efficiency 
is not based on the notion of time and resources. This is largely because of the lack of effective 
public participation forums that are able to adequately inform citizens of municipal processes, 
plans and budgets. In general, citizens do not know projects timelines and associated budgets in 
order to be able to judge whether projects and services are delivered technically efficiently.  
eThekwini Metro spends on average its entire annual capital budget and receives 
clean audits from the Auditor-General. This would mean technically that it is 
efficient. But it is not efficient if service provision still maintain the spatial 
inequalities of Apartheid in that the predominantly white and wealthy wards still 
get superior quality services compared to the poor mostly black wards. Although 
there is some development taking place in rural and other townships areas, the 
nature and scale is still outpaced by the continuous development and upgrades in 
rich white areas of the municipality. Thus, from the standpoint of effectiveness and 
transformation, the municipality is not efficient.517 
However, performance is measured against the key performance areas contained in the budget of 
the Metro. The misalignment between efficient utilization of financial resources and the inability 
to correct Apartheid spatial inequalities can be explained through the examination of the capital 
budget priority areas. This could also be a further indication of how the voices of the elites are 
prioritized over those of the working class.  
 
Municipal Annual and Audits Reports  
To balance the perceptions of the efficiency of service delivery by the municipality, it is important 
to also consider the actual reports of its performance. As with Msunduzi Municipality, the annual 
                                                          
516 See Sabela, P.M. 2014. Towards an Alternative Development Approach to Low Cost Housing Delivery in KwaZulu-
Natal Province. Doctoral Thesis. University of Zululand  
517Interview with municipal official (TMO29) 
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reports are the correct tools by which to analyse the municipality’s efficiency. The 2015-2016 
annual report indicates that the eThekwini Metro received an unqualified audit from the Auditor-
General, having spent 91% of its capital expenditure, coupled with a 101% revenue collection 
rate.518 The 2014-2015 annual report stated that the expenditure of the capital budget was 91.6% 
whilst the revenue collection was 103%.519 The rate of revenue collection is also consistent with 
the 104.8% rate of the 2013-2014 financial year, whilst the capital expenditure represents a slight 
increase from the 89% reported in the same period.520 This is further supported by the unqualified 
audit reports that the municipality has received from the Auditor-General from 2012 to 2016.  
From the reading of the various reports, it can be concluded that the municipality is a high-
performing efficient municipality, especially when compared to the Msunduzi Municipality. The 
underspending over the years is, for the most part, explained by exigent factors such as the R422 
million that was not spent in the 2014-2015 financial year due to the loss of 31 days of productivity 
as a result of a taxi strike and non-awards of contracts. In the 2015-2016 financial year, the 
underspending was mainly due to “environmental issues, land ownership issues, and delays in 
plant and equipment being delivered from overseas.”521 This report further notes that irregular 
expenditure decreased substantially from R782.5 million in 2012 to R208.32 million in 2016. 
However, the annual reports and many respondents acknowledge that, whilst the municipality 
seems efficient in relation to service delivery expenditure, there are increasing backlogs in a 
number of service delivery areas. A key cause of the backlog is the constant rural-urban migration 
in search of better services and opportunities - mainly driven by poverty and unemployment in 
rural areas. One result of the migration is the increase in informal settlements and the demand for 
suitable housing with the necessary services, which occurs in the context of funding shortages for 
human settlements.  Tables 14 and 15 below illustrate the housing backlog in the municipality for 
three financial years, whilst Table 16 illustrates the level of household connectivity over the same 
period.  
                                                          
518 See eThekwini Municipality 2015-2016 Annual Report.  
519See eThekwini Municipality 2014-2015 Annual Report.  
520See eThekwini Municipality 2013-2014 Annual Report.   
521See eThekwini Municipality 2015-2016 Annual Report Executive Summary. Pg. 9  
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Table 14: Fully subsidized Housing Delivery Levels522 
 
 
Table 14 indicates both a declining target for subsidies houses and a declining actual delivery of 
the said houses over three financial years. The decline in the target does not necessarily indicate a 
decline in the demand. The decline in the grant from the provincial government may also help 
explain the decline in the actual construction of the subsidized houses.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
522See eThekwini Municipality 2015-2016 Annual Report   
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Table 15: eThekwini Housing backlog523 
 
Table 15 presents a picture of the overall housing backlog in the Metro over three financial years. 
Of critical important is the understanding of the backlog against actual houses constructed. More 
concerning for the municipality is that the backlog as presented in the table excludes the growth 
rate, which one of the single biggest contributors to the backlog.  
 
Table 16: Cumulative Number of Households Connected524 
 
There are 945 910 households in the Metro, 421 329 of which are informal settlements. Based on 
the figures stated in the table above, there is a total of 26.24% of households that are without 
                                                          
523 Source: eThekwini Municipality 2015-2016 Annual Report 
524Ibid  
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electricity, despite the steady increase in household electrification. This suggests, at least in part, 
that the Metro is efficient in connecting electricity and other utilities to houses that have been 
constructed. The main challenge is the actual construction of new houses to house the ever-
growing population, much of which cannot afford to purchase houses on their own.  
  
7.3.3 Service Delivery and Provincial Government 
As noted above, whilst the Metro has several legislative functions and responsibilities, in some 
instances the municipality acts as an implementing agent of the provincial government. One of 
these instances is on the provision of RDP or low cost housing to the municipality through the 
Human Settlements Programme. The Programme “aims to provide a range of housing 
opportunities, including fully subsidised housing, rental accommodation... and to facilitate social 
housing and gap housing.”525 This programme also includes the provision of other associated 
services such as water, electricity, sanitation and roads. The key focus areas of the Programme 
include: upgrading of informal settlements; refurbishment and upgrades to existing housing stock; 
urban and rural projects; providing services to informal settlements; upgrading and management 
of ‘hostels’.526 The capital expenditure for this project is R1, 6 billion annually.  
Illuminated by the abovementioned backlogs, the Human Settlement programme has a number of 
challenges that affect efficiency in delivery and influence dissatisfaction levels amongst poor 
people in rural and informal settlements. In this regard, Sabela argues:  
  …the whole process of housing delivery was state-driven with lack of  
  participation of stakeholders that normally serve as a link between the  
  government and intended beneficiaries, such as Community-Based Organisations 
  (CBOs), Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) or Non-Profit Organisations 
  (NPOs). These were totally excluded in the housing delivery systems which were 
  found to be dominated by developers. Some of the housing units provided were 
  credit-linked and finance was organized by the developers for the   
  beneficiaries.527 
                                                          
525eThekwini Municipality 2014-2014 Annual Report. Pg. 213 
526Due to historical design and management, the hostels in the Metro have been and continue to exhibit political 
intolerance, which manifests itself as political violence and political killings.  
527Sabela, P.T. 2014. Towards an Alternative Development Approach to Low Cost Housing Delivery in KwaZulu-Natal 
Province. Doctoral Thesis. University of Zululand 
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For its part, the Metro underscored the challenge of sufficient funding to effectively deal with the 
housing provision. The housing subsidy from the provincial government is insufficient to cover all 
the associated costs of implementing the programme, especially given the topography and geology 
of the Metro. As one respondent noted, “people look to the municipality to give them RDP houses. 
When we engage with the province to say ‘we need more money’ the province says we must do 
what we can with what we have. They also do not have enough.”528  
 
In such situations, the Metro is left to deal with the demand for housing and protests resulting from 
the backlog. This bring into focus the need to revisit the grant allocation process and the 
relationship between the different spheres of government in relation to service delivery. Should, 
for example, the provincial government be responsible for any provision of housing in any 
municipality within its jurisdiction? Or should the provincial government simply provide funding 
for municipalities to implement their own service delivery programmes based on their priorities, 
as agreed to through the IDP? This is in essence questions the role of provincial governments in 
service delivery at a municipal level, and the implications of this on efficiency.  
 
 
7.3.4 Public Participation vs. Service Delivery Efficiency  
Borge et al529 found in their study of local government in Norway that there are three factors that 
contribute to local government efficiency: “high fiscal capacity and high degree of party 
fragmentation contribute to low efficiency”, whilst democratic participation contributes to higher 
efficiency.530 With respect to the latter, they state: 
A high degree of democratic participation in terms of voter turnout may reduce 
inefficiencies in public service provision through more efficient monitoring of 
politicians. The argument is that a higher turnout may give politicians incentives to 
implement policies that improve efficiency and benefit the electorate at large, at the 
expense of policies benefiting public sector unions and other special interests.531 
                                                          
528Interview with municipal official (TMO3)  
529Borge, Lars-Erik et al. 2008. “Public Sector Efficiency: the roles of political and budgetary institutions, fiscal 
capacity and democratic participation.” Public Choice (136). Pp 475-495  
530Ibid, Pg. 475  
531Ibid, Pg. 483  
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The premise for this conclusion is high voter turnout, which indicates high levels of public 
participation. Adversely, the implication is that low voter turnout - low participation levels - 
increases the potential for local government inefficiency. This suggests that the answer to the 
central question of this study is that public participation is desirable for the enhancement of service 
delivery efficiency. As the eThekwini case seems to suggest, public participation is necessary but 
not sufficient for service delivery efficiency. However, there is certainly no clear evidence of 
public participation negatively affecting efficiency.   
 
As with Msunduzi Municipality, to examine the research question, all the respondents were 
requested to comment on their understanding of the relationship between public participation and 
service delivery efficiency. 70% argued that public participation ideally ought to improve service 
delivery efficiency in local government through ensuring continuous and effective monitoring and 
accountability of elected representatives and information provision to the citizens. Accountability 
in local government is not just about the output, some argued. It is about the relationship between 
the promises made during election campaigns, the social contract between the elected 
representative and the electorate and the output within a specific timeframe. In other words, 
explained one respondent532, accountability is about making clear what the goals are and ensuring 
that what was promised is delivered. If councillors deliver on their promises, they are viewed as 
effective and therefore efficient. In an event where services are not delivered as promised, a 
process of accountability should ensure that the municipality, councillors in particular, explain and 
take responsibility for the failure.  
 
The challenge with linking accountability with municipal efficiency, argued one respondent - 
particularly as it relates to ward councillors in eThekwini Metro - is that the same ward councillors 
are also chairpersons of the ward committees. The problem with ward committees in eThekwini is 
that they are, more often than not, when they are in place, dominated by members of the dominant 
party within the ward, which in turn are often chaired by the ward councillor.533 Councillors 
therefore account to themselves. In this context, there are little consequences for non-performing 
but politically well-connected councillors. The only recourse that seems to be effective is public 
                                                          
532Interview with civil society (TMCS64) 
533Interview with civil society (TMCS51) 
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participation in a form of mass action, such as service delivery protests. “This is partly why a few 
years ago you saw these massive protests in places such as Cator Manor and Chatsworth.”534 The 
inability to hold councillors responsible leads to frustrations amongst the community. Ward 
councillors, under the protection of their political parties, and with the powers to ignore 
recommendations from ward committees are essentially not accountable. They cannot be removed 
from office unless through a public outcry often expressed through protests.   
 
Despite the lack of accountability on the part of elected officials, the Metro does seem to be 
responsive to the needs and concerns of communities. On paper, through the annual reports, the 
municipality demonstrates its ability to translate goals into actions, which it then publically reports 
on. “The problem with this is that the municipality’s reports are inaccessible to the majority of the 
citizens because they are bulky and very technical.”535 However, the absence of effective public 
platforms to deliver these reports means that citizens are often not aware of the achievements and 
challenges of the municipality. This lack of awareness then leads to service delivery protests, 
which in turn affects the Metro’s efficiency. Effective public participation would prevent this and 
increase efficiency by minimising service disruption.536 One respondent put this more succinctly:  
 
  Nobody tells us anything. So we strike and protest so that we can be listened to 
  and provided with information. They only speak to us around election times. 
  After they win, they forget us. If only they sat down with us and speak to us, we 
  would not need to march and we would trust them to do their jobs.537 
 
Respondents from the municipality agreed that in some instances, service delivery protests, as a 
form of public participation, can be more effective in providing short-term relief to the issue for 
those affected. However, the disruption and damage caused by many of such protests often have 
long-term negative effects, with respect to the municipal budget, on the very services the 
community requires. In fact, evidence of a positive correlation between public participation and 
service delivery efficiency can be allegedly observed with the successes brought about by the 
introduction of the Area Based Management System, which was aimed at accelerating 
                                                          
534Ibid.  
535Interview with civil society (TMCS51) 
536Ibid. 
537Interview with civil society (TMCS53) 
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development through bringing the municipality closer to and working with the people.538 The Area 
Based Management approach resulted in the municipality being demarcated into 5 areas: Inner 
eThekwini Regeneration and Management Urban Programme (iTRUMP), Southern Durban Basin 
ABM (SDB); Cator Manor ABM; Inanda, Ntuzuma and KwaMashu (INK); and RURAL ABM. 
Each of the ABM areas has its own profile and a dedicated office aimed at coordinating projects 
with the community and to bring services closer to the people. Figure 6 below is a map of the Area 
Based Management areas. 
 
The first and most notable feature of the ABM design for the Metro is how it reinforces the 
Apartheid spatial planning design and do not consider integration beyond the convenience of 
geography. For instance, the Rural ABM is not only vast in size, but it also cuts across the logical 
geographical considerations of the other ABMs. More precisely, rural areas that are found on the 
south, west and north of the Metro are grouped together. Certain rural areas such as uMbumbulu, 
for instance, could be considered to fit better with the Southern Durban Basin due to their 
proximity to places such as uMlazi and Amanzimtoti. Their developmental needs may also be 
different from other rural wards such those in uMkhomazi or Mkhambathini. The Inanda, 
Ntuzuma, and KwaMashu ABM also excludes areas such as Newlands, which is closer even 
geographically to this ABM than the Cator Manor ABM. From a distance, class and race seems to 
have played a role in the design of these ABM areas, despite the argument that they are trying to 
be effective administrative structures.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
538Interview with municipal official (TMO24) 
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Figure 6: eThekwini Municipality ABM Areas539 
 
 
                                                          
539See Pillay, 2011. Pg. 5 
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In addition to ABM, some respondents from the municipality pointed out the improvements 
brought about by the establishment and activities of the Community Participation and Support 
Unit. “Although challenged in terms of financial and human resources, this unit has enabled the 
municipality to keep its ear on the ground and improve turnaround times on concerns raised by the 
communities.”540 One of the ways in which the unit improves municipal efficiency and 
responsiveness through public participation is by promoting a culture of caring amongst municipal 
officials and public representatives, whilst simultaneously promoting a culture of consumer 
responsibility amongst community members. These two principles are said to greatly improve 
municipal efficiency by facilitating respect and collaboration.541 
 
Conversely, 23% of the respondents stated that there is no clear correlation between public 
participation and efficiency. To this extent, one respondent stated that “it is possible for a 
government entity to be efficient without high levels of public participation; the same way it is 
possible for an entity to be inefficient even with high levels of participation.”542 In terms of the 
opinions of the respondents, there are other factors that may contribute to the efficiency of the 
municipality. For instance, the way in which the municipality is managed and governed is 
important in determining its efficiency. As one municipal official emphasised, the audit history of 
the Metro and the accomplishments over the years indicates, for all intents and purposes, a well-
managed and governed municipality. This is partly due to limited party political interference in 
management and governance and or the ability of the officials to resist or minimise the political 
interference.543 
 
The structure of the municipal governance system vests significant decision-making powers in the 
executive committee, which is led by the mayor. Only the powers that are legally within the 
competence of the city council have not been delegated to the executive committee. The 
centralisation of substantial decision-making powers in the executive committee means that the 
                                                          
540Interview with municipal official (TMO30) 
541Ibid.  
542Interview with civil society (TMCS51) 
543Interview with civil society (TMCS40), who drew extensive comparisons between eThekwini Metro and 
Msunduzi Municipality in relation to party political squabbles, particularly within the governing party—which 
happened to be the ANC in both municipalities at the time.  
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time it takes to make a decision and implement such decisions is significantly shorter than it would 
be in a highly devolved or participatory system. This point is emphasised by Piper and Nadvi544 
when they state: 
    
  …eThekwini has been under the clear guidance of city manager Mike Sutcliffe 
  (who, it is worth noting, is senior in the ANC to eThekwini mayor Obed Mlaba). 
  Under Sutcliffe’s close attention, eThekwini governance had evolved in a more 
  efficient, if centralised, direction best characterised as ‘managerialism’. This 
  orientation has influenced the implementation of participatory governance, and 
  not always in a beneficial way. At the same time – and some would argue, as a 
  direct result of managerialism—eThekwini has experienced much more radical 
  direct action, especially in terms of housing and rent evections, of the ‘counter 
  hegemonic’ sort typical of social movements.  
 
Secondly, the size of a municipality’s budget and its ability to collect revenue to sustain its budget 
may have much more effect on the efficiency of the municipality, regardless of the nature and 
extent of public participation. “If the municipality has money and delivers service, and people see 
the delivery, they might not feel inclined to participate in municipal issues because things are being 
done.”545 This is the point that Borge et al make when they argue that municipalities with 
substantial fiscal capacity can hide their inefficiencies through generally good service standards.546 
Consequently, it may seem like a contradiction that eThekwini is relatively efficient in the context 
of poor public participation. However, this is possible, according to this argument, due to a 
professional civil service and a healthy - although not sufficient - fiscal capacity.  
 
 
7.4 Conclusion 
This chapter focused on the structure and functions of the eThekwini Metro in relation to public 
participation and service delivery efficiency. The findings of this chapter, with respect to 
eThekwini Metropolitan Municipality in relation to the research question underpinning the 
research, present a seemingly contradictory - and perhaps - confusing picture of the municipality. 
                                                          
544Piper and Nadvi, Pg. 227 
545Interview with civil society (TMCS41) 
546See Borge et al. 2008.  
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In terms of public participation, the municipality does not seem to have a strong and effective 
public participation culture, through established structures such as the ward committees. In fact, 
literature and empirical evidence on the subject indicates that ward committees are not effective 
due to a number of factors. These include party political interference, which forces the alignment 
of ward committees with ward political party branch leadership. However, a slightly better picture 
emerges when mass protests and service delivery protests are considered as forms of participation. 
These tend to be more effective in soliciting responses, albeit short term, from the municipality 
than any other form of participation in the municipality. However, mass protests may be effective 
but they are not part of the public participation strategy of the Metro and they can be 
counterproductive in certain instances.   
 
The role of the civil society is also very critical in deepening democracy in the Metro. Civil society 
plugs the gaps left by dysfunctional or non-existent public participation structures. Their role is 
especially critical on social housing issues, a subject that is very thorny in the Metro, given the 
backlog that currently exist. Civil society is also instrumental in helping communities navigate the 
Metro’s policy and legislative framework in order to inform people of the processes and their rights 
as citizens. Despite this work by civil society, by its and the municipality’s admission, levels of 
participation still remain low amongst the citizens. Additionally, having civil society play an 
intermediary - as opposed to supportive - role between the citizens and the municipality is not ideal 
in deepening democracy and accountability in local government.  
 
However, despite the low levels of public participation, on average citizens are generally satisfied 
with the municipality’s performance with regard to basic household services. Empirical evidence 
and various research conducted on the Metro supports this perception of eThekwini as a relatively 
efficient municipality, with respect to service delivery. Even in areas of low citizen satisfaction, 
the inefficiency is partly a product of exigent factors such as lack of adequate funding from the 
provincial or national government and the continuous urban migration influx that the municipality 
constantly faces.  
 
The seeming contradiction which emerges through the findings of this chapter is on the 
municipality being considered efficient despite the low levels of public participation on the one 
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hand, and a strong view amongst citizens, at least the respondents, that public participation ought 
to enhance the municipality’s efficiency, on the other hand. If the municipality is relatively 
efficient and citizens are on average satisfied with basic household services - despite low 
participation levels - in what way would effective public participation enhance efficiency? The 
findings of this chapter, based on the interviews data and current literature on the subject in relation 
to eThekwini, do not provide an answer to this question.  
 
This means, therefore, that the one conclusion that could be deduced is that, in relation to 
eThekwini Metro, efficiency comes at a cost to effective public participation. The relationship 
between public participation and efficiency is one that is ideal but not necessary for local 
government efficiency—but may be necessary for accountability. The Metro’s approach to 
governance is one of centralised managerialism, where significant powers are vested in the 
executive committee and all municipal structures, especially the administrative structure as led by 
the Municipal Manager, are designed to support the executive committee to make decisions as 
quickly as possible for the benefit of the Metro.  
 
The weakness or absence of ward committees limits the input by citizens on municipal activities, 
outside of the IDP engagements, despite the presence of a very clear public participation policy. 
The community engagements that take place through civil society and the Community 
Participation and Support Unit are riddled by inconsistencies, lack of effective municipality-wide 
coordination and lack of sufficient resources. Furthermore, these tend to attempt to empower and 
support communities in terms of engaging with the municipality without providing the actual 
platforms for engagement. It is empowerment without real participation opportunity.  
 
Having considered the discussions in this and the previous chapters, the following Chapter 8 
discusses the findings of this study in relation to the participatory democracy theoretical 
framework. Chapter also seeks to identify gaps in the research, which could held illuminate the 
unanswered questions on the subject of public participation and local government service delivery 
efficiency.  
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Chapter 8: Public Participation in Local Government   
8.1 Introduction 
This chapter seeks to serve two main purposes. Firstly, it discusses the relationship between public 
participation and service delivery efficiency, as demonstrated by the two local government case 
studies: Msunduzi Local Municipality and eThekwini Metropolitan Municipality. This is done 
through critiquing the assumptions of the theoretical framework of participatory democracy and 
the problems associated with the application of the conception of efficiency on local government. 
Secondly, the chapter identifies the gap in the research and broader literature that warrant further 
investigation.  
 
8.2 Public participation  
Chapter 2 discussed in depth the debate on democracy and the different meanings attached to the 
concept by different people in different times and contexts. Fundamental to this debate is the 
relationship between government and the citizens. What role, if any, do citizens have in 
government processes of their societies? Amongst the things to emerge out of this debate is the 
theory of participatory democracy, which forms the theoretical framework for this study. 
Participatory democracy argues that public participation is the key to meaningful democracy and 
it improves the quality of governance and the efficiency in service delivery. Chapter 3 looked at 
how local government in South Africa was redesigned and transformed after the Apartheid era to 
be an instrument of development through the promotion of public participation. The promotion of 
public participation in local government was deemed so critical that it was entrenched in the 
Constitution of the country, and different legislative and policy instruments were enacted to 
operationalize this. In this regard, a lot of responsibility was placed upon municipalities to establish 
effective mechanisms for and support public participation initiatives within their jurisdiction. 
These include mechanisms such as the Integrated Development Plan and the establishment of ward 
committees. 
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8.2.1 Integrated Development Plan 
The Municipal Systems Act requires municipalities to develop, through public participation, a 
single and integrated development plan, which will guide all municipal activities and decisions for 
a specific period. The Act stipulates the minimum content of the IDP in order to ensure uniformity 
and to achieve the underlying objectives. However, the findings of this research based on empirical 
evidence and scholarly literature indicate that the IDP processes have not been able to promote 
high levels of effective public participation in local government.547 For both eThekwini Metro and 
Msunduzi Municipality, the IDP process is ostensibly used as a consultation process, in which the 
public’s comments are sourced on already existing plans. The development of plans is not 
informed by contextual realities as identified and informed by citizens. In this regard, Stanton 
states:  
  Municipalities have long been criticized for their ineffective and inadequate 
  Integrated Development Plans (IDPs). Municipalities have been accused of 
  drafting broad objectives as opposed to specific local development plans. Whilst 
  this criticism is mostly justified, the growing range of cross-sectoral national and 
  provincial government programmes increase the responsibilities of   
  municipalities, thus complicating their planning and budgeting problems.548 
 
Part of the problem of low levels of participation, as was more clearly the case with Msunduzi 
Municipality, is poor communication with communities on the IDP process and its participation 
mechanisms. Additionally, lack of trust in processes has had a negative impact on public 
participation in IDP processes. Given the placement of the municipality under administration and 
the alleged corruption that preceded that, it is reasonable to understand the apathy that is growing 
driven by lack of trust in municipal processes. With regard to eThekwini Metro, the main problem 
is that despite a comprehensive process of developing the IDP and the enormous resources utilized 
by the Metro to achieve this, the process is controlled by municipal officials in such a way that 
inputs from the public are used to simply legitimize the plans already developed without the 
                                                          
547See Mohamed, 2006. Pg. 41 
548Stanton, 2009. Pg. 123  
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communities: what Aronstein549 broadly refers to as tokenism. In turn, this affects the levels of 
public participation in the IDP processes.  
 
8.2.2 Ward Committees  
In addition, Municipal Systems Act provides for the establishment of ward committees in 
municipal wards as a platform to facilitate public participation in category B and category C 
municipalities. Category A municipalities have an option to establish ward committees. As it is 
with the IDP, the Municipal Systems Act provides roles and responsibilities of the ward 
committees, including their powers in relation to the municipality. The findings of this study reveal 
a number of issues regarding the existence and effectiveness of the ward committees in the two 
municipalities being considered.  
Firstly, whilst Msunduzi Municipality was amongst the first of the municipalities in the country to 
establish ward committees, as is required by law for local municipalities, eThekwini has been 
inconsistent in establishing ward committees as permanent structures. In some cases, the election 
of ward committees has been considered flawed by various sectors. For instance, the 2012 ward 
committee elections in eThekwini were conducted only two days after notice of such elections was 
given to citizens by means of posters, with no clear venues being advertised. This created a 
problem of legitimacy for many ward committees, which resulted in protest actions.550 The ward 
committees that had been elected in 2007 were only provided with training, albeit inadequate, in 
2010. Consequently, the lack of proper training and legitimacy of some of the ward committees 
affects the trust the citizens have towards these structures, which in turn affects the levels of 
participation of citizens.  
Furthermore, a common factor with regard to ward committees is the lack of awareness of their 
existence by the citizens. Where they do exist, their roles and responsibilities and powers and 
functions, are not well known amongst the citizens. This point was emphasized strongly by the 
                                                          
549Aronstein, 1969.  
550Parliamentary Monitoring Group. 2012. “State of Local Government Finance Report; Ward Committees.” 
Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs Committee Meeting Summary. Online: 
https://pmg.org.za/committee-meeting/14712.  
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civil society respondents during the interviews, supported by scholarly research on the subject.551 
Although there are various programmes aimed at assisting ward committees in both municipalities 
to understand their responsibilities, these programmes do not extend to informing the general 
public of these.  
An additional issue that emerges from the research findings is that of the politicization of the ward 
committees along party lines. This phenomenon is perhaps the biggest obstacle with regard to the 
effectiveness of ward committees and has been noted as a fundamental problem affecting ward 
committees across the country. The alignment of ward committees with the dominant political 
party branch in the ward results in reduced representation for the different sectors of the ward. 
Without the diversity in representation, participation levels are affected, especially amongst those 
who feel excluded. With the ANC being dominant in both municipalities, many of the ward 
committees are ostensibly extensions of the ANC. Consequently, party politics become ward 
committee politics and political party squabbles also find expression in ward committees. The 
payment of a R1000 monthly stipend to ward committee members in both municipalities also 
exacerbates unhealthy political competition associated with ward committee membership and 
branch politics. The combination of high unemployment levels and the general perception of ward 
committees as another political space to be contested and controlled further facilitates the 
politicization of ward committees. 
Interestingly, there is no evidence of any real attempt to deal decisively with this trend, despite an 
acknowledgement from the different sectors, including municipal officials, on the seriousness of 
this problem. One point to speculate on is that it might be inevitable that ward committees become 
politicized given that they are established formal municipal structures.  
The absence of decision-making powers of ward committees in relation to ward councilors is a 
fundamental point of weakness in local government, as evidenced by the findings in both 
Msunduzi and eThekwini. Ward committees are by law advisory bodies to the ward councilor, 
who also serve as chairs. This reduces their roles to simply assisting the ward councilor in 
addressing ward community needs. They cannot hold the ward councilor accountable nor can they 
take decisions that are legally binding to the councilor. Their relationship to the ward citizens is 
                                                          
551See Shembe, Sibusiso. 2014. Role of Traditional Leadership in Service Delivery: a case study of eThekwini 
Municipality. Masters dissertation. University of KwaZulu-Natal. Unpublished; Smith and de Visser, 2009.  
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that of relaying information on areas of concern and possible actions being taken by the councilor. 
Their advice to the councilor can, legally, be ignored. Consequently, whilst the ward committees 
were designed to be at the core of public participation in local government, they cannot promote 
effective participation in the absence of any real powers to not only make binding decisions, but 
also to hold the councilor accountable. They are beholden to the ward councilor. For instance, the 
Department of Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs states that in many cases where 
the ward committee is viewed as ineffective or inactive, it is because the ward councilors fail to 
convene regular ward committee meetings and ward community meetings.  
Unsurprisingly, the research found that the levels of participation in, and effectiveness of, ward 
committees can also be along the urban/rural divide.  The ward committees in rural areas 
experience low levels of participation and effectiveness predominantly due to their vast 
geographical spread and the challenging means of transport. The municipal wards that are largely 
rural in both Msunduzi and eThekwini municipalities tends to be much larger than the wards in 
urban areas. One of the reasons for this is population density, which is higher in urban wards than 
in rural wards. Given that the rural population is the most underprivileged in both municipalities, 
organizing and coordinating the activities of ward committees is a difficult task. The lack of 
adequate meeting infrastructure also affects the attendance and participation in ward committees 
by different sectors of the ward. As a result, it is not uncommon in rural wards to have better 
participation levels and service delivery in the area of the ward closest to the residence of the ward 
councilor compared to other corners of the ward.  
The participation of ward communities in and effectiveness of the ward committees in rural areas 
is also affected by the parallel structure of traditional leadership in KwaZulu-Natal. Whilst both 
municipalities make provision for the involvement of traditional leadership in local government 
processes, at a ward level the public participation processes depend on the relationship between 
the elected structures and the traditional leaders: more specifically between the ward councilor and 
the chief or delegated traditional authority. Where the traditional leader and the ward councilor 
have a shared understanding, public participation levels are improved, such as in Vulindlela, where 
some ward committees coordinate meetings with the chief or delegated traditional leader in order 
to encourage participation in ward community meetings and service delivery processes.  
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It is common course that traditional leadership still enjoys substantial support amongst rural 
communities and the meetings convened by traditional leaders are well-attended. By contrast, the 
effectiveness of ward committees and the participation of people in them can be affected by 
political disagreements between the councilor and the traditional leaders, such as in some rural 
wards of eThekwini Municipality. Given the historical and often violent divide between the ‘ANC-
aligned councilors’ and the ‘IFP-aligned’ traditional leaders, the relationship between the 
councilor and the traditional leader remains a sensitive and potentially dangerous issue affecting 
service delivery in KZN local government. This point was underscored in the interviews in both 
municipalities and has been discussed in some depth in academic literature. However, it is 
important to note that this IFP-ANC divide with respect to traditional leaders and elected 
councilors is eroding, as demonstrated by electoral results.  
With regard to informal settlements, the feeling of exclusion in municipal processes including in 
ward committees is common across the municipalities, albeit in varying degrees. The findings of 
this study reveal that the informal settlement dwellers are the least satisfied with municipal service 
delivery, especially in relation to basic services such as housing, sanitation and electricity. Many 
of the informal settlement dwellers in both municipalities come largely from other mostly rural 
parts of the province, in search of better opportunities in the cities. The lack of economic 
opportunities forces many dwellers to settle in informal settlements, which are often built illegally 
on municipal or private land. The pitiable living conditions in these informal settlements leads to 
the feeling of marginalization, indignity and frustration. In socio-economically diverse wards, the 
challenges facing informal settlements do not often resonate with the rest of the community. In 
some wards, informal settlements are considered a nuisance and not prioritized in service 
delivery.552Consequently, their living conditions also impact upon their ability to participate 
meaningfully in ward committee and community meetings. The situation becomes better where 
                                                          
552One of the common issues that emerged in both municipalities with respect to informal settlements was that of 
basic housing. A number of communities have had free RDP houses built in order to not only improve their living 
conditions, but also to eradicate the informal and often dangerous dwellings. It this provision of basic housing that 
perpetuates the continued existence and spread of informal settlements. In some instances, due to lack of 
provincial coordination, some recipients end up owning multiple RDP houses in different municipalities, which they 
then rent out to others, especially foreign nationals. This contributes to the continued housing backlog and 
frustrations of municipal officials and has been highlighted as one of the issues related to xenophobic attacks. 
However, it must also be said that part of this relates to corruption of some municipal officials with respect to 
selling RDP houses.   
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the ward is predominantly informal settlements. The common socioeconomic condition in the ward 
allow for some sense of equality, which is also important for public participation.     
However, although largely excluded from formal processes and mostly dissatisfied with service 
delivery, informal settlement dwellers, who are predominantly young people, can often mobilize 
and engage in alternative public participation processes such as protests, lobbying and engaging 
with civil society. In some instances, they can even engage in litigation in order to protect their 
rights and demand services from their municipalities. Despite notable victories, they remain 
trapped by their socio-economic conditions and the limited political spaces for their concerns and 
contributions to be heard in terms of municipal governance.  
Furthermore, the research also found that although not the focus of the study, ward committees are 
dominated by men whilst it is mostly women who participate in community meetings and 
development initiatives in both municipalities. This point was not investigated in any detail as it 
emerged more clearly during the analysis. However, it is worth noting given that women, 
particularly black women, continue to face economic and political exclusion in general, in a 
country where they are the majority of the population.  
It is clear from looking at the findings, with respect to public participation in IDP and ward 
committees, that the levels and nature of public participation in both municipalities are generally 
poor. The continued politicization of ward committees and the shortcomings with respect to 
communication with community members are clear reasons for the low levels of participation.  
The implications of the low levels of participation on the research exploration can only be clearly 
understood in the context of the other critical element of this study: efficiency in service delivery 
in Msunduzi Local Municipality and eThekwini Metropolitan Municipality.  
 
8.3 Service Delivery Efficiency  
Analysis of the data from the interviews and literature indicate that the two municipalities, despite 
both experiencing low levels of participation, albeit in varying degrees, perform differently in 
terms of service delivery efficiency. Msunduzi, a category B municipality, is considered an 
improving but not efficient municipality. The municipality’s own annual reports, the AG’s reports, 
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the provincial government reports, the living conditions survey and the interview responses all 
lead to the conclusion that the municipality is relatively inefficient. By inefficiency in this regard, 
the study found that the municipality is unable to use its limited resources to achieve the maximum 
results in terms of service delivery. The placing of the municipality under administration in 2011 
by the provincial government, as well as years of financial mismanagement practices, which the 
AG has raised through audit findings, are indicative of the municipality’s inefficiency. This is 
despite the fact that the Municipal Council delegated many of its powers to the Executive 
Committee in order to improve efficiency.  
The inefficiency in Msunduzi can be attributed to several reasons, chief amongst which is the party 
political interference in the administration and management of the municipality. Amongst others, 
this takes the form of party deployment to several critical municipal positions of people without 
the necessary and requisite skills. Moreover, the municipality is susceptible to interference as a 
result of intra-party political conflicts of the dominant regional party. As discussed in Chapter 5, 
Msunduzi suffered tremendously when the political contestations within the regional ANC spilled 
over to its district municipality (uMgungundlovu District Municipality). As a result of the political 
interference, several competent municipal managers and other municipal officials have been 
haphazardly removed from their positions in order to install those perceived to be more 
sympathetic to, or controllable by, the dominant faction of the time.  
In contrast, despite significant challenges such as the housing backlogs, eThekwini Metro is 
considered relatively efficient. In fact, it is considered one of South Africa’s best run municipalities 
and has received a number of awards in this regard. Its comparatively large budget and high 
collection rates enable the municipality to maximize service delivery, whilst minimizing wasteful 
and under expenditure. One of the reasons for this is the structure of the Metro’s management and 
administration, which largely shields it from undue political interference. This is strengthened by 
the professionalization of administration in order to ensure that the right people with the requisite 
skills are placed in critical positions - as opposed to deployment.553As it is with Msunduzi, 
eThekwini Council delegated much of its powers to the Executive Committee in order to improve 
the speed and quality of the decisions being taken in terms of service delivery. The whole structure 
                                                          
553This is not to say that no political interference or deployment occurs in eThekwini Metro. It is to say that the 
study did not find significant evidence of this being raised as an issue through either interviews or the literature.  
203 | P a g e  
 
of the Metro is designed to ensure that quality decisions are taken as quickly as possible in line 
with the available resources.  
 
8.4 Public Participation and Service delivery Efficiency  
The question that this study explores is whether public participation has negative effects on service 
delivery efficiency, given that public participation is time and resource consuming in a way that 
delays and derails service delivery. Given the generally held view that public participation leads 
to service delivery efficiency, is there a correlation between public participation and service 
delivery efficiency in local government? There are two major findings emerging out of this study.  
The first finding relates to the correlation between public participation and service delivery 
efficiency. Chapter 5 concluded by stating that Msunduzi Municipality has a challenge of low 
levels of public participation in municipal governance, especially through the formal structures 
such as the ward committees and the IDP processes. In addition, the municipality cannot be 
regarded as efficient. Despite this, the majority of the respondents were of the view that effective 
public participation would improve efficiency by ensuring accountability and transparency in the 
processes. In other words, the inefficiency in service delivery can partly be explained by the low 
levels of participation, which are in turn affected by frustrations regarding municipal inefficiency. 
From this, it can be deduced that there is positive correlation between public participation and 
municipal efficiency in service delivery; when public participation is effective and valued, service 
delivery becomes efficient. Such a deduction is consistent with common thinking and the views of 
the respondents.  
eThekwini Metro on the other hand presents a different picture with respect to the correlation 
between public participation and service delivery efficiency. The Metro has low public 
participation levels in municipal governance structures such ward committees and IDP processes. 
The inconsistency in establishing ward committees and ensuring their sustainability and 
effectiveness suggests that the municipality, despite a comprehensive public participation policy 
and a budget for ward committees, does not place real value in public participation processes, 
especially regarding service delivery issues. However, unlike Msunduzi Municipality, the study 
found the Metro to be efficient. Chapter 6 also concluded that the majority of the respondents were 
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of the view that public participation ought to improve service delivery efficiency although they 
believed that the municipality was efficient despite low levels of participation. The challenge 
therefore is on explaining the efficiency in the context of low participation. In this regard Chapter 
6 further concluded that for an economically large municipality, there is no necessary and clear 
correlation between public participation and service delivery efficiency. A well-managed and 
governed municipality, with a relatively large purse, can appear to be efficient even with little 
input from the community.   
Perhaps, an argument can be made that there is in fact a correlation; the less effective public 
participation is, the more efficient the municipality is. To support such an argument, reference 
could be made on the living conditions survey, which found that the major point contributing to 
the dissatisfaction levels was mainly the shortage of decent housing in per-urban and rural areas. 
However, such an argument would not be plausible given Msunduzi’s experiences.554 
Consequently, with respect to the eThekwini, the study finds that there is no correlation between 
public participation and service delivery efficiency. The link between the two is, at least for the 
Metro, a value link which would be concerned mostly about the legitimacy of the decisions and 
service delivery processes in a democratic society than a discernable improvement in service 
delivery efficiency.   
Secondly, the research finds that public participation cannot be said to adversely affect local 
government service delivery efficiency, as shown by data from the two case studies.  This is 
primarily because the research question rests on the assumption of a correlation between public 
participation and service delivery efficiency in local government. This assumption can be 
expressed in the following terms: the higher the level of public participation, the lower the 
efficiency of the municipality in delivering basic services. By extension, the lower the levels of 
public participation, the higher the municipality’s service delivery efficiency. It is obvious from 
this study that neither of the two propositions can be regarded as scientifically valid. As stated 
above, the study found that there is no obvious and necessary correlation between public 
                                                          
554This raises a further point regarding correlations—causality. Does public participation improve efficiency or does 
efficiency improve participation? This point is discussed later in this chapter.  
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participation and service delivery efficiency in local government: at least not in the two case 
studies.   
This therefore poses certain conceptual challenges for the participatory democracy theory, 
specifically as it relates to local government in South Africa. The dominant position in democratic 
governance is that the participation of communities in various forms and aspects of governance, 
including budgeting, improves the effectiveness of the outcomes, enhances governance, empowers 
citizens and improves the lives of the poor. This is because participatory democracy improves 
accountability, responsiveness, transparency and efficiency. Focusing on an aspect of participatory 
democracy, Participatory Budgeting (PB) in Brazil, Touchton and Wampler555 make the point that 
the arguments on the tangible benefits of participatory democracy in relation to the governance 
services are often not based on empirical evidence. Font and Smith concur with this view by citing 
a number of studies which reveal that little evidence exists of the impact participatory processes 
have on decision making by political authorities.556 Often there is gap between the participatory 
process and the decisions. Where such connections might exist, there is no public participatory 
process to monitor the implementation. This brings into question the theoretical and evidentiary 
foundations of the transformation of local government in South Africa, as advocated by the New 
Public Management approaches in the 1990s. There was little or no evidence at the time proving 
that participation actually leads to the stated benefits in similar local government contexts.  
However, there is emerging evidence that participatory democracy might improve the overall 
social wellbeing of communities if it is coupled with the power of public authority and supported 
with significant resources. In this regard, the example of Brazil’s PB systems is hailed as a 
benchmark of the actual benefits of participatory democracy in improving social conditions and 
government efficiency at a local level.  
 PB in Brazil is a yearlong decision-making process through which citizens exercise 
voice and vote—they negotiate amongst themselves and with government officials
 in annul or biannual meetings over the allocation of  new capital investment
 spending on public work projects, such as health care clinics, schools, and street
 paving…the presence of vote is an important innovation because it helps citizens
                                                          
555Touchton, M. and Brian Wampler. 2014. “Improving Social Well-Being Through New Democratic Institutions”. 
Comparative Political Studies. Vol. 47 (10) Pp. 1442-1469  
556Font, J. And Graham Smith. 2013. “The Policy Effects of Participation: Cherry-picking among local policy 
proposals?”  Ponenciapresentada al XI Congresso de la AECPA, UPO, Sevilla.  
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 overcome the collective action problem—Citizens are mobilized to vote for specific
 projects, which then induces them to maintain pressure on government officials.557 
 
A comprehensive review by de Renzio and Wehner558 of 38 empirical studies on participatory 
budgeting suggests that there is a gap in understanding the exact intervention that produce the 
desired outcomes and under the conditions that facilitate this. It is this gap that ultimately leads to 
the conclusion of this study that the participatory democracy theory is founded on a causal link 
between participation and government efficiency for which there is very little evidence. As it is in 
Brazil, the advocacy of participatory democratic structures in local government was mainly about 
political reforms and ideological appeasement. The assumption, in so far as local government is 
concerned, is that ward committees and IDP processes, as public participation platforms, would 
lead to improvements in government efficiency and over wellbeing of the communities. The fault 
in this assumption is that it does not consider the power of communities to actually make policy 
decisions, as opposed to simply expressing their opinions to be considered by municipal 
authorities. In the PB case in Brazil, communities are actually empowered to make decisions in 
terms of how budgets are allocated. The result is more budgets being allocated to address social 
issues such as health care: something that does not exist in local government in South Africa. Ward 
committees and IDP processes do not necessarily have the power to make decisions. Ward 
committees are expressly advisory bodies.  
Furthermore, participatory democracy theory has a false assumption of causality and impact being 
the same in any context; it does not necessarily take into account non-western contexts with 
different ideological and traditional predispositions. The phenomena of ward committees may not 
be appropriate for all municipalities, given financial, ideological and cultural differences. Ward 
committees in rural areas, where traditional councils also exist, may not be effective and 
appropriate, given the nuances of participation in rural areas. They may also not be appropriate in 
smaller wards where community meetings may be the most appropriate platform. To require ward 
committees in all category C and B municipalities assumes sufficient homogeneity across the 
wards such that ward committees can work in any local setting.   
                                                          
557Touchton and Wampler, 2014: 1447 
558deRenzio, Paolo and Joachim Wehner. 2015. “The Impacts of Fiscal Openness: A Review of the Evidence.” 
Incentives Research. Global Initiative for Fiscal Transparency.  
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It also cannot account for government efficiency in the contest of poor or low levels of public 
participation. As discussed in Chapter 6, eThekwini is an efficient municipality with low levels of 
participation. By all accounts eThekwini also has the best quality of life in the country. If one takes 
into account the stated benefits of participatory democracy, in the context of some municipalities, 
these can be achieved without effective public participation. Obviously, some other factors must 
be considered in order for there to be a clear and valid causal correlation between public 
participation and service delivery efficiency. To illustrate this point, Category C and Category B 
municipalities share responsibility in terms of service delivery. However, category C 
municipalities cannot have ward committees, given that they do not have wards. In the case, of 
Msunduzi Municipality, the municipality’s efficiency is also impacted upon by uMgungundlovu 
District Municipalities, whose role is to provide bulk services and coordinate the different local 
municipalities which belong to it.  In the case of eThekwini Metro, the coordination with the 
provincial government is critical in the delivery of certain services such as RDP houses. 
Participation in ward committees and IDP processes would not necessarily lead to efficiency in 
housing delivery if there are challenges with respect to this coordination with the provincial 
government.  
 
8.5 Areas for further research  
In conducting this research, a number of issues emerged as requiring further investigation. These 
include (i) structural design of local government vis-à-vis municipal efficiency; (ii) the impact of 
public participation on service delivery; and (ii) causality between public participation and 
government efficiency or effectiveness in local government. 
 
8.5.1 Structural design of local government and municipal efficiency   
The structural arrangement of local government entails some overlaps with the other spheres of 
government in the provision of the basic services. Although section 151 of the Constitution 
establishes the autonomy of local government, this is subject to national and provincial legislation. 
In other words, the national and provincial governments still retain certain powers of ‘supervision’ 
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and intervention in municipal affairs, under certain circumstances.559 However, such powers 
cannot be exercised to the extent that the autonomy of the municipalities is infringed upon.560 This, 
therefore, means that municipalities are meant to be the primary providers of basic services to their 
communities.  
 
To this effect, local government is organized in terms of district municipalities (Category C) and 
local municipality (Category B). The Municipal Structures Act of 1998 (as subsequently amended) 
provides for the powers and functions of municipalities. Section 8(1) gives District municipalities 
powers to coordinate local municipalities within their jurisdiction; to provide bulk services such 
as water and electricity; to develop and implement an IDP for its areas, as well as guide the IDPs 
of its local municipalities; improvement and maintenance of public infrastructure for the whole 
district.  
 
Similarly, section 8(2) states, “a local municipality has the functions and powers referred to in 
section 83(1), excluding those functions and powers vested in terms of subsection (1) of this 
section in the district municipality in whose area it falls”.561 This essentially means that both local 
and district municipalities have the same functions, limited only by jurisdiction. The district 
municipality only becomes relevant when an issue affects two or more municipalities within its 
sphere of operation. It is also on this basis that section 6 (2) provides for the declaration of an area 
as a District Management Area if the establishment of category B (local government) for that area 
would not be viable. These are areas in which only the district municipality has municipal 
authority. 
 
As it is with provincial and local government as a whole, there is a considerable overlap of 
functions and powers between district and local governments. This overlap would, at times, result 
in disputes over jurisdiction, functions and powers. In line with the constitutional principle of 
cooperative government, section 86 of the Municipal Structures Act authorizes the provincial 
government, through the Member of the Executive Committee (MEC) for local government, to 
                                                          
559 See Section 44 of the Constitution 
560 Section 151(4) of the Constitution states, The national or a provincial government may not compromise or 
impede a municipality’s ability or right to exercise s powers or perform its functions 
561 “Chapter 5 of the Municipal Structures Act of 1998 (as amended). 
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intervene. In dealing with the concurrency or overlap of powers and functions between provincial 
and local government, Steytler et al state, “due to this overlap or concurrency, there is a degree of 
confusion about who does what. A lack of clarity about the role and definition may prejudice 
service delivery and cause conflict over resources and authority.562 This was evident in the case 
between NokengTsaTaemane Local Municipality and Metsweding District Municipality in which 
there was a dispute regarding the provision of Emergency Medical Services (EMS) and the transfer 
of this service from the local to the district municipality.563 
 
Furthermore, coordination between the district municipality and its local municipalities is crucial 
in ensuring effective and efficient service delivery to citizens. In this regard, local municipalities 
must align their Integrated Development Programmes with that of the district municipality. The 
Municipal Systems Act further states that the district municipality must adopt its own IDP after 
consultation with and the consideration of the proposals and IDPs of its local municipalities as 
well as other stakeholders within its jurisdiction. As such, a reading of the district municipality 
IDP and those of its local municipalities will reveal a lot of similarities as part of the coordination. 
This may be potentially confusing in terms of what service or function, within the scope of the 
IDP is meant to be the responsibility of which municipality.  
 
In addition, coordination between local and district municipalities must also happen at a political 
structural level. As such, district councils were designed to be composed of 60% local councilors 
and 40% directly elected district councilors.564 The local councilors are essentially forwarded by 
local municipalities to represent their interests within the district. This is meant to improve 
communication and accountability between the local and the district municipalities. This, in turn, 
would improve service delivery within the broader district.  
                                                          
562 “See Steytler, N. et al. Defining Provincial and Local Government Powers and Functions: The Management of 
Concurrency. Unpublished  
563 See NokengTsaTaemane Local Municipality and Independent Municipal and Allied Trade Union vs Metsweding 
District Municipality and others (2003) 3 JS227 (LCSA) 
564 Community Law Centre. 2008. Redefining the Political Structure of District Municipalities. Local Government 
Project, University of the Western Cape. Local government elections are based on a combination of a 
ward/constituency and proportional representation systems. See Section 23 of the Municipal Structures Act.  
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The Intergovernmental Relations Framework Act of 2005 further establishes the District 
Intergovernmental Forums (DIF), which are made up of the district and local mayors.565 The 
purpose of this forum is to improve coordination and communication between the district and local 
municipalities. In this regard, the State of Intergovernmental Relations Review Report566 notes 
that, not unlike the District councils, membership of the DIFs is premised on the same principle of 
representation. This means representatives of various municipalities often seek mandates from 
their respective municipalities before making a decision. This results in several delays in decision-
making, particularly those related to issues deemed politically sensitive. It is worth noting, 
however, that the introduction of the DIFs has had a positive impact in the improvement of 
coordination between the district and local municipalities.  
 
The existence of a number of coordination bodies only serves to highlight the complexity and 
redundancy of the local government structures. Decisions have to be negotiated between many 
different forums, which delays the efficiency of the implementation and delivery of services. This 
could be further worsened by the ideological dispositions of the different councils within a district. 
Each municipal council prioritizes according to the needs of its citizens and the ideology of the 
governing party.567 
 
Palmer568 concludes in his study on the performance of district municipalities that the current two-
tier system of local government is not only very costly to the state, it also renders district 
municipalities mostly ineffective in service delivery. District municipalities are mostly funded 
from the national fiscus and lack viable revenue generation, especially those that operate in rural 
areas. The current three-tier system does not only create inefficiencies in service delivery, but also 
creates opportunities for fraud and corruption due to the difficulty of accountability, especially of 
the district municipality, which does not have actual constituencies. 
                                                          
565 Ibid  
566 Department of Provincial and Local Government. 2008. 15 Year Review Report on the state of 
Intergovernmental Relations Review Report.  
567See Nene, S. 2016. “Enhancing Service Delivery: A Review of South Africa’s Dual Local Government System”. 
Politeia. 35 (1). Pp. 19-40  
568 Palmer, Ian. 2011. “An Assessment of the performance of district municipalities.” In the Municipal Demarcation 
Board. The First Decade of The Municipal Demarcation Board –Reflections on demarcating local government in 
South Africa.   
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There is a need therefore to consider more carefully the impact the current local government design 
has on the efficiency in service delivery. The current, albeit limited, literature focuses largely on 
the relevance and effectiveness of the district municipality, given the overlaps with local 
municipalities. There is a need to study in more detail how the current structure of the local 
government maximizes public participation and service delivery efficiency. Moreover, there is a 
need for further research on how the current multi-tier local government design may be susceptible 
to or even promoting political interference in municipal governance. The research could be aimed 
at understanding the best possible structural design for local government in the South African 
context with the aim of maximizing both public participation and service delivery efficiency.  
 
 
8.5.2 Impact of public participation on service delivery in South Africa  
This research found that based on the two case studies, there is no correlation between public 
participation and service delivery efficiency. This means that there is also no empirical evidence 
to conclude that public participation improves service delivery efficiency in local government - at 
least in the context of the two case studies. Substantial literature exists on the ideological and 
normative value of public participation in local government. More literature exists on the 
challenges facing different municipalities with regard to service delivery and public participation 
in ward committees and other local government processes.  
However, there is no literature that systematically and methodically looks at empirical ways in 
which public participation actually leads to municipal efficiency in service delivery, without this 
being explained through other factors such as the availability of resources and the 
professionalization of the municipal civil service. Furthermore, the question of what actually leads 
to the other between participation and efficiency needs to be investigated. It is inadequate to base 
the value of participation on an assumed effect on efficiency when the adverse could also be 
possible. These flaws of the participatory democracy theory were identified in this research, at 
least in relation to local government and service delivery efficiency. This is not to discount the 
participatory democracy theory entirely.  
Linked to this is a need for a more thorough investigation of what is efficiency means in the context 
of local government service delivery. This research discussed the difficulties regarding the 
212 | P a g e  
 
conceptualization of efficiency in local government. Simply looking at time in relation to decision-
making and the notion of input-output to define efficiency - without considering effectiveness and 
quality – provides an incomplete picture of the complexities of local government.  
 
8.5.3 Causality between government efficiency and public participation 
Based on the data discussed in previous chapters, this chapter makes the argument that the 
exploration of the research question has resulted in the conclusion that there is no clear correlation 
between public participation and service delivery efficiency at local government level. Causality 
between the two could not be determined using data from eThekwini Metro and Msunduzi Local 
Municipality. Whilst the participatory democracy theory, which forms the theoretical framework 
for this study, has value, some of its assumptions cannot be said to be true in all contexts.  
With a clear answer to the research question, this chapter has suggested three areas of investigation 
in relation to the subject of this dissertation. Furthermore, the chapter raises questions about the 
structural design of local government in relation service delivery efficiency and public 
participation. The legislative assumptions about the value and effectiveness of ward committees 
as instruments of public participation has been questioned in this chapter. This is because the 
differences between municipalities and their contexts in South Africa requires that policies and 
instruments be appropriate for and adaptable to individual context.  
 
8.6 Conclusion  
This Chapter discussed the findings in relation to the relationship between public participation and 
service delivery efficiency, as demonstrated by the two local government case studies: Msunduzi 
Local Municipality and eThekwini Metropolitan Municipality. The Chapter argued that public 
participation was deemed so central to local government that it was entrenched in the Constitution 
and given expression through legislated processes such as the Integrated Development Plan, and 
the creation of structures such as Ward Committees. However, based on the evidence, the Chapter 
highlights the fact that the IDP process is not as effective in promoting public participation due to 
a number of factors, such as the development of plans that are not informed by contextual realities, 
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as stated by the citizens. Issues of poor communication (Msunduzi Municipality) and tokenism 
(eThekwini Metro) contribute substantially to the low levels of participation in IDP processes.  
Furthermore, the Chapter discussed in detail the challenges of ward committees in both 
municipalities. The Chapter argued that the key issue with regard to ward committees in both case 
studies is the party-politicization of these committees, which leads to exclusion and their 
ineffectiveness in promoting effective public participation. Ward committees, the Chapter stated, 
become extensions of the local branch of the dominant political party. Moreover, even in instances 
where the ward committees are fairly representative of the ward population and diversity, their 
lack of decision-making powers means they can only serve as advisory bodies to the ward 
councilor, who may choose to disregard the advice. This adds to their ineffectiveness in promoting 
effective public participation.  
Drawing from Chapters 6 and 7, this Chapter argued concludes that the effectiveness of ward 
committees can also be understood the lens or urban/rural divide. Issues such as availability and 
accessibility of resources, the size of the ward, the existence of parallel structures of leadership 
such as traditional leaders can and often impact on the nature and extent of participation in ward 
committees. Informal settlement dwellers often also face similar challenges with rural 
communities in terms of exclusion.  
The Chapter concluded that, based on the data, the two municipalities performed differently in 
terms of service delivery efficiency, despite some similarities in the low levels of participation. 
Msunduzi Municipality is considered an improving but not efficient municipality, whilst 
eThekwini Metro is considered relatively efficient, despite its own significant challenges.  
Drawing from the above, the Chapter stated that, based on the findings of the research, there are 
faults in the participatory democracy theory’s assumption of causality and impact being the same 
in any context. There are several nuances that the theory does not take into account in terms of the 
diversity and differences within and between municipalities in South Africa, such that the 
promotion of a particular homogenous structure or system of public participation may not be 
effectively applied everywhere.  
Finally, having discussed a number of other findings based on the study of the two municipalities, 
this Chapter identified some areas for possible further research. First, the Chapter argued that there 
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is need for further research in order to understand more broadly the impact of the current local 
government design has on the efficiency in service delivery. Secondly, there is a need for further 
research to look empirically at the issue of causality between public participation and municipal 
service delivery efficiency. Linked to this would be research aimed at clearly defining efficiency 
with respect to municipalities. 
The following chapter, Chapter 9, provides an overall summary of the dissertation and revisits the 
key points of the chapters of the dissertation.  
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Chapter 9: Conclusion  
The purpose of this dissertation was to explore the relationship between public participation and 
service delivery efficiency in local government. Central to this exploration was the question of 
whether public participation had any adverse effects of service delivery efficiency in local 
government. To explore the answer to this, the research was located within the context of 
Msunduzi Local Municipality (category b) and eThekwini Metropolitan Municipality (category 
a). To guide the research, participatory democracy theory was used as the framework. This 
framework provided the lenses through public participation in local government can be 
understood.... the dissertation is structured as follows.   
Chapter 1 was an introductory chapter which discussed, amongst others, the rationale of the 
research and the research methodology. The methodology was based on qualitative and 
quantitative research techniques, which involved analysis of the literature and gathering of 
empirical data through interviews in both eThekwini Metro and Msunduzi Municipality. The 
collected data was analysed through the Statistical Programme for Social Sciences and discussed 
in the following chapters.  
Chapter 2 was a review of the existing literature on the topic and discussed in detail the theoretical 
framework of the study. Democracy broadly and participatory democracy in particular was 
discussed in order to ground the exploration. The central argument the chapter makes is that the 
participation of citizens is fundamental to the democratic agenda, especially at local government 
level.  
Chapter 3 is historical analysis of the foundations and transformation of local government in South 
Africa. The chapter discussed the various policies and pieces of legislation in relation to democracy 
and service delivery, especially in KwaZulu-Natal local government. The chapter concluded by 
stating that the history of local government in South Africa is a long and complex one, which has 
at its centre issues of race and racism. The role of ideology in shaping local government policies 
and legislation cannot be ignored. Pre-1994, local government was used to reinforce the notion of 
separate development based on the superiority of whites and the subjugation of blacks. In the post-
1994 context, local government has been tasked with a developmental task. Finally, the chapter 
discussed the contested role of traditional leaders in local government.  
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Following from this, Chapter 4 discussed the legislative and policy framework that underpins 
public participation in local government in the post-Apartheid South Africa. The Chapter placed 
at the centre the Constitution of South Africa, from which all the other legislation and policies 
emerge. Instruments such as the Municipal Systems Act, the Municipal Structures Act and other 
related legislation were influenced, to some extent, by global local government planning trends, 
which limited the space for the crafting of truly authentic and contextually relevant instruments.  
Furthermore, Chapter 5 discussed the nexus between public participation and developmental 
planning in local government. The structures and mechanisms of participatory planning, such as 
the IDP and ward committees, came under scrutiny in terms of their functionality. In addition to 
the vulnerability of these structures and mechanisms to political interference or manipulation, the 
chapter also took the view that these place a heavy cost burden on the very limited resources of 
municipalities. There might also be an unnecessary duplication of public participation structures, 
which add to the logjams in terms of decision-making.  
Having dealt with the theoretical discussions, Chapter 6 considered the main issues raised in the 
previous chapters in the context of Msunduzi Local Municipality. The chapter began by providing 
a comprehensive profile of the Msunduzi Municipality. Thereafter, the structures and mechanisms 
of public participation were critiqued in relation to service delivery within the Municipality. In 
conclusion, it was found that the Municipality is characterised by low levels of public participation 
and low levels of efficiency in service delivery, despite demonstrable improvements over the years. 
The finding of a positive link between public participation and service delivery efficiency has to 
be considered in the context of the history of poor governance within the Municipality, which led 
to the place of the Municipality under administration in 2011.  
By the same token, Chapter 7 discussed the research question in the context of eThekwini Metro, 
which is currently the only metro in the province of KZN. The Chapter highlighted amongst others 
that the public participation policy of the Metro is very complex and does not seem to yield any 
real value in terms of promoting effective public participation. This is despite the considerable 
resources that are made available to try and make it work. It was in this chapter that the rural-urban 
divide in terms of public participation and service delivery became clear. Despite the challenges, 
the chapter concluded that the Metro is characterised by service delivery efficiency in the context 
of low public participation levels. However, civil society seems to be more active and effective 
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within the Metro. The overall administrative design of the Metro in terms of clustering the 
municipality into 5 Area-Based Management areas was found to posing some possible challenges 
in terms of participation and service delivery efficiency.  
Chapter 8 discussed the overall findings in relation to the question as to whether public 
participation has any adverse impact on service delivery efficiency in local government. The 
assumptions of the participatory democracy theory were critiqued in relation to the findings of the 
study. Overall, the Chapter makes the point that no clear correlation between public participation 
and service delivery efficiency in local government could be established through this study, based 
on the two case studies. However, the raised questions regarding the structural arrangement of 
local government based on the legislative and policy framework. The argument the chapter 
advanced is that the differentiation of municipalities based on their context has to be considered in 
the design of participation and implementation tools. This also includes questions about the 
relationship between the different tiers of the local government systems, as well as the three 
spheres of government.    
From the aforementioned, this study concludes that participatory democracy, on which the study 
is based and which also informs the design of local government structures and systems, needs to 
be viewed with the context in mind. Whilst the principles of the theory are sound, they cannot be 
said to apply as well in every context. There are contextual nuances that have to be considered in 
the design and implementation of participatory mechanisms. Essentially, participatory democracy 
has to be strengthened through the infusion of realities from developing countries, many of which 
still have traditional institutions that must exist alongside the new.   
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Appendix A: Arnstein’s Ladder of Citizen Participation 
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Appendix B: Msunduzi Municipality Election Results 2000-2011 
Political Party  Election year - 2000  Election year - 2006 Election year - 2011 
African National 
Congress (ANC) 
56.5% 64.62% 65.35% 
African Christian 
Democratic Party 
(ACDP) 
0.83% 1.49% 0.65% 
Democratic Alliance 
(DA)  
23.68% 15.53% 19.18% 
Economic Freedom 
Fighters (EFF) 
-- -- -- 
Inkatha Freedom 
Party (IFP) 
17.63% 14.27% 4.7% 
Minority Front (MF) 0.97% 1.12% 0.71% 
Congress of the 
People (COPE) 
-- -- 0.28% 
National Democratic 
Convention 
(NADECO) 
-- 0.73% 0.14% 
National Freedom 
Party (NFP) 
-- -- 5.13% 
Azanian People’s 
Organization 
(AZAPO) 
-- -- 0.32% 
246 | P a g e  
 
Independent (IND) 3.55% 2.19% 0.39% 
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Appendix C: Msunduzi Area Based Management Plan Boundaries and Ward Boundaries 
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Appendix D: Msunduzi Municipality 2011 Local government Election Results 
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Appendix E: Msunduzi Housing and Human Settlement Budget Plan 2011-2016 
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Appendix F: eThekwini Metropolitan Municipality Election Results 2000-2011 
Political Party  Election year - 2000  Election year - 2006 Election year - 2011 
African National 
Congress (ANC) 
46.93% 57.6% 61.07% 
African Christian 
Democratic Party 
(ACDP) 
1.18% 1.6% 0.74% 
Democratic Alliance 
(DA)  
26.14% 16.66% 21.02% 
Economic Freedom 
Fighters (EFF) 
-- -- -- 
Inkatha Freedom 
Party (IFP) 
17.4% 11.09% 4.13% 
Minority Front (MF) 4.9% 6.22% 5.31% 
Congress of the 
People (COPE) 
   
National Democratic 
Convention 
(NADECO) 
-- -- -- 
National Freedom 
Party (NFP) 
-- -- 4.7% 
Azanian People’s 
Organization 
(AZAPO) 
0.17% 0.24% 0.14% 
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Independent (IND) 0.89% 2.28% -- 
Truly Alliance (TA) -- 0.7% 0.72% 
African People’s 
Congress (APC) 
-- -- 0.3% 
United Action Front 
(UAF) 
-- -- 0.17% 
African Christian 
Alliance (ACA) 
-- -- 0.11% 
Vryheidsfront Plus 
(VF PLUS) 
-- 0.18% 0.08% 
Social Green 
Coalition (SGC) 
-- -- 0.05% 
Black Consciousness 
Party (BCP) 
-- -- 0.05% 
Solidarity Party (SP) -- -- 0.03% 
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Appendix G: eThekwini IDP Process Plan 2016-2017 
 
Month 
  
Details 
   
Legislation 
  
Responsibility 
 
 Estimate           
          
Budget 
 
               
    Submit draft 2016/17     
Corporate Policy 
   
    
Process  Plan for noting  to 
       
     
MSA 31 
 
Unit (CPU) 
   
    
council 
       
       
(1)(a)(b)(c)
( 
      
              
 
July 2015 
 Submit 2016/2017 Process  d)  
CPU 
   
  
Plan to Cogta 
        
              
               
    Advertise Process   Plan     
CPU 
 
R15 972    
2016/2017 
       
             
                
  
Summar
y of IDP 2016/17 MSA CPU  R46 585 
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prepared in plain English 
 
  
25(4)(a),(b) 
 
  
and isiZulu 
      
         
  Plain English and isiZulu 
MFMA:MSC 
   
  
adopted, 
    
CPU 
 
R302 500       
M 
 
  
IDP's printed and distributed 
   
      
  Draft participation plan  for  
CPU, CPAS, 
 
  
internal and 
 
external 
  
   
MSA 29 Communication 
 
  
stakeholders with relevant 
 
  
(1)(b) s, Speakers 
 
  
service units (e.g. CPAS, 
 
   
Offic
e 
  
  
Comm) CBP alignment 
   
      
         
  Present  participation MSA 
CPU 
 
Exco   strategy to exco   30(a)(b)(c)  
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  Zonal Public Participation  
CPU and 
 
        
MSA 
 
        
Communication 
 
  
CBP 
 
alignment and 29(1)(b) 
 
   
s 
  
  
implementation 
     
        
         
            
  Continue Zonal Public MSA 
CPAS and CPU R665 500   
Participation 
   
29(1)(b)         
         
 
August 
Strategic Issues Workshop 
MSA (35) 
CPU, senior  
 
with senior Municipal Municipal R13 310 
2015 (1)(a) 
officials 
    
officials 
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  MEC Panel commences     
  assessment on reviewed  Cogta   
  IDP          
  Draft participation plan for MSA 29 CPU, CPAS, Draft 
  internal and external (1)(b) Communication participation 
  stakeholders with relevant  s, Speakers plan for 
  service units(e.g. CPAS,  
Offic
e  internal and 
  Comm)        external 
           stakeholders 
           with relevant 
           service 
           units(e.g. 
           CPAS, 
           Comm) 
            
  Alignment  of the 2016/17 
MSA 34 
   
  
Process  Plan  with  Budget, CPU, PM&E, 
 
Sept 2015 MFMA 
 
Annual Report Performance Treasury  
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21(2)(a) 
 
  
Management 
      
         
  Prepare  first draft  2016/17      
  IDP based on Strategic MSA 34 CPU    
  Issues Workshop       
September 
Consultatio
n on the IDP 
MSA 29 CPU 
   
2015 with Business (DCCI) 
    
      
             
 October Present  first 2016/17 Draft  
CPU / Plan 
 
2015 IDP to DCM Forum, EXCO, MSA 29(a) 
 
Owners/council 
 
  
Council  and for “Noting  of 30(a)(b)(c) 
 
  
ors/exco 
  
  
Progress
” 
       
           
             
 November Strategic workshop with 
MSA (35) 
    
2015 Plan Owners and Plan CPU    
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(1)(a) 
   
  
Representatives 
      
         
             
 December 
IDP 
 
Best Practice 
MSA     
2015 31(a)(b)(c)( CPU 
   
Conference 
      
     
d) 
    
            
  Prepare second draft 
MSA 34 
CPU/Plan   
  
2016/17 
    
Owner
s 
   
          
        
             
January 
Complet
e second  draft  of 
MSA 34 
CPU / Plan  
2016 2016/17 IDP 
   
Owner
s 
   
      
           
             
  Meeting  Cogta and MSA     
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Municipalities on IDP 
    
  
31(a)(b)(c)( CPU 
   
  
Submission 
  
and 
   
    
d) 
    
February Assessment Process 
     
      
2016 Prepare third 2016/2017      
  IDP draft based on  public 
MSA 34 
CPU/Plan   
  
comment received from 
Owner
s 
   
      
  public participation       
             
  
Advertis
e  third draft 
MSA 
CPU,    
  
2016/2017 IDP in press for Communication R16 637.50   
29(1)(b)   
public comment 
  
s 
   
        
        
 
March 
Third draft 2016/2017 to be  
CPU/Plan 
  
 tabled at DCM forum, exco MSA 34   
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2016 
Owner
s 
   
and council for noting 
     
        
        
  Third draft 2016/2017 to be MSA 
CPU/Plan 
  
  
submitte
d to MEC for 31(a)(b)(c)( 
  
  
Owner
s 
   
  
assessment 
   
d) 
   
         
             
        MSA 
CPU/Plan 
  
  
IDP Assessment by Cogta 31(a)(b)(c)( 
  
  
Owner
s 
   
        
d) 
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Appendix H: Chapter 7 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa  
 
CHAPTER 7 
LOCALG OVERNMENT 
151. Status of municipalities.-(1) The local sphere of government consists of municipalities, 
which must be established for the whole of the territory of the Republic. 
 
(2) The executive and legislative authority of a municipality is vested in its Municipal 
Council. 
 
(3) A municipality has the right to govern, on its own initiative, the local government 
affairs of its community, subject to national and provincial legislation, as provided for in the 
Constitution, 
 
(4) The national or a provincial government may not compromise or impede a municipality’s 
ability or right to exercise its powers or perform its functions. 
 
152. Objects of local government.-(1) The objects of local government are- 
(a) to provide democratic and accountable government for local communities; 
(b) to ensure the provision of services to communities in a sustainable manner; 
(c) to promote social and economic development; 
(d) to promote a safe and healthy environment; and 
(e)  to encourage the involvement of communities and community organisations in 
  the matters of local government. 
 
(2) A municipality must strive, within its financial and administrative capacity, to achieve 
the objects set out in subsection (1). 
 
153. Developmental duties of municipalities.-A municipality must- 
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(a)  structure and manage its administration and budgeting and planning processes 
  to give priority to the basic needs of the community, and to promote the social 
  and economic development of the community; and 
(b) participate in national and provincial development programmes 
 
154. Municipalities in co-operative government.--- 
(1) The national government and provincial governments, by legislative and other 
measures, must support and strengthen the capacity of municipalities to manage their own 
affairs, to exercise their powers and to perform their functions. 
 
(2) Draft national or provincial legislation that affects the status, institutions, powers or 
functions of local government must be published for public comment before it is introduced in 
Parliament or a provincial legislature, in a manner that allows organized local government, 
Municipalities and other interested persons an opportunity to make representations with regard to 
the draft legislation. 
 
155. Establishment of municipalities.--- 
(1) There are the following categories of municipality: 
(a)  Category A: A municipality that has exclusive municipal executive and 
legislative authority in its area. 
(b)  Category B: A municipality that shares municipal executive and legislative 
  authority in its area with a category C municipality within whose area it falls. 
(c)  Category C: A municipality that has municipal executive and legislative 
authority in an area that includes more than one municipality. 
 
(2) National legislation must define the different types of municipality that may be 
established within each category. 
 
(3) National legislation must- 
267 | P a g e  
 
(a) Establish the criteria for determining when an area should have a single 
  category A municipality or when it should have municipalities of both 
  category B and category C; 
(b) establish criteria and procedures for the determination of municipal 
  boundaries by an independent authority; and 
(c) subject to section 229, make provision for an appropriate division of 
  powers and functions between municipalities when an area has  
  municipalities of both category B and category C. A division of powers 
  and functions between a category B municipality and a category C  
  municipality may differ from the division of powers and functions  
  between another category B municipality and that category C  
  municipality. 
 
(4) The legislation referred to in subsection (3) must take into account the need to
 provide municipal services in an equitable 2nd sustainable manner. 
 
(5) Provincial legislation must determine the different types of municipality to be
 established in the province. 
 
(6) Each provincial government must establish municipalities in its province in a manner 
consistent with the legislation enacted in terms of subsections (2) and (3) and, by
 legislative or other measures, must- 
(a)  Provide for the monitoring and support of local government in the  
  province and 
(b) Promote the development of local government capacity to enable  
  municipalities to perform their functions and manage their own affairs. 
 
(6A)If the criteria envisaged in subsection (3) (b) cannot be fulfilled without a municipal
 boundary extending across a provincial boundary— 
(a)  that municipal boundary may be determined across the provincial  
  boundary, but only-- 
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(i)  with the concurrence of the provinces concerned; and 
(ii)  after the respective provincial executives have been authorised by 
  national legislation to establish a municipality within that  
  municipal area; and 
(b) national legislation may-- 
(i)  subject to subsection (3, provide for the establishment in that 
  municipal area of a municipality of a type agreed to between the 
  provinces concerned; 
(ii)  provide a framework for the exercise of provincial executive 
  authority in that municipal area and with regard to that  
  municipality; and 
(iii)  provide for the re-determination of municipal boundaries where 
  one of the provinces concerned withdraws its support of a  
  municipal boundary determined in terms of paragraph (a).  
   [Sub-s. (6A) inserted by s. 1 of Act No. 87 of 1998.] 
 
(7) The national government, subject to section 44, and the provincial governments
 have the legislative and executive authority to see to the effective performance by
 municipalities of their functions in respect of matters listed in Schedules 4 and 5, by
 regulating the exercise by municipalities of their executive authority referred to in section
 156 (1). 
 
156. Powers and functions of municipalities.—(1) A municipality has executive authority in 
respect of, and has the right to administer— 
(a)  the local government matters listed in Part B of Schedule 4 and Part B of 
  Schedule 5; and 
(b) any other matter assigned to it by national or provincial legislation. 
 
(2) A municipality may make and administer by-laws for the effective administration of 
the matters which it has the right to administer. 
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(3) Subject to section 151 (4), a by-law that conflicts with national or provincial
 legislation is invalid. If there is a conflict between a by-law and national or provincial
 legislation that is inoperative because of a conflict referred to in section 149, the by-law
 must be regarded as valid for as long as that legislation is inoperative. 
 
(4) The national government and provincial governments must assign to a municipality, 
by agreement and subject to any conditions, the administration of a matter listed in Part A 
of Schedule 4 or Part A of Schedule 5 which necessarily relates to local government, if— 
 
(a)  that matter would most effectively be administered locally; and 
(b) the municipality has the capacity to administer it. 
 
(5) A municipality has the right to exercise any power concerning a matter reasonably
 necessary for, or incidental to, the effective performance of its functions. 
 
157. Composition and election of Municipal Councils.-( 1 ) Subject to Schedule 6A,a 
Municipal Council consists of— 
(a)  members elected in accordance with subsections (2) and (3); or 
(b)  if provided for by national legislation- 
(i)  members appointed by other Municipal Councils to represent 
  those other 
(ii)  both members elected in accordance with paragraph (a) and 
 members Councils; or appointed in accordance with subparagraph  
 (i) of this paragraph. 
 
(2)  The election of members to a Municipal Council as anticipated in subsection 
(1)(a)must be in accordance with national legislation, which must prescribe a system— 
(a)  of proportional representation based on that municipality’s segment of 
  the national common voters roll, and which provides for the election of 
  members from lists of party candidates drawn up in a party’s order of 
  preference; or 
270 | P a g e  
 
(b)  of proportional representation as described in paragraph (a) combined 
with a system of ward representation based on that municipality’s segment 
of the national common voters roll. 
 
(3) An electoral system in terms of subsection (2) must result, in general, in proportional 
representation.  
  [Sub-s. (3) substituted by s. 1 (b) of Act No. 18 of 2002.] 
 
(4)  (a) If the electoral system includes ward representation, the delimitation of 
   wards must be done by an independent authority appointed in terms of, 
   and operating according to procedures and criteria prescribed by  
   national legislation. 
(b) Where a municipal boundary has been determined in terms of section 
  155 (6A), a ward delimited within that municipal boundary may not 
  extend across the provincial boundary concerned. 
 
[Sub-s. (4) substituted by s. 2 of Act No. 87 of 1998.] 
 
(5) A person may vote in a municipality only if that person is registered on that  
  municipality’s segment of the national common voters roll. 
 
(6) The national legislation referred to in subsection (1) (b) must establish a system that 
  allows for parties and interests reflected within the Municipal Council making the 
  appointment, to be fairly represented the Municipal Council to which the  
  appointment is made. 
 
158. Membership of Municipal Councils.-(I) Every citizen who is qualified to vote for a 
Municipal Council is eligible to be a member of that Council, except— 
(a) anyone who is appointed by, or is in the service of, the municipality and 
  receives remuneration for that appointment or service, and who has not 
  been exempted from this disqualification in terms of national legislation; 
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(b) anyone who is appointed by, or is in the service of, the state in another 
  sphere, and receives remuneration for that appointment or service, and 
  who has been disqualified from membership of a Municipal Council in 
  terms of national legislation; 
(c) anyone who is disqualified from voting for the National Assembly or is 
  disqualified in terms of section 47 (1) (c), (4 or (e) from being a member 
  of the Assembly; 
(d) a member of the National Assembly, a delegate to the National Council of 
  Provinces or a member of a provincial legislature; but this disqualification 
  does not apply to a member of a Municipal Council representing local 
  government in the National Council; or 
(e) a member of another Municipal Council; but this disqualification does not 
  apply to a member of a Municipal Council representing that Council in 
  another Municipal Council of a different category. 
 
(2) A person who is not eligible to be a member of a Municipal Council in terms of 
  subsection (1) (a), (b), (d) or (e) may be a candidate for the Council, subject to 
  any limits or conditions established by national legislation. 
 
159. Terms of Municipal Councils.—(1) The term of a Municipal Council may be no more 
than five years, as determined by national legislation. 
 
(2) If a Municipal Council is dissolved in terms of national legislation, or when its term 
  expires, an election must be held within 90 days of the date that Council was 
  dissolved or its term expired. 
 
(3) A Municipal Council, other than a Council that has been dissolved following an 
  intervention in terms of section 119, remains competent to function from the time 
  it is dissolved or its term expires, until the newly elected Council has been  
  declared elected. 
[S. 159 substituted by s. 1 of Act No. 65 of 1998.] 
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160. Internal procedures.—(1) A Municipal Council— 
  (a)  makes decisions concerning the exercise of all the powers and the  
   performance of all the functions of the municipality; 
 
(b)  must elect its chairperson; 
(Date of commencement: 30 June, 1997) 
(c)  may elect an executive committee and other committees, subject to  
  national legislation; and 
(d)  may employ personnel that are necessary for the effective performance 
  of its functions. 
 
(2)  The following functions may not be delegated by a Municipal Council: 
(a)  The passing of by-laws; 
(b)  the approval of budgets; 
(c)  the imposition of rates and other taxes, levies and duties; and 
(d)  the raising of loans. 
 
(3) (a)  A majority of the members of a Municipal Council must be present before 
   a vote may be taken on any matter. 
 
(b)  All questions concerning matters mentioned in subsection (2) are  
  determined by a decision taken by a Munic.ipa1 Council with a  
  supporting vote of a majority of its members. 
(c)  All other questions before a Municipal Council are decided by a majority 
  of the votes cast. 
 
(4)  No by-law may be passed by a Municipal Council unless- 
(a)  all the members of the Council have been given reasonable notice; and 
(b)  the proposed by-law has been published for public comment. 
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( 5 )  National legislation may provide criteria for determining- 
(a) the size of a Municipal Council; 
(b) whether Municipal Councils may elect an executive committee or any 
  other committee; or 
(c) the size of the executive committee or any other committee of a  
  Municipal Council. 
 
(6) A Municipal Council may make by-law which prescribe rules and orders for- 
(a)  its internal arrangements; 
(b) its business and proceedings; and 
(c)  the establishment, composition, procedures, powers and functions of its 
  committees. 
 
(7)  A Municipal Council must conduct its business in an open manner, and may 
  close its sittings, or those of its committees, only when it is reasonable to do so 
  having regard to the nature of the business being transacted. 
 
(8)  Members of a Municipal Council are entitled to participate in its proceedings 
  and those of its committees in a manner that- 
(a)  allows parties and interests reflected within the Council to be fairly  
  represented; 
(b) is consistent with democracy; and 
(c) may be regulated by national legislation. 
 
161. Privilege.—Provincial legislation within the framework of national legislation may provide 
for privileges and immunities of Municipal Councils and their members. 
 
162. Publication of municipal by-laws.—(1) A municipal by-law may be enforced only after it 
has been published in the official gazette of the relevant province. 
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(2)  A provincial official gazette must publish a municipal by-law upon request by the 
  municipality. 
 
(3)  Municipal by-law must be accessible to the public. 
 
163. Organized local government.—An Act of Parliament enacted in accordance with the 
procedure established by section 76 must 
(a)  provide for the recognition of national and provincial organizations 
  representing municipalities; 
(b) determine procedures by which local government may 
(i)  consult with the national or a provincial government; 
(ii)  designate representatives to participate in the National Council of 
  Provinces; and 
(iii)  participate in the process prescribed in the national legislation 
  envisaged in section 221 (1) (c).  
[Para. (b) substituted by s. 4 of Act No. 61 of 2001.] 
 
164. Other matters.—Any matter concerning local government not dealt with in the 
Constitution may be prescribed by national legislation or by provincial legislation within the 
framework of national legislation. 
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Appendix I: Interview Questions: Civil Society 
1. What is the state of service delivery in the municipality? 
2. Are there mechanisms or channels put in place by the municipality for public 
participation in local government? 
3. How do these work and are they effective? 
4. To what extent does civil society participate in local government service delivery? 
5. In your opinion, what impact does public participation have on service delivery 
efficiency?  
6. How can service delivery be improved in relation to public participation?  
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Appendix J: Interview Questions: Municipal Officials 
Questions: 
1. What services does this municipality provide to citizens? 
2. How effective and efficient is the municipality in providing basic services to the people? 
3. What are the mechanisms and instruments put in place in the municipality regarding 
public participation? 
4. To what extent does the public participate in municipal government processes? 
5. Is the participation of the public effective? 
6. How is the relationship between the municipality and organized formations such as 
political parties and civil society at large in terms of service delivery and participation?  
7. What impact does public participation have on the efficiency of service delivery? 
8. How can service delivery be improved in relation to public participation?  
 
